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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
The passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 significantly
changed the statutory foundation of American preference law.' Sec-
tion 547 mixes new, carefully measured concepts with familiar defini-
tional language from old section 60. The new conceptual structure of
section 547 is a departure from the abstract framework of its predeces-
sor. Under section 60, "worthy" transfers were protected by qualifica-
tions imaginatively grafted by the judges onto the specific elements of
the preference definition. Among the most ingenious, and perhaps
most significant, of these qualifications were those designed to protect
pre-petition transfers incident to various types of financing arrange-
ments. In contrast, section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) is a new
and radical integration of definition and exception. The exceptions are
separately listed in the statute and are not codifications of old case law
qualifications. The new statutory test clearly displaces the old ap-
proach to "worthy" transfers. The use of section 60 language in the
547(b) definition of a preference, however, makes the vitality of old
case law qualifications of this language an open question. The role of
this case law in the new integration is a general concern that runs
throughout the following discussion. Another general concern is the
mechanics of the new integration when transfers normally incident to
commercial financing are involved. What is the proper relationship be-
tween definition and exception in the new integration? How do the sep-
arate exceptions which may affect commercial financing relate to one
another? Although the language of each exception suggests an isolated
application, in a typical commercial financing arrangement several ex-
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. J, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (current version codified at 11 U.S.C.
101 to 151326 (Supp. V 1981)). Of principal concern are those sections of the "Code" dealing
with "Preferences" (§ 547) and "Definitions" (§ 101).
Section 401(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act repealed the prior Bankruptcy Act. Pub. L. No.
95-598, tit. IV, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). For most substantive purposes, the repeal
was effective on October 1, 1979. The "Bankruptcy Act" is the common name given to "An Act to
Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United States." Act of July 1, 1898, ch.
541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). For comparison purposes, the most important sections of the
"Act" were § 60 (Preferred Creditors) and § I (Meaning of Words and Phrases). The words
"Bankruptcy Act" or "Act," when used in this Article, refer to the statutory provisions of the 1898
Act that were repealed in 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). The
words "Bankruptcy Code" and "Code" are used in this Article to refer to the current provisions
enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 151326 (Supp. V 1981)
(amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1255 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)).
[Vol. 6 1:1
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ceptions may be brought into play. This Article systematically exam-
ines the many specific problems within these broad topic areas in an
effort to provide helpful solutions. Before these problems are discussed
in more detail, however, some background is needed to give perspective
to the new integration.
B. Background
Preference law has always had an intriguing structure. Its founda-
tion has always been legislative, but its shape and detail historically
have been fashioned by case law.' Between 1898 and 1978, when the
new Code was enacted, section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act was the statu-
tory foundation for preference law.' From the beginning, section 60
was highly conceptual, lacking a specific list of either included or ex-
2. The first American bankruptcy statute was the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 19
(repealed 1803). It copied existing English laws and therefore contained no mention of prefer-
ences. Neither, however, did this first statute specifically save bona fide payments in the ordinary
course: which were protected under existing English law. Despite the absence of a statutory base,
case law developed in the early part of the nineteenth century which proscribed certain preferen-
tial transfers as "fraudulent." See, e.g., Locke v. Winning, 3 Mass. 324 (1807).
A statutory definition of preference first appeared in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5
Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). The preference, treated in the manner of a fraudulent conveyance, was
an "act of bankruptcy." The elements of this first statutory definition included the requirements
that bankruptcy be contemplated and that the debtor intend to prefer or give priority. The case
law under the 1841 Act, however, emphasized presumed intention derived from the financial posi-
tion of the debtor before and after the transfer, rather than the actual purpose of the transfer. See,
e.g., Everett v. Stone, 8 F. Cas. 898 (C.C.D. Me. 1844) (No. 4577); Peckham v. Burrows, 19 F. Cas.
S5 (C.C.D. R.I. 1844) (No. 10,897); Arnold v. Maynard, I F. Cas. 1181 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No.
561).
Influenced by prior case law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 moved away from fraudulent purpose
and adopted the familiar but highly theoretical framework of section 60. For the case law ori-
ented history of preference law before the 1898 Act, see In re Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. R. 671, 679-88
(W.D.N.Y. 1900). Section 60 itself has been little more than a foundation for a case law exposi-
tion of the various elements. See McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: .An Expression
of Doubt. 67 VA. L. REv. 249, 249-59 (1981).
3. Section 60 was amended six tunes prior to its ultimate repeal by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act. The amendments of 1903, 1910, and 1926 were aimed at strengthening the law against se-
cured creditors who attempted to appropriate the debtor's assets on the eve of bankruptcy. See J.
MAcLACHLN N, BANKRUPTCY § 257 (1956). The amendments of 1938 took a more significant step
in that same direction, The Chandler Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 940 (1938). The
Chandler Act provided that the trustee could claim the standing of a bona fide purchaser against
transfers "unperfected" at bankruptcy. It further provided that transfers "perfected" before the
petition were "deemed" made when so "perfected." The 1950 amendments modified the Chan-
dler Act by specifying that transfers of personalty were deemed made when they were so far
perfected that no "lien ... attainable by legal or equitable proceedings. . . could become supe-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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eluded transfers.4 Section 60 case law soon developed a life of its own,
nearly independent of the language of the section.5
Independent expansion of these protective case law concepts was
both natural and predictable. Expanding credit requirements in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the development of
security arrangements which extended the notion of collateral to in-
clude replacements and additions acquired after the original under-
standing.6 When the debtor's assets were by nature constantly turning
tior...." Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, 64 Stat. 24, 27 (1950). For other changes made by the
1950 amendments, see J. MACLACHLAN, supra at 262.
For a discussion of the 1903 amendment to § 57(g) of the Act, see infra notes 161-66 and accom-
panying text.
4. The Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 provided:
Sec. 60 Preferred Creditors.
a A person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has
procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of any person, or
made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the enforcement of such judg-
ment or transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class.
b If a bankrupt shall have given a preference within four months before the filing of
a petition, or after the filing of the petition and before the adjudication, and the person
receiving it, or to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall have had reason-
able cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference, it shall be voida-
ble by the trustee, and he may recover the property or its value from such person.
c If a creditor has been preferred, and afterwards in good faith gives the debtor
further credit without security of any kind for property which becomes a part of the
debtor's estates, the amount of such new credit remaining unpaid at the time of the
adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off against the amount which would otherwise be
recoverable from him.
See also Healy, The Floating Lien Controversy in the Courts: Judicial Response to the Preference
Problem, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 265, 269-72 (1969).
5. See, e.g., Piie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438 (1901); Kimball v. E.A.
Rosenham Co., 114 F. 85 (8th Cir. 1902); C.S. Morey Mercantile Co. v. Schiffer, 114 F. 447 (8th
Cir. 1902); Gans v. Ellison, 114 F. 734 (3d Cir. 1902); Dickson v. Wyman, 111 F. 726 (1st Cir.
1901); McKey v. Lee, 105 F. 923 (7th Cir. 1901). See infra text accompanying notes 161-75. Later
decisions dating the time of transfer served to protect the floating lien and other collateral trans-
fers incident to after-acquired property financing. See, e.g., In re Portland Newspaper Publishing
Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Or. 1967), a f'dsub nom. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
1969); Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Skilton,
Security Interests in After-4cquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 WIs. L.
REv. 925, 970-86.
6. 1 G. GILMORE, SEcuirry INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 2.3-2.5 (1965); Cohen &
Gerber, The After-AcquiredProperty Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1939); Skilton, Tradition and
Change: The Law ofMortgages on Merchandise, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 359, 402-21. The enforcement
of after-acquired property clauses was often denied in the courts because of the possible injury to
unsecured creditors without notice. See, e.g., Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E.
127 (1907); Skilton, supra, at 386-402; Stiller, Inventory and.4ccounts Receivable Financing: The
Maryland Maze, 18 MD. L. Rav. 185, 206 (1958); Note, The Validity o/a Chattel Mortgage Given
on a Stock of Goods, 20 NOTRE DAME LAW., 84, 87-88 (1944).
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over, as in the case of accounts or inventory, this extension was often
critical.7
The circumstances which prompted the development of an extended
concept of security encouraged the fashioning of a flexible debt obliga-
tion geared to inevitable fluctuations in the value of the collateral. A
regular sequence of advances and payments became common within
the context of secured financing, whether the debtor's collateral was by
nature constantly shifting or merely subject to occasional expansion
and substitution. At the time these arrangements became important,
the language of section 60 did not provide a specific foundation for
their protection.8 Nevertheless, section 60, along with its case law cor-
rolaries, might have worked adequately if the hodgepodge structure of
American security law had not changed. In 1950, when old section 60
was last amended, radical surgery on security law was, however, al-
ready underway. The structure and terminology of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) ushered in a new approach to familiar financing
devices. After-acquired property financing and a running account con-
cept of credit fell within a new set of facilitating rules. Unfortunately,
the terminology and structure of financing under Article 9 of the UCC
was foreign to the language of section 60. Cases attempting reconcilia-
tion of the two laws produced one-sided solutions and bent the lan-
guage of both statutes almost to the breaking point. A committee of the
National Bankruptcy Conference charged with exploring a coordina-
tion of the statutes reported: "[Pirospects for working through to an
intermediate position. . . through a case law development do not ap-
pear to be particularly bright. If a fair and sensible resolution of the
underlying policy issues is available,. . . a statutory revision is indi-
cated. . ... I This suggested legislative coordination was absorbed
7. For accounting purposes, inventories and receivables are often lumped along with cash in
the "current assets" classification. T. FIFLES & H. KRiPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS
56 (1971). Although liquid, these assets are not ephemeral. The investment of a business enter-
prise in a standing inventory is a long term relatively fixed investment. Similarly, the credit in-
vestment in receivables normally fluctuates only within defined limits. Long term capital is
required to sustain both of these investments. Kripke, Current Assets Financing as a Source of
Long-Term Capital, 36 MINN. L. REv. 506, 510-12 (1952).
8. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, (pt. 1), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 202-04 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION RE-
PORT (pt. 1)]. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, (pt. 2), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT (pt. 2)]. See also Healy, supra note 4, at 278-79.
9. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF
Number 1]
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into the general revision of bankruptcy law and procedure begun in
1968.10 Between the formation of the Commission to Study the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States and the final passage of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, several revisions of the preference section
were proposed.11 The study of the step-by-step development of the
preference section from early proposals to its present form reveals far
more about congressional intent than does the more visible legislative
history.' 2 As noted at the outset, the statute that finally emerged, de-
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT (1970), reprintedin APPENDIX,
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 204, 208 (1977) [hereinafter cited as the GILMORE COM-
MITTEE REPORT].
10. Senate Joint Resolution 100 called for the creation of a Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States. The resolution was favorably reported out of the Committee on the
Judiciary. S. REP. No. 1529, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The resolution, S.J. Res. 88, passed the
Senate on June 20, 1969. 115 CONG. REC. 16,717-18 (1969). The Senate Joint Resolution became
law on July 24, 1970. Joint Resolution to Create a Commission to Study the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
11. The first such proposal introduced was § 4-607 of the Commission Bill. See COMMISSION
REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 166-75. The Commission Bill was originally introduced in 1973.
See H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 33,445 (1973). A bill supported by the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges was introduced in 1975. See S. 235, 94th Cong. 1st
Sess., 120 CONG. REC. H9249 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Judges' Bill]. The Judges' Bill also dealt
with preferences in § 4-607. Important parts of the preference provision in both bills are com-
pared and criticized in Kronman, The Treatment of Security Interests in After-Acquired Property
Under the ProposedBankruptcyAct, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 110 (1975). A House of Representatives
resolution was introduced in early 1977. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 125 (1977).
Section 547 appears again in H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), and in final form after H.R.
8200 was amended. See Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547, 92 Stat. 2549, 2597-2600
(1978). See infra note 12.
12. The most visible and frequently cited legislative history is the commentary in the first
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY accompanying S. 2266. See S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as the SENATE REPORT]; REPORT OF HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY accompanying H.R. 8200, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 were the last stages of a legislative process formally begun in 1970 with
the establishment of a Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. See supra note
10. Part 2 of the Commission's Report was a proposed new Bankruptcy Act. See supra note 8.
The Commission's bill was introduced in the 93d Congress as H.R. 10792 and S. 2565. An alter-
native proposal was drafted by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and introduced as
H.R. 16643 in the 93d Congress. Both the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill were reintroduced
in the 94th Congress as H.R. 31 (S. 236) and H.R. 32 (S. 235). Both the House and Senate held
hearings on the bills between February, 1975 and May, 1976.
As a result of these hearings a bill which attempted a synthesis was drafted and introduced in
the 95th Congress on January 4, 1977 as H.R. 6. This bill was marked up by the House Subcom-
mittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary. C. BUTLER, MIN-
UTES OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ON H.R. 6, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
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spite the reenactment of key phrases from section 60, differed radically
in both structure and content from its predecessor. In opting for a list
of protected preferential transfers, Congress abandoned earlier at-
tempts to include exceptions by tinkering with the definition of a pref-
erence. Congress did not adopt a totally new vocabulary to define a
preference in section 547(b), realizing perhaps that some of the section
60 wisdom was still valuable. It must be emphasized, however, that
Congress did not intend to integrate two sets of exceptions, one derived
from the statutory list in section 547(c), the other from section 60 case
law. " The applicability of these old decisions creates doubt and confu-
sion concerning the scope of the new preference definition. Both the
history and design of section 547 indicate that the section 547(c) excep-
tions cannot meaningfully be applied until after a section 547(b) prefer-
ence is found. A radical integration of the two subsections is called for.
C The Radical Integration-Some Discouraging Signs
The new structure should herald a tighter, more literal construction
of the familiar definitional language in section 547(b). In addition, new
facilitating rules need to be developed for section 547(c). Early cases
are not encouraging. They suggest that protective and ambiguous case
law concepts borrowed from section 60 are still being used to shelter
transfers not specifically excepted in section 547(c). Also, the relation-
ship between the various exceptions in section 547(c) apparently is not
well understood. If these early cases suggest a trend, the result could be
a preference law so oblique, cumbersome, and inefficient that it is no
longer worth the cost and effort of its administration.
Signs on the legislative front are also discouraging. A creditor-
backed challenge to the new structure had significant support in the
second session of the Ninety-Seventh Congress. On May 27, 1982 a
Senate committee favorably reported on Senate bill S. 2000 which
would inject the old "reasonable cause to believe" requirement back
into the new section 547 structure.' 4 This and other proposed substan-
(available in the Washington and Lee University School of Law Library) [hereinafter cited as
MARK-UP MINUTES]. Following this mark up, the bill was reintroduced as H.R. 7330 on May 23,
1977 and then as H.R. 8200 on July 1I, 1977, The House passed H.R. 8200 on February 1, 1978.
In the Senate, the synthesis bill, &. 2266, was passed on September 7, 1978 as an amendment to
H.R. 8200. After additional amendments by both the House and Senate, H.R. 8200 was passed by
the Senate on October 5, 1978 and by the House on October 6, 1978.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 40-75.
14, See sura note 24 for the elements of a § 60 preference. S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
10 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:1
tive changes to the new Code will almost certainly be reintroduced in
the Ninety-Eighth Congress. While minor problems do exist in the
new structure, the legislative response recommended in the committee
report on S. 2000 is overkill. If the Ninety-Eighth Congress enacts the
change recommended in S. 2000 it will strike a crippling blow to the
equality principle so central to the new structure. The potentially more
efficient structure of section 547 will be undermined before it has a
chance to prove itself.15 If the new structure does not survive these
Sess. (1982). The most controversial provisions of S. 2000 dealt with restrictions on the availabil-
ity of discharge in consumer bankruptcies. These proposed changes became entangled in the dis-
pute on how to deal with the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). Supporters of S. 2000 wished to append these
substantive changes to the bills which dealt with the jurisdiction question. The House Judiciary
Committee insisted on and approved a "clean" jurisdiction bill, H.R. 6978. H. REP. No. 807, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Representative Butler introduced two bills, H.R. 7294 and H.R. 7349,
which were intended as compromises. These bills contained less severe restrictions on consumer
bankruptcies. The latter bill contained an amendment to the preference section which would have
contained a "small amount" exception, suggested by the consumer credit industry, whereby the
trustee could not avoid aggregate transfers to a particular creditor of less than $1000. No action
was taken on these bills, and the 97th Congress adjourned sine die without taking any final action
on any bills dealing with the jurisdiction issue or the substantive consumer bankruptcy
amendments.
15. The hearings on S. 2000 indicate that early experience with the new act pointed up three
minor problems. First, many ordinary course payments on consumer obligations did not qualify
for the protection under § 547(c)(2) and recovery of these relatively small amounts did not signifi-
cantly increase the distributable estate. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Sub.
comm on Courts of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 68-69 (statement of
Jonathan M. Landers, Claude Rice & Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr.), 158 (statement on behalf of American
Retail Federation and National Retail Merchants Ass'n), 181-82 (statement of Fred M. Haden,
NAFCU), 249-51 (preliminary report of the Committee on the Avoiding Powers of the National
Bankruptcy Conference), 244-45 (testimony of Leonard Rosen), 254-55 (statement of Irving
Sulmeyer) (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Reform Act Hearings]. Second, § 547(c)(2) did not
adequately protect a few ordinary course commercial credit arrangements. Id at 244-45 (testi-
mony of Leonard Rosen); id at 254-55, (testimony of Irving Sulmeyer). Third, a mechanical use
of § 547 by the trustee in a Chapter 11 reorganization often defeated the overall purpose of the
reorganization. Id at 249-50. The advocates for reform who addressed these minor problems all
stopped short of recommending that "reasonable cause to believe" be restored as a § 547(b) ele-
ment. The National Bankruptcy Conference explicitly recommended against such a change. Id
at 249. The only consistent advocate of this drastic across the board alteration of the new struc-
ture was the American Bankers Association. Id at 150 (statement of Walter W. Vaughan, Ameri-
can Bankers Ass'n). This position, however, cannot fairly be regarded as a new criticism of § 547
because the American Bankers Association vigorously opposed the elimination of this element
when the section was drafted. See Bankruptcy ReformAct of 1978 Hearings Before the Subcomm,
on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 576
(1977). But see Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1148, 1167 (1981).
The change recommended in S. 2000 seems poorly conceived. It inadvertently changes even old
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/1
PREFERENCE RULES
attempts by creditors to undermine it by legislation or judicial con-
struction, the preference concept might just as well be eliminated from
bankruptcy law altogether. 6
As an alternative to the elimination or compromise of the new pref-
erence law, a more efficient, mechanical integration of section 547 lan-
guage is advanced in this Article. Such an integration would
emphasize equality of distribution and provide a more efficient system
of recapture. Unlike the situation under section 60, transfers subject to
recapture could be predicted with greater certainty. The trustee would
be discouraged from challenging transfers clearly within protected cat-
egories. Where Congress intended recapture, the trustee's evidentiary
and economic burdens would be minimized. 17 Many of the premises
underlying this integration may seem a radical departure from familiar
preference law. These premises, however, are consistent with the struc-
ture that Congress chose for its new preference section.
This Article is presented in defense of the new integration of prefer-
ence law and may serve as a guide to its purpose and operation when
the various transfers incident to commercial financing are involved. In
particular, security arrangements involving after-acquired property will
be scrutinized. The Article has five major sections. First, the new
structure of section 547 is introduced.'" Second, drawing from the leg-
islative history of section 547, the premise is advanced that the new
structure of section 547 has displaced much of the haphazard case law
Act law that was left undisturbed by the Code. Section 67(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act allowed the
trustee to avoid judicial liens arising during the cntical period whether or not the creditor-lienor
had "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent." 11 U.S.C. § 67(a)(1) (1976 &
Supp. 11 1978). One of the consolidations made possible by the elimination of the reasonable
cause to believe requirement from § 547 was the elimination of this separate avoidance power.
See COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 172. The substance of the law was not changed
because without the "reasonable cause to believe" element § 547 can be used for any recapture in
which § 67(a)(1) might have been necessary under the old Act. If S. 2000 passes, judicial liens
arising within the ninety-day period will not be avoidable unless the creditor-lienor had "reason-
able cause to believe." There is no reason to make the avoidability of these involuntary lien
transfers dependent on the creditor's perception.
The effect of the amendment on the overall structure of new § 547 was not carefully considered.
The proposed changes would make much of § 547(c) unnecessary and further complicate applica-
tion of § 547(c)(5). The more significant damage, however, would be the lost efficiency in prefer-
ence recapture which was the major reason for the change in the 1978 Code. See infra text
accompanying notes 24-39 & note 46.
16. McCoid, supra note 2, at 262-73.
17. Id at 262-68.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-39.
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interpreting the definitional language transplanted from section 60.19
Third, with an eye toward commercial financing arrangements, the in-
tegration of old case law and the new preference definition is carefully
analyzed. 2° Fourth, the exceptions in section 547(c) are briefly de-
scribed, and, with the aid of examples, their separate impact and inte-
grated effect on commercial financing is explored.2' Finally, an overall
theory of integration for section 547(b) and all the relevant exceptions
in section 547(c) is described and illustrated by more complex
examples.22
II. THE SUMMARY OF THE NEW STRUCTURE
A. The Important Subsections
As it affects commercial financing, new section 547 has three impor-
tant subsections.23 Subsection (b) lists the elements of a preference.
Subsection (e) contains the rules for determining when a "transfer" oc-
curs in cases where the transferee must comply with state recording,
notice, or documentation requirements in order to get a measure of
protection against third parties. Transfers are preferences if they occur
within the critical period, actually or by virtue of subsection (e), and if
they meet the other requirements of subsection (b). Subsection (c) con-
tains a list of "worthy" preferential transfers which are nonetheless
unavoidable.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 40-75.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 76-236.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 237-319.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 320-46.
23. Three additional subsections within § 547 are significant but will have limited or only
indirect impact on commercial financing. Subsection (a) contains definitions of terms including
"new value" and "receivables." Subsection (d) deals with transfers to secure reimbursement of a
surety who gives a bond or other obligation for the purpose of dissolving an avoidable judicial
lien. Subsection (f) contains a presumption of insolvency during the 90 days prior to bankruptcy,
See infra note 30.
A proposal for a new section 547(g) was introduced in the Ninety-Seventh Congress as part of
the 1981 Technical Amendments. The purpose of proposed subsection (g) is to expressly allocate
the burdens of proof in § 547. The burdens of proof expressly detailed in proposed subsection (g)
can, however, be inferred from the present structure. The comments accompanying the Technical
Amendments make clear that proposed subsection (g) merely "clarifies" existing law. See S. REP.
No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981). The House had previously passed a different version of a
prior Senate bill, containing the same proposed clarification of § 547. See S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., §48f (1980), as passed by the House. See H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1980). Senate bill S. 863 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee but was not acted on
before the end of the session.
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B. The Section 547(b) Definilion
For the most part, the terms used to state the elements of a prefer-
ence have been transplanted from section 60 of the old Act. 4 A "trans-
fer" of "property of the debtor" is required.2 5 The transfer must be "to
or for the benefit of a creditor" and "for or on account of an antecedent
debt.",2 6
The transfer must be made while the debtor is insolvent and within
the newly defined "critical periods" before bankruptcy. 7 In the case of
an ordinary creditor-transferee, the critical pre-petition preference pe-
riod is shortened from four months to ninety days. If the creditor is an
insider, the period is extended to one year.2S For any transfer within
the ninety-day period, whether or not the creditor is an insider, the
trustee does not have to prove, as he did under the old Act, that the
creditor receiving the preference had "reasonable cause to believe" the
debtor was insolvent at the time of transfer.29 The Code retains the old
24. Briefly, the elements of a preference under section 60 of the Act were: (I) a transfer of the
debtor's property, (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt, (3) made within four months of the
petition, (4) while the debtor was insolvent, (5) to or for the benefit of the creditor, (6) which
transfer enabled the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the
same class. If these elements were present, the trustee could avoid the preference if at the time of
the transfer the creditor had "'reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent."
25. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp V 1981). The phrase "property of the debtor" is transplanted
from § 60(a) of the Act. "Property of the debtor" is not defined in the Code, but "property of the
estate" is described broadly in § 541. Id § 541. The debtor's exempt property did not become
property of the estate under § 70 of the old Act, but under new § 541 all of the debtor's property
becomes property of the estate, including exempt property. The fact that transferred property may
ultimately be exempted under § 522 does not preclude its recovery by the trustee if the transfer
was preferential. If the trustee refuses or neglects to challenge a preferential transfer of debtor's
exempt property, the debtor may avoid to the extent that he could have exempted the transferred
property under § 522(g)(1). See Id § 522(h) (Supp. IV 1981).
26. Id. § 547(b)(1), (2) (Supp IV 1981). Cases dealing with the "for or on account of an
antecedent debt" element under § 60 of the Act often struggled to "refine" this phrase in order to
protect certain "w'orthy" transactions. In light of the new relationship between the tightly drawn
elements in § 547(b) and the specific exceptions for worthy transactions in subsection (c), these
case-. should not be carried over into § 547(b). See infra text accompanying notes 40-75.
27. I1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3),(4) (Supp. IV 1981). Although the trustee must prove the debtor's
in olvency, he is now aided by the presumption of § 547(0. See infra note 30.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 1981). "Insider" is defined expansively in
§ 101(25) to include most of the incidents of blood relationship, management, or control. Id
§ 10 1(25). This definition would include financing agencies which were "affiliates" of the debtor.
Id § 101(2). Between one year and 90 days before bankruptcy, the trustee can only avoid trans-
fersN to insiders if he proves they have reasonable cause to believe the debtor is insolvent.
29. A recent Senate proposal seeks to restore the reasonable cause to believe requirement.
For a discussion on the damaging impact of such a change on the new § 547 structure, see supra
note 15.
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Act's requirement that the debtor be insolvent at the time of transfer.
The trustee, however, has the benefit of a presumption that the debtor
was insolvent during the ninety days prior to bankruptcy.30
The final requirement in old section 60(a)(1), that the transferee ob-
tain a greater percentage of his debt than "some other creditors of the
same class," has been replaced by a more inclusive and mechanical
"receives more" test. Improvement is measured by a simple compari-
son between liquidation positions. A creditor is preferred if he "re-
ceives more" than he would have received fthe transfer had not been
made and the creditor were instead receiving a distribution in a chapter
7 bankruptcy liquidation.31
As a result of these substantive changes, section 547(b) classifies far
more transfers as preferences than did section 60(a) of the old Act.
These changes are consistent with the overall structure of the new pref-
erence scheme because section 547(b) is only the initial step in deter-
mining whether transfers are in fact avoidable. Some of these transfers
will nonetheless be protected by section 547(c).
C The Timing Rule in Section 547(e)
New section 547(e) further contributes to the greater inclusiveness of
the section 547(b) definition, particularly in cases involving after-ac-
quired property financing. Section 547(e) determines the time of trans-
fer when the transferee must comply with state recording or notice
requirements and abandons the "so far perfected" language of section
60(a)(2) by overruling its case law corrolaries. Instead, the Code dates
the transfer at "perfection" or at the time of actual transfer if perfection
occurs within ten days. Perfection is defined with respect to personal
property as the time after which a simple contract creditor could not,
under state law, obtain a judicial lien prior to the transferee's interest.
Section 547(e)(3), however, prevents the transfer from occurring before
the debtor acquires rights in the property being transferred.
Thus, section 547(e) overrules section 60 case law which dated the
time of transfer at recording, even if this occurred before the debtor
30. 11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (Supp. IV 1981). This presumption shifts the burden of going forward
with the evidence on insolvency from the trustee to the creditor-transferee. See FED. R. EVID.
301. Although the trustee shoulders the ultimate burden of proof, unless the creditor comes for-
ward with evidence of solvency, the trustee will prevail on the strength of the presumption.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 125-31.
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acquired the property.32 By postponing the date of transfer, this section
helps expand the reach of section 547(b). First, through the abandon-
ment of these artificial devices, more transfers will occur within the
critical period. Moreover, the delaying of these transfer dates will
make more transfers "for or on account of antecedent debt."
D. The Exceptions in Section 547(c)
Operating in conjunction with the more inclusive and mechanical
sweep of sections 547(b) and 547(e), section 547(c) contains a list of
specific exceptions for worthy transfers. But for the mitigating effect of
section 547(c), the sweeping efficiencies resulting from the changes in
sections 547(b), 547(e), and 547(f) would result in hardship to transfer-
ees who are congressionally identified as being engaged in "worthy"
ordinary course transactions. At the same time, section 547(c) need be
consulted only if a preferential transfer has been established under sec-
tion 547(b).33
The language of section 547(c) is often difficult to navigate, but
it is aimed at six different types of "worthy" transfers:
(1) Substantially contemporaneous exchanges, 34
(2) Ordinary course payments for "like-cash" obligations incurred
in the ordinary course,"-
(3) Enabling loans which are preferences because of section
547(e),36
(4) Credit against preferential transfers because of subsequent new
value given to the debtor,37
(5) Transfers of floating lien collateral which do not produce a prej-
udicial improvement of position,3 8
(6) Statutory liens unless elsewhere invalidated.39
32. For a detailed discussion of the effect of § 547(e)(3), see infra text accompanying notes
81-112.
33. The proposed Technical Amendments expressly allocate the burden of proof between
creditor and trustee on the assumption that the elements of § 547(b) must be established by the
trustee before the basis for an exception needs to be demonstrated by the creditor. See supra note
23.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 237-66.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) ISupp. IV 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 267-71.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 272-83.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 284-95.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 296-319.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1981).
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The impact of these exceptions on commercial financing, especially
those arrangements which rely on after-acquired property, are explored
in the balance of this Article. The most important point bearing on the
integration of the new preference scheme is developed in the next sec-
tion. The clear implication from the new structure of the preference
section is that section 547(c) contains the exclusive list of exceptions to
avoidable preferences. Case law exceptions engrafted into the defini-
tional language of old section 60 should not be injected into the
retooled elements of new section 547(b).
III. THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF SECTIONS 547(b) AND 547(c) IN THE
NEW INTEGRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Preface
Although the new preferences section arms the trustee with a broader
definition of a preference, the definition contained in old section 60(a)
was itself broad.' To temper the breadth of this original definition, the
courts developed a body of imaginative, if less than forthright, case law
which classified certain transfers as not within the definitional language
of section 60. Since section 60 contained no list of protected transfers,
this imaginative judicial approach to working and reworking the ele-
ments of a preference was the only means of protecting many transfers.
The history of new section 547(c) demonstrates that Congress in-
tended to abandon such devices. Consistent with the case law, initial
drafts of the preference section continued to build exceptions into the
definitional elements of a preference. The drafters, however, aban-
doned this approach and ultimately created a new section containing a
list of protected transfers. Despite the borrowing of critical phrases
from the section 60 definition of a preference, the legislative history
taken as a whole indicates that the list of protected transfers in section
547(c) was intended as the exclusive list of exceptions. 4'
Limiting protected transfers to the statutory list is critical to the suc-
cess of the new preference scheme. The cornerstone of the new prefer-
ence section is the principle of equality of distribution based on fairness
40. See supra note 4.
41. The enactment of a new statutory structure which relies, in part, on language trans-
planted from a predecessor statute does not necessarily create a presumption that the enacting
legislature adopted the prior construction of the transplanted language. Llewellyn, Remarks on
the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 4bout how Statutes are to be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395, 403 (1950). See infra text accompanying notes 68-70.
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and perhaps economic utility. 2 Unlike section 60, section 547 does not
merely arm the trustee with the power to avoid transfers to creditors
who have "behaved badly" by accepting payments with notice of the
debtor's insolvency or by participating in the race of diligence.43 In-
42. To the economist, behavior which maximizes aggregate utility is "efficient." Efficiency in
a rule regulating behavior is a positive or "good" characteristic. The group of all creditors of an
insol'ent debtor would be better off by maximizing the total of payments to all creditors. When
going concern value exceeds liquidation value this is best accomplished by a proportionately equal
allocation of the debtor's assets paid out of the debtor's ongoing income stream. The most effi-
cient model for the creditors as a group, therefore, would be one which discouraged individual
creditors from seeking full payment. On the other hand, if each creditor could act for his separate
individual benefit many would and the result might be the debtor's premature liquidation, thus
frustrating the operation of the most efficient behavior model for the creditors as a group.
For the economist this is a prisoner's dilemma problem. If efficiency is important to the
lawmaker the appropriate response would be to impose the outcome that is best for the creditors
as a group. The best response would be to remove incentives to individual creditors to seek pay-
ment in full when the debtor was insolvent, whether or not the creditors seeking full payment were
fully aware of the debtor's predicament. The rule should require all creditors to return all prefer-
ences unless particular payments or transfers to individual creditors had the effect of making the
economic model more efficient for the creditors as a group. Subsection (b) could be viewed as a
broadly effective disincentive to the disruptive behavior of individual creditors.
The exceptions in § 547(c), on the other hand, would protect transfers that tend within a limited
time frame to return equivalent value to the group of all creditors, that is, preserve the going
concern value. In fact, each of the (c) exceptions involves an equivalent return to the debtor
which generally is associated with the continuation of the business, such as short term trade credit
and other "like-cash" transactions, sale and aquisition of inventory, liquidation and creation of
accounts, purchase money loans, and credit advances after payments.
43. Statements to this effect are found throughout the drafting history of § 547. The Com-
nusNion Report favorably cited a Canadian study which had concluded: "it should be modified so
as to provide a more comprehensive and equitable system. When a preference is given within the
\uspect period, intention should be irrelevant. No creditor should, for any reason, improve his
position, at the expense of other creditors, within the suspect period .. " REPORT OF THE
STUDY COIMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION-CANADA (1970), reprinted
In COMMISSION REPORT (pt. I), supra note 8, at 203. The principle of equality was endorsed by
those who supported the legislative reform. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act, 1975: Hearings on
S 2.75 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comn on the Judiciar, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 101-02 (1975) (statement of then Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad Cyr on behalf of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Senate Hearings]; Bankruptcy Act Revision, 1977 Hearings on H.R. 31 andHR. 32 Before the
Subcomm on Cil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
1851 (1976) (statement of Leon Forman on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference) [here-
inafter cited as 1976 House Hearings]. The clearest statements of the preeminence of principle of
equality of distribution may be found in the MARK-UP MINUTES, supra note 12, at 550-51, 561
(statements of Mr. Klee).
In a recent case, a bankruptcy court correctly interpreted the underlying policy of preference
avoidance in stating, "[i]t has never been contended that preference recovery is fair to the pre-
ferred creditor it is those creditors which did not receive payment within the preference period
that are aided by a preference recovery action." In re Anders, 20 Bankr. 468, 469 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1982). The occurrence of bankruptcy is in the truest sense unfair to all unpaid creditors. The
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stead, section 547 comes closer to the principle that all creditors ought
to be treated equally. Other considerations not tied to the creditor's
level of perception nevertheless prevented the adoption of a pure
equality rule. Congress protected certain transfers to creditors, simply
through a desire to protect and stabilize certain transactions essential to
continuation of the business, especially in credit supported enter-
prises.4" These protected transfers, however, are similar to each other
in another important aspect. Not only has Congress declared these
transfers essential, but it has also built in guarantees that the creditor
supply the debtor with equivalent value.45 Both requirements are cen-
tral to the legislative premise behind the integration of sections 547(b)
and 547(C).46
purpose of the new bankruptcy section is to achieve greater fairness by spreading the costs more
evenly. This fact is continually obscured by the proponents of the drastic changes in S. 2000. For
example, Mr. Norman Grant, Executive Director of the Kansas Retail Council, has described
§ 547 as "annoying and inequitable .. " 1981 Reform Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 158. Per-
mitting certain creditors to keep these payments is "inequitable" and "annoying" to the greater
number of unpreferred creditors.
Those objective parties opposed to the drastic legislative assault on the preference scheme have
argued to retain the basic equality principle underlying § 547 and to withstand the desires of
special creditor interests. One such person has reminded us that: "[tihe equality principle is the
most important principle of the preference section. It should be the guiding light, dimmed by
protection of ordinary course of business transactions only where necessary." 1981 Reform Act
Hearings, supra note 15, at 302 (statement of Mr. Levin).
44. COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 1), supra note 8, at 219; MARK-UP MINUTES, supra note 12, at
552, 562-63 (Statements of Mr. Klee); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 101-02 (statement of
then Bankruptcy Judge Cyr).
45. In § 547(c)(1) an excepted transfer results only where the debtor receives new value in
"exchange" for the transfer. In § 547(c)(2) only current "like-cash" ordinary course expenses are
excepted. The value given the debtor immediately precedes the ordinary course payments. In
§ 547(c)(3) collateral transfers are protected when they take place within the context of enabling
loans which guarantee that the debtor acquire the new collateral protected. In § 547(c)(4) subse-
quent new value moving to the debtor can be set off against prior preferential transfers. In
§ 547(c)(5) transfers of inventory and receivables are protected to the extent that they do not at the
expense of other conditions reduce any collateral deficiency which may have existed at the begin-
ning of the appropriate critical period.
The return of equivalent value found in these exceptions is consistent with an economic model
that supports recapture'of preferences to preserve the going concern value of the enterprise. The
§ 547(c) exchanges provide the debtor with the necessary means of continuing the business with-
out diminishing the assets of the enterprise.
46. As already noted, these important legislative premises of the Bankruptcy Code are
threatened by pending legislation and by case law insensitive to the new integration. See supra
text accompanying notes 14-16.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/1
Number 1] PREFERENCE RULES
B. A Case Study in Legislative Intent: Preserving the Integrity of the
New 'Antecedent Debt"
The concept of an antecedent debt was critical under section 60 and
is equally critical under the Code. The phrase appears to be almost
self-explanatory. The debt must occur before the transfer. If the lan-
guage of section 60 had been applied literally, many ordinary and im-
portant transactions would have fallen within the definition of a
preference.47 For example, a monthly bill from the ordinary trade
creditor or utility company for goods or services would have been con-
sidered a preference. Similarly, payments to employees typically made
at the end of a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly period would have been
preferences. Because avoidability under the old Act was related to a
creditor's state of mind, most of these transfers, however, were pro-
tected because the trustee usually had great difficulty proving that such
creditors had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent.43
There were instances, however, when this requirement did not shield
these creditors, especially employees, who did obtain knowledge of the
debtor's troubled circumstances. 49 When the creditor was aware of the
bankrupt's fiscal problems, courts indulged the fiction that these pay-
47. Many of the early case law "refinements" of the antecedent debt requirement did not
involve security transfers at all The way in which these "refinements" have been dealt with under
the new statute is, however, generally instructive on the nature of the new definition in section
547(b) and its relationship with the exceptions in section 547(c).
48. This element was difficult to prove and often made legitimate recapture expensive or
even impractical. MARK-UP MINtJTES, supra note 12, at 551. Circumstances causing suspicion or
merely indicating that the creditor is apprehensive do not necessarily indicate a reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor was insolvent. See, e.g., In re Solof, 2 F.2d 130, 132 (9th Cir. 1924)
(trade creditors taking precautionary measures). See also Cusick v. Second Nat'l Bank, 115 F.2d
150 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (mere late payments held insufficient to prove creditor knowledge). A delay
in payment, however, is one of the circumstances which, when combined with other factors, is
sufficient to put the creditor on inquiry notice. See, e.g., Margolis v. Gem Factors Corp., 201 F.2d
803 (2d Cir. 1953).
Many employees would have significant knowledge of their employer's financial condition, thus
jeopardizing wage payments during the critical prebankruptcy period. Trade creditors and utility
companies were less likely to obtain early knowledge of sufficient facts to create the notice. Trade
creditors who became aware of the debtor's apparent insolvency could have switched to cash
transactions. They might have chosen, however, "to ride out the storm" with a loyal customer.
The utility company would have had little choice if it obtained the requisite knowledge, since it
could not as a practical matter deal on a cash basis. It would have been forced either to discon-
tinue service or accept payment as usual at risk of trustee avoidance. Discontinuance of service
would have been disastrous for the struggling debtor.
49. See, e.g., In re Henry C. King Co., 7 Am. Bankr. R. 619, 621 (D. Mass. 1902).
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ments were for "current expenses," and not for an "antecedent debt."50
The result may have been defensible, but the reasoning was less than
forthright. 51
The rationale behind the "current expense" cases was the need to
protect ordinary course transactions between the creditor and the
financially troubled debtor, irrespective of the creditor's perception of
the debtor's problem.52 Apparently, the courts viewed the continued
efforts of these types of creditors to be largely responsible for whatever
wealth remained in the bankrupt's estate. Moreover, these arrange-
ments, although technically credit transactions, did resemble cash
transactions.53 The trouble, however, with this distortion of the antece-
dent debt concept was that it was not easily confined to cases truly re-
sembling cash transactions.54
The new preference section, with its list of precisely tailored excep-
tions, takes a more direct and controlled approach. In sections
547(c)(1) and 547(c)(2), Congress protected many "worthy" transac-
tions formerly protected under the awkwardly constructed section 60
case law defining antecedent debt. The new structure signals a new
integration of definition and exception. Congress clearly abandoned
the case law distortions of the "antecedent debt" element and in its
place enacted in section 547(b) a mechanical strict-timing concept of
"antecedent debt," free from the cumbersome requirement that the
creditor have "reasonable cause to believe." Section 547(c) provides
the only exceptions to this concept.
The new antecedent debt element emerges clearly from the legisla-
tive history. In two early bills, the so-called Commission Bill and
Judges' Bill, the definition of antecedent debt was drawn to exclude
certain transfers of the types previously discussed. 5 The Commission
50. See, e.g., Blauvelt v. Walker, 72 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1934) (wages); In re Barrett, 6 Am.
Bankr. R. 199 (1901) (rent).
51. Cases to the contrary include: In re Great Lakes Lumber Co., 8 F.2d 96, 97 (D.C. Cir.
1925); In re John Morrow & Co., 134 F. 686, 687-88 (S.D. Ohio 1901).
52. See, e.g., Blauvelt v. Walker, 72 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1934).
53. The courts also considered the secured inventory or accounts creditor, who in no way
resembles one dealing on a cash basis, equally worthy of this protection. The courts developed
theories to protect these creditors, but not based on the concept of antecedent debt. See infra text
accompanying notes 81-101.
54. See, eg., Marshall v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 112 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1940); In re Macklem, 22
F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1927); In re Columbia Real Estate Co., 205 F. 980 (D.N.J. 1913). Cf. Barash
v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981) (decided under new Bankruptcy Code).
55. For a discussion of these two bills, see supra note 11. For a side-by-side comparison of
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Bill contained a short grace period and a list of transfers deemed not an
antecedent debt, basically payments for utilities, personal services, and
inventory. 6 The Judges' Bill attempted to reach similar results by a far
longer grace period and a shorter list of exceptions.5 7 The short grace
period of the Commission Bill was apparently a response to the strict,
mechanical application of the definition of antecedent debt in National
City Bank v. Hotchkiss."
This early statutory approach was subject to two lines of attack.
First, dissatisfied creditors who did not fit within the exceptions to the
definition of antecedent debt objected to the preferred treatment of util-
ities, employees, and inventory creditors.59 These types of creditors,
these two proposals, see Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on HR 31 and HR 32 Before the
Subcomm. on Ciril and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, Appendix 1,
94th Cong. 1st and 2d Sess. (1975), reprinted in 7 A. RESNICK AND E. WYPYsKI, BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1-332 (1979).
The definition of antecedent debt is found at § 4-607(g) of the Commission Bill and § 4-607(h)
of the Judges' Bill. Id at 180.
56. Commission Bill, § 4-607(g) provides:
Definitions.-For the purpose of this section, the following definitions are applicable:
(1) The term "antecedent debt" is a debt incurred more than five days before a trans-
fer paying or securing the debt. The term "antecedent debt" does not include (A) a debt
fbr personal services, (B) a debt for utilities incurred within three months of the petition,
(C) a debt for inventory paid for within three months of the delivery of the goods in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business, or (D) an obligation to transfer ownership aris-
mg out of a contract for the sale of property owned by the debtor and in existence either
at the date the contract was entered into or at a time more than three months prior to the
petition.
57. Judges' Bill, § 4-607(h) provides:
(h) Definitions.-For the purpose of this section, the following definitions are appli-
cable:
(1) the term "antecedent debt" is a debt incurred more than thirty days before a
transfer paying or securing the debt. The term "antecedent debt" does not include a debt
for personal services entitled to priority under section 4-405(a)(3) of this title.
58. 231 U.S. 50 (1913). COMMISSION REPORT (pt.2), supra note 8, at 169. The Commission
incorrectly characterized the facts of Hotchkiss.
59. This pattern of complaint is worthy of notice, for it reemerges in the present support for a
legislative assault on the preference scheme. These creditor organizations objected to exceptions
that aided others. At the same time, they objected to the fundamental statutory changes that put
payments to them in jeopardy. Many of these creditor organizations objected, therefore, to the
presumption of creditor insolvency during the 90 days before bankruptcy or the elimination of the
element of "reasonable cause to believe." They supported, however, those changes that would
protect payments to them. The 30-day grace period in the antecedent debt definition, therefore,
received a great deal of support from these creditors. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 438
(statement of Richard Kaufman on behalf of National Association of Credit Management); id at
457, 464-65, 469 (statement and testimony of Robert Grimmig on behalf of the American Bankers
Association); 1976 House Hearings, supra note 43, at 2503 (testimony of John Ingraham on behalf
of Robert Morris Associates and the National Association of Bank Loan and Credit Officers).
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perhaps with an overly optimistic view of the meaning of the section,
nevertheless supported the thirty-day grace period in the Judges' Bill.
In contrast, a second group of challengers sought to narrow or elimi-
nate the exceptions, particularly those written into the definition of an-
tecedent debt. The National Bankruptcy Conference opted for a
narrower set of exceptions to the antecedent debt definition. Professor
Countryman objected to attempts to protect certain types of "ordinary
course" creditors. Both the Conference and Countryman objected to
the redefinition of antecedent debt with its inflexible five- or, thirty-day
grace period.60 The Conference preferred a retention of the section 60
case law represented by Dean v. Davis61 and National City Bank v.
Hotchkiss.62 Although the true significance of these cases was lost in
some of the subsequent discussions comprising the legislative history, it
did not escape Professor Countryman or the Conference.
The critical distinction between these two decisions is found by com-
paring the intentions of the parties involved in the transfer. In Dean v.
Davis, a contemporaneous transfer was intended, but the transfer was
delayed a few days beyond the credit extension. In Hotchkiss, the par-
ties initially intended an unsecured obligation, but hours after the
credit was extended security was granted. In Dean v. Davis, the Court
declared the transfer unavoidable as being not for an antecedent debt,
while in Hotchkiss the transfer was avoidable despite the shorter pe-
riod. The mechanically defined grace periods of both the Commission
and Judges' Bill ignored the question whether the parties actually in-
tended a contemporaneous exchange.63 The National Bankruptcy
Conference preferred a more flexible approach but wished to retain the
actual intention requirement.64
60. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1975, reprinted in Bank.
ruptcyAct Revisiorn Hearings on H. 31 and HA 32 Before the Subcomm. on CiPi and Constltu.
tional Rights ofthe House Coma on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist and 2d Sess. (Supp. Appendix
Pt.1) 333, 361-64 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NBC Bankruptcy Act of 1975]; 1976 House Hearings,
supra note 43, at 1842-43; id at 1849; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 1041 (prepared
statement of Professor Ven Countryman).
61. 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
62. 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
63. The Commission Report does not indicate whether the grace period in the Commission
Bill was designed to create a conclusive presumption that the parties intended a contemporaneous
exchange. The note on Hotchkiss contained in the report emphasizes the small time gap between
credit extension and the grant of security. It does not refer to the absence of an original intent to
create a secured obligation. COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 169.
64. NBCBankruptcyAct of 1975, supra note 60, at 363, 365 n.l. The Conference would have
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Congress subsequently adopted the results of much of the section 60
case law on antecedent debt, including the rules of Dean v. Davis and
Hotchkiss. Congress, however, made a significant change from the ap-
proach found in the case law and in the Commission and Judges' bills.
Rather than artificially defining antecedent debt, Congress, in section
547(c)(1), protected preferential transfers which were substantially con-
temporaneous if they were intended to be contemporaneous. By pro-
tecting these transfers in section 547(c)(1), Congress implicitly
recognized that delay of a transfer, however minimal, would make that
transfer for or on account of an antecedent debt.
Congress also decided to continue the protection of trade creditors,
employees, and utilities but again rejected the approach developed in
section 60 case law and followed in the Commission and Judges' bills.
The exceptions to the definition of antecedent were eliminated, and
these transfers to these creditors were treated as preferences within the
definition of section 547(b). In section 547(c)(2), however, transfers to
these parties were explicitly protected from avoidance as long as the
carefully drawn limitations were met.65
In choosing this approach, Congress opted for a clean, mechanical,
and highly inclusive definition of a transfer for antecedent debt.66
Even payments by check, traditionally likened to cash payments under
section 60, arguably fall within the new definition of a preference and
are saved only by resort to section 547(c)(1). 67 From the legislative his-
excluded from the definition of antecedent debt one that is "intended to be paid or secured con-
temporaneously, and in fact is paid or secured contemporaneously." See NBC Bankruptcy Act of
1975, supra note 60, § 4-607(d)(i)(A). See also 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 1041
(statement of Professor Vern Countryman); 1976 House Hearings, supra note 43, at 1842-43 (state-
ment of Leon Forman on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference).
65. Representative Drinan was very concerned that the staff was creating new exceptions not
recommended by anyone. With great difficulty, the committee staff tried to explain that the sub-
stance of the § 547(c)(2) exception was contained in the definitions of antecedent debt in the Com-
mission Bill and Judges' Bill. MARK-UP MINUTES, supra note 12, at 562-64.
66. In the same discussion, the staff indicated that one purpose of the change was to take the
protection out of the definition of antecedent debt and to create an explicit exception for ordinary
course transfers. Id at 553. (remarks of Mr. Klee, associate counsel to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee). The inclusiveness of the definition of antecedent debt is further demonstrated by these
discussions. In their explanation of the origin of the 45-day period in § 547(c)(2), the committee
counsel explained that the debt would be incurred at the time when the goods or services were
delivered, not when the bill was tendered. For a discussion of § 547(c)(2), see infra text accompa-
nying notes 267-71. This is clearly a repudiation of § 60 case law treating such payments as for
"current" obligations.
67. HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 373-74; SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 88. Payment
by check against concurrent sale and delivery has many of the characteristics of a cash sale under
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
24 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tory, it is clear that Congress abandoned the artificial contortion of the
definition of a preference and substituted a forthright statement of
those transfers entitled to protection.
C Deriving a Rule of Construction
The history of the "antecedent debt" element is a guide to the proper
role for all the parts of the preference definition in section 547(b). In
opting for a list of explicit exceptions, Congress created a new purpose
for the definition subsection. The definition subsection, however, has
many old parts. The transplantation of old section 60 language along-
side new language and concepts into section 547 requires the proper
choice between conflicting rules of statutory construction.68 On the one
hand, it is a well settled maxim of interpretation that when a statute or
part of a statute has been construed by the courts and is subsequently
reenacted without material change, the legislature is presumed to have
adopted the existing judicial construction. 9 On the other hand, if the
reenactment occurs along with sufficient substantive revision, the legis-
lature probably intended a "fresh start" despite the transplanted lan-
guage.70 In interpreting section 547, it is essential to construe the old
language consistently with its new context in order to further the pur-
pose of the legislative changes.
Old section 60 definitional language must be construed in the context
of section 547(c) and the new integration of preference law. To en-
hance the equality of the distribution, creditor knowledge has been
state law. U.C.C. § 2-511, § 2-507 & § 3-802. It is not, however, an immediate assignment of
funds. Id § 3-409. Under the clean new approach to antecedent debt taken by Congress in
§ 547(b), a check is technically a credit transaction for bankruptcy purposes. MARK-UP MINUTES,
supra note 12, at 562 (statement by Mr. Klee in response to an observation by Representative
Drinan). At least one commentator has viewed the House and Senate reports on this point as
containing a misleading aberration. See P. MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY
§ 10.14 (1980). The reports are consistent, however, with the new definitional context for "antece-
dent debt" and with the elements of§ 547(b) generally. See infra text accompanying notes 248-66.
68. Although canons of statutory construction are the accepted conventional vocabulary of
interpretation, they need not enslave us. As Professor Llewellyn pointed out: 'There are two
opposing canons on almost every point. On every point there is a 'thrust' and 'parry.'" Llewel-
lyn, supra note 41, at 403.
69. See Mrugala v. City of Boston, 330 Mass. 707, 708, 115 N.E.2d 148, 149 (1953). See also
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 130-31, 182-83 (1975);
Llewellyn, supra note 41, at 403.
70. R. DICKERSON, supra note 69, at 130-31, 182-83; 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STAT-
UTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 49.09, 40.10 (Sands 4th ed. 1972); Llewellyn, supra note 41, at 403.
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made irrelevant and the trustees' burden of proof has been eased.7
Rather than engrafting exceptions for "worthy" transfers onto the defi-
nitional language, Congress has forthrightly opted for a clean defini-
tion and a list of specific exceptions. Section 60 case law perpetuating
alternative exceptions has no place in this structure.
Abandonment of these cases will have substantial impact on trans-
fers incident to commercial financing. The protective case law concepts
of section 60 were often overly generous to the creditor.72 Since these
concepts are no longer applied, creditors will be limited to the carefully
drawn section 547(c) exceptions.73
Thus, as it affects commercial financing arrangements, the primary
theory of integration in the new preference structure has three related
premises:
(1) The preference definition in subsection (b) calls for a strict,
mechanical timing test for transfers within the critical period;
(2) The exclusive list of transfers in subsection (c) should not be
expanded by reading old case law qualifications into the transplanted
definitional language of subsection (b);
(3) Subsection (c) should be strictly construed according to its lan-
guage and intended scope.74 This new integration should reduce ad-
ministrative expenses incident to recapture and result in larger, fairer
distributions from the estate.75
71. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
72. The generous nature of this protective case law is discussed throughout Part IV. See, e.g.,
infra text accompanying notes 81-112 & 160-207.
73. The new clean language defining creditor improvement in § 547(b)(5), and the new con-
text for the transplanted antecedent debt requirement will have a particularly important impact on
after-acquired property financing. See infra text accompanying notes 125-236.
74. Some flexibility does exist in these exceptions, but only where the language requires fac-
tual determinations of a flexible nature. For example, § 547(c)(1) requires the transfer to be at
least substantially contemporaneous. Congress followed the National Bankruptcy Conferences
suggestion and opted for judicial flexibility over an arbitrary five- or thirty-day period. Similarly,
with respect to § 547(c)(2), the court must determine whether the debt was incurred in ordinary
cours.e, whether payment was made in the ordinary course, and whether the transfer was made
according to ordinary business terms. See infra text accompanying notes 267-69. This permits
flexible adjustments to the circumstances of particular transactions and particular industries.
75. The Senate Report of May 27, 1982, on the Bankruptcy Improvement Act of 1981, S.
2000, concludes that restoring the requirement that the trustee prove "reasonable cause to believe"
protects "good faith creditors." The report further concludes that the "evidence" fails to show that
the Reform Act provisions have "resulted in significant increases of distributions from the estate."
See S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1982). The hearing evidence, however, does not
support the negative inference concerning a statutory integration which has not really had a
chance to sort itself out from the older case law. See supra note 15.
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IV. THE NEW SECTION 547(b).
A. Basic Princpiles
Section 547(b) is the first operative stage of the new preference law.
Exceptions provided in section 547(c) are only relevant if the trustee
proves that all the elements of a section 547(b) preference are present.76
The challenge for courts dealing with section 547(b) is to interpret this
section consistent with the function of section 547(c) while retaining the
important wisdom in the transplanted section 60 language.
77
The statute provides some explicit guidance. Where section 60 con-
cepts remain vital to the section 547(b) definition, there are usually
strong indications in the legislative history that these concepts carry
over to section 547(b).78 For example, some of the case law concepts
76. There was no mention of burden of proof in the floor debates or committee reports. The
substantive structure of the section certainly suggests that the trustee must prove the elements of
§ 547(b) and the creditor the elements of§ 547(c). Further indication of congressional intent may
be derived from the drafting history of the preference section and from the Senate Report on the
Technical Amendment.
Both the Commission Bill and Judges' Bill defined a preference merely as a transfer by an
insolvent debtor for antecedent debt during the critical period. That section specifically gave the
trustee the burden of proving these elements under § 4-607(a). Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of§ 4-
607 contained the exceptions to the preference definition. Among these exceptions was "the non-
preferential effect," a transfer which "did not enable the creditor... to obtain a greater percent-
age of his claim. ... § 4-607(b)(3). Subsection (d) contained the exception for receivables and
inventory. The only mention of any burden of proof in the exceptions was contained in subsection
(d). This subsection expressly placed the burden on the trustee of proving "an improvement in
position by an increase in value of security at the expense of the estate and the extent thereof."
§ 4-607(d). Apparently, the creditor carried the burden of proving all other elements of the excep-
tions, including the fact that a transfer to him did not enable him to obtain a greater percentage of
his claim than other creditors.
After considering this earlier draft, the allocation of burden of proof of § 547 can be accurately
inferred. All the elements of a preference, including the "receives more" test, were relocated in
the subsection defining a preference. The trustee clearly has the burden of proving these elements,
even though the express reference to burden of proof was deleted. The creditor was relieved of
proving that a transfer did not enable him to receive more. Moreover, the reference to the
trustee's burden in the inventory and receivables exception was deleted, putting the burden of
proof for this exception on the creditor consistent with the other exceptions. For a proper alloca-
tion of the burden, see In re Brown, 20 Bankr. 554, 555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). This burden of
proof sequence suggested by the Code appears as an express allocation in the 1981 Technical
Amendments. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1981, S. 863, supra note 23, at § 48(0. Under
the proposed § 547(g), the trustee has the burden of proving the elements of a preference under
§ 547(b). The challenged creditor has the burden of proving nonavoidability under § 547(c). Al-
though the burdens are explicitly stated under new § 547(g), the additions merely clarify present
law. See S. REP. No. 150, supra note 23, at 11.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
78. For example, retention of the rule of Palmer Clay Prods. Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227
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broadly defining the phrase "transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor,"
which have been taken verbatim from section 60, clearly have continu-
ing validity in section 547(b).79 In contrast, case law which deemed a
transfer of property to occur before the debtor acquired that property
has been expressly overruled by language in section 547(e).80 Between
these two extremes are case law concepts neither clearly embraced nor
clearly rejected by the language and the legislative history of section
547(b). This case law must be carefully reexamined to determine if it is
compatible with the new integration of preference law.
This section of this Article discusses section 60 case law concepts that
are included and those that are expressly excluded under section 547.
More importantly, concepts between the extremes which have been dis-
placed by the new context of the transplanted definitional language are
identified. Finally, the operation of section 547(b) on transfers to a se-
cured party with an interest in after-acquired property is examined
with several illustrations.
(1936), is strongly suggested by the legislative history. See infra note 128. See also infra text
accompanying notes 137-39.
79, SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 314. The two
reports indicate that the changes in definition of transfer in § 101(40) were designed to eliminate
those phrases which might be construed as limiting the broad definition. Set-offs were expressly
incorporated in an earlier version of the definition, H.R. 8200, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), but
deleted after protection for set-offs was removed from § 547. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 101(40) (1978); 124 CoNG. REC. H41,090 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards);
124 CONG. REC. S17,407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). Set-offs are not
avoidable as preferences because they are no longer transfers. Set-offs are disallowed or limited,
however, in § 553. Section 553(b) provides a limitation on set-offs similar to that contained in
§ 547(c)(5). A set-off is permitted only to the extent that the gap between the claim against the
debtor and the debtor's "mutual" claim has not been narrowed within the 90-day period. There-
fore, no practical consequences follow from exclusion of the term from the definition of transfer.
This is the only instance where Congress artificially narrowed its broad definition of transfer. It
did so expressly and apparently for the purpose of maintaining the exclusive role of § 547(c) in
carving out exceptions to § 547(b) preferences. Since all issues involving set-offs were to be
treated under § 553, Congress chose to eliminate set-offs from § 547(b). They did so by excluding
set-offs from the definition of transfer. Once again, § 547(c) contained the only exceptions to
preferences meeting all the elements of subsection (b).
For a recent case which reads "transfer" of property of the debtor very broadly in denying a
motion to dismiss, see In re Moskowitz, 13 Bankr. 357 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see House
Report, supra note 12, at 367-68.
Although the increase in value of property previously transferred to the creditor does benefit the
creditor, such benefit may not be caused by or be traceable to a transfer which occurs during the
critical period. Appreciation of the value of collateral already subject to a security interest is not a
transfer,
80. See infra text accompanying notes 106-09.
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B. The Role of Section 60 Case Law
L '54 transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights..
Under the Act a transfer included the receipt of additional or new
security under a prior agreement granting an interest in after-acquired
property.8' When the collateral was a constantly shifting mass, much,
and perhaps all, of the collateral existing on the date of bankruptcy
might have been acquired during the critical four-month period.
Under Article 9 of the UCC, a security interest does not attach until the
debtor obtains rights in the collateral82 and cannot be perfected until
attachment.8 3 Therefore, interests in after-acquired property, including
81. Section 1(30) provided in part: Transfer shall include the sale and every other and
different mode, direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an
interest therein... or of fixing a lien upon property or an interest therein... as a
conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, secur-
ity, or otherwise; the retention of a security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be
deemed a transfer suffered by such debtor.
I1 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976). See In re Tempco Business Servs. Inc., 13 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 327
(E.D. Mich. 1977). The Tempco court correctly identified the problem as determining when such
a transfer has taken place.
82. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1978) provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a collecting
bank, Section 8-321 on security interests in securities and Section 9-113 on a security
interest arising under the Article on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable against
the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or
the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the
collateral and in addition, when the security interest covers crops growing or to
be grown or timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with
respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the events specified in
subsection (I) have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of
attaching.
83. U.C.C. § 9-303 (1978) provides:
(1) A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the applica-
ble steps required for perfection have been taken. Such steps are specified in Sections 9-
302, 9-304, 9-305 and 9-306. If such steps are taken before the security interest attaches,
it is perfected at the time when it attaches.
The key cases involving potentially preferential transfers of security interests in after-acquired
property were decided under the 1962 version of Article 9. Although the Official Text underwent
substantial revision in 1972, the drafters did not alter the time at which a security interest attached
to specific collateral. Under the 1962 version, a security interest could become enforceable as soon
as a signed security agreement was executed. It could not attach under § 9-204(1), however, until
there was an agreement, value had been given and the debtor had rights in the collateral. The
1972 revisions made the time of attachment and the time a security interest was enforceable iden-
tical, and consolidated these timing provisions in § 9-204. No change was made in § 9-303.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/1
Number 1] PREFERENCE RULES
the floating lien, were potentially preferential under section 60.84 The
UCC sought to avoid this result through the operation of section 9-
108.' 5 Under this provision, certain security interests are "deemed to
be taken for new value and not as security for antecedent debt." 86 Sec-
tion 9-108 was generally considered "a clumsy attempt to perpetrate a
fraud on the Bankruptcy Act." 7 The validity of security interests in
collateral acquired during the critical pre-petition period remained in
doubt, and the potential "insecurity" of the floating lienholder was ab-
horrent to most commentators."8
Judicial treatment of the floating lien in bankruptcy was more
favorable than the secured creditors imagined possible.89 Central to
the courts' analyses were the numerous theories that either placed
84. If the transfer occurred, at the earliest, when the security interest attached, security inter-
ests in property which the debtor acquired subsequent to the debt would necessarily have been
transfers for antecedent debt.
85. U.C.C. § 9-108 (1978) provides:
When After-Acquired Collateral Not Security for Antecedent Debt
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a perfected se-
curity interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in whole or in part by
after-acquired property his security interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be
deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the debtor
acquires his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of his business or under
a contract of purchase made pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time
after new value is given.
This is identical to the 1962 version.
86. Id
87. GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 207; Countryman, Code Security Interests
in Bankruptcy 75 CoM. L.J. 269, 276 (1970); Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory under
,4ricle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLuM. L. REv. 49, 58
(1962); Kripke, The Modernization of Commercial Security under the Uniform Commercial Code,
16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 195 (1951); Reimer, Bankruptcy-Preference-Conflict between Sec-
tion 9-108 of Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60(a) of Bankruptcy Act, 70 COM. L.J. 63, 66
(1965); Skilton, supra note 5, at 962-79, 983-99; Comment, Creditors' Rights-Article 9 of the Uni-
nform Commercial Code-A Potential Conflict With the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 2 VILL. L. REV.
395, 407 (1957); Comment, After-Acquired Property Clauses and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,
39 WASH. L. REv. 365, 377 (1964). But see Henson, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial
Code and Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act Reconciled, 21 Bus. LAw. 371 (1966).
88. See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1289 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants of
Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 214-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
France v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 396 U.S. 827 (1969). See also Coogan & Bok, The Impact of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203 (1959);
Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property Clauses Under the
Code, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 194 (1959); Henson, supra note 87.
89. Even the clumsy attempt in § 9-108 to perpetuate "fraud" was cited approvingly in some
cases. See Mills Morris Co. v. Scanlon, 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971); Biggins v. Southwest Bank,
322 F. Supp. 62 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modfled, 490 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1973); Rosenberg v. Rudnick,
262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967).
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transfers of security interest outside the four-month period or found the
transfer not to be for an antecedent debt. The most notable cases, Du-
Bay v. Williams9 and Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank91
seemed to insulate all collateral acquired under any Article 9 security
interest if the interest had been perfected in a timely manner.
The issue in DuBay and Grain Merchants was whether a transfer of a
security interest in an account could occur before the account was cre-
ated. For example, in DuBay the Rose City interests in accounts which
came into existence during the four-month period were "deemed" to be
transfers at the time of filing-before the four-month period. The court
found support in section 60(a)(2) which deemed a transfer of personal
property to occur when "it became so far perfected" that the interest
would not be inferior to a judicial process lien creditor.92 Although this
is a possible reading of section 60(a)(2), the section was probably
designed to postpone the date of transfer when tardy perfection oc-
curred, not to advance it in the case of timely perfection.93 Congress
90. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
91. 408 F.2d 209.(7th Cir. 1969).
92. The Bankruptcy Act, § 60(a)(2) provides:
For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer of property other than
real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when it became
so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equi-
table proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee.
Under U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b), a creditor must become a lien creditor before a security interest is
perfected in order to have priority over the secured party. If the necessary steps for perfection
occur before the debtor obtains rights in specific collateral, the security interest in that collateral
will be perfected at the moment the debtor obtains those rights. Since U.C.C. § 9-301(3) defines a
lien creditor to be a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved, a lien creditor
generally becomes a lien creditor vis-a-vis specific property, at the earliest, when the debtor has
rights in the collateral. See generally Ward, Ordering the Judicial Process Lien and the Security
Interest UnderArticle Nine: Meshing Two Dffierent Worlds Part I-Secured Parties and Post-Judg-
ment Process Creditors, 31 ME. L. REv. 223 (1980). As a result, the best the lien creditor can
normally do is "tie" the secured party, that is, become a lien creditor simultaneously with the
secured party's perfection. A tie is insufficient to subordinate the security interest to the lien credi-
tor. Thus, under the reasoning of DuBay and Grain Merchants, once a security agreement has
been executed, value given, and a financing statement filed, the security interest in yet to be ac-
quired property is "so far perfected," although not yet perfected, that it can never be inferior to the
judicial process lien creditors. 408 F.2d at 212-13. Support for this approach also appeared in the
law review literature. See, e.g., Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with the Bankruptcy Preference Chal.
lenge to 4ccounts and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 553 (1968); Kripke, The Code and
the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences andAfter-Acquired Property (pt. 21 42 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 284 (1967).
93. Note that the definition of transfer included "fixing a lien upon property." See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1(30) (1976). Similarly, a preference included a transfer of any property of the debtor. Id
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designed the old preference section without consideration of the prob-
lem. The language of section 60 existed long before the modem float-
ing lien was developed.94 DuBay is best seen as an opinion protecting
the security interest in after-acquired property against trustee avoid-
§ 60 (a)(I). Both definitions focus upon specific property. Clearly a debtor cannot actually trans-
fer property, or an interest in property, unless he has rights in that property. Even § 60(a)(2)
seems to presuppose that the property already belonged to some extent to the debtor. A transfer of
properov is deemed to have occurred when "it became so far perfected. ... Transfer, where
security interests were involved, under § 1(30), included the parting with an interest in property or
fixing a lien upon property. If the word "it" has any meaning, then it likely refers to an already
existing transfer not yet perfected. See Countryman, supra note 87, at 277.
In 1938, § 60 was revised to overrule Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912). In Kessler, Justice
Brandeis insulated from trustee attack a transfer for securities on the eve of bankruptcy. Four
ycar, earlier, the security interests had been granted in the securities, but no delivery made. Al-
though the securities were not properly pledged by delivery until 1907, an equitable lien valid in
bankruptcy arose in 1903. The 1938 revision added the "so far perfected" language, but required
the interest to be good against all bona fide purchasers. As Gilmore has noted, this language not
only did away with this type of equitable lien, but also put at risk much accounts receivable
financing and all inventory financing. The 1950 revision retained the "so far perfected" language,
but substituted the lien creditor test in cases involving personal property. See 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 6, at §§ 45.3-45.4; Hogan, supra note 92, at 567-68. There are virtually no preference
cases dealing with pre-Code floating security interests under § 60 after 1938.
Interestingly enough, the drafting of Article 9 and the 1950 version of § 60 took place at the
same time, but without "effective liaison." When new § 60 emerged in 1950, it was apparently too
late to undertake the massive conceptual changes necessary to make the Article 9 security interest
safer under § 60. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, § 45.3, at 1303 n.15. See also GILMORE COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 207. The "Article 9' security interest in a sense meshed too well with
the language of § 60--the attachment, or "fixing," of a security interest, or "lien," on property,
which occurred when the debtor acquired rights in the property, seemed to make a transfer possi-
ble, at the earliest, on the date of attachment. The concepts designed primarily to simplify priority
contests between secured creditors seemed to invite a preference challenge to after-acquired
property financing.
94. See supra text accompanying note 8. Some have unconvincingly sought support in the
legislative history of the 1938 and 1950 changes. For example, the DuBay opinion bolsters its
interpretation by pointing out that Congress in 1950 amended § 60(a)(2) "to loosen the flow of
credit to small businessmen whose financing had been seriously impaired by the old bona fide
purchaser test." 417 F.2d at 1289. See also 408 F.2d at 214. The 1950 changes were designed to
undo the unintentional damage to inventory and accounts receivable financing in 1938. See supra
note 93. The prevalent forms of after-acquired property financing (warehousing, trust receipts,
factoring and receivables financing), operating under the strictures of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S.
353 (1925), were carried out "on a new value or revolving credit basis." 2 G. GILMORE, supra note
6. § 45.6, at 1309; Henson, supra note 87, at 374. Nonetheless, a bona fide purchaser of the ac-
count still enjoyed priority over the secured party. Therefore, the transfer would have been post-
poned until the filing of the petition under § 60(a)(2), and would have been at least theoretically
avoidable.
While the 1950 amendment restored new value or revolving credit based financing, it could not
"restore" a form of floating lien yet to be born, a form perfected by notice filing. The efficiency
associated with the Article 9 security interest in after-acquired property is based upon this filing
replacing the new credit type of arrangement necessitated by Benedict, 268 U.S. 353. In fact, § 9-
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ance in order to preserve the integrity of a significant form of modem
financing-the floating lien.95
Other theories, such as the res (or "Mississippi River") theory96 and
the misnamed substitution theory,97 were devised to provide similar
108 can be viewed as an attempt to engraft the fiction of new value on the notice filing system. See
supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
95. The DuBay court quite correctly saw that to destroy the floating lien in bankruptcy,
"would impair, not promote, the intent of the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code to
make security transactions conform to the legitimate needs of commerce, rather than to the com-
mon-law lawyer's wish for conceptual nicety." 417 F.2d at 1289. To avoid this distasteful result,
the court decided the case as it did. But see Skilton, supra note 5, at 1014-16.
96. The theory has been called res, entity, and Mississippi River Theory. See, e.g., 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 6, § 45.5, at 1307-08 (entity); Friedman, supra note 88, at 215-16 (res); Hen-
son, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 232, 233-34 (1965)
(Mississippi River). Professor Henson gained instant immortality when he jumped from the para-
dox of Heraclitus to the life of Huck Finn to suggest that although you cannot step twice into the
same river, since a river constantly changes, you can step twice into the Mississippi. Regardless of
name, the theories merely stated that receivables and inventory should be viewed as an entity or
aggregate which usually exists at the time when the debt is created or, when a financing statement
is filed, most often before the four-month period. Subsequent changes in the composition of the
mass were not viewed as relevant. Since the transfer of the original entity or aggregate was not for
antecedent debt or occurred prior to the four-month period, there was no preference.
97. Countryman refers to this as relaxed substitution, since actual substitution theory re-
quired that the substitution be substantially contemporaneous with the release and the new collat-
eral not exceed the old in value. Any excess value was preferential. Countryman, supra note 87,
at 277-78; see also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.21 (14th ed. 1976). Actual substitution in-
volves a transaction in which original collateral is released in exchange for new collateral. Re-
laxed substitution entertains the fiction that all changes of collateral are viewed as a single
transaction, with no preference as long as the end result is no diminution of the estate. 408 F.2d at
217-18; 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, § 45.6. The theories are separately criticized in Countryman,
supra note 87, at 275-80. In addition a so-called "sophisticated-res" theory was referred to in a
footnote inDuBay. 417 F.2d at 1287 n.8. This theory treated subsequent accounts or inventory as
proceeds of earlier accounts or inventory. If there is "continuous perfection" under § 9-306, these
transfers related back to the transfer of security interests in the original accounts or inventory.
The concept of "continuous perfection" expressed in § 9-306 determines contests between compet-
ing creditors. The 1972 version of § 9-312 makes the purpose of this concept clear. For purposes
of the first to file or perfect rule of§ 9-312(5)(a), the priority dates back to "the time when a filing
is first made ... or the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier, provided
that there is no period therafter when there is neither filing nor perfection." Comment 2(b) to § 9-
306 attempts to make § 9-306(2), (3) a rule in bankruptcy for dating the transfer of the interest in
the proceeds as the "date of the secured party's obtaining the security interest in the original
collateral." While this is a valid rule for determining priorities between creditors under state law,
it cannot determine when a transfer takes place for § 60 purposes. See generally Countryman, The
Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pt. 2), 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631, 631-39 (1972).
At any rate, the theory could only be validly applied if sufficient control were exercised so that
the identifiable proceeds of the accounts or inventory were utilized to obtain new accounts or
inventory. With accounts, this would be nearly impossible, since new accounts are generated by
the general work of the enterprise; unless the only source of funds is payments on encumbered
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protection. Despite these imaginative theories, both the Bankruptcy
Act and the UCC seem to assume that a security interest attaches to a
specific piece of property at a specific time and not to an undefined
mass.98 The best metaphoric rejoinder to these theories appears in Ref-
eree Snedecor's opinion at the first stage of the DuBay litigation.99 Re-
sponding to Professor Henson's "Mississippi River" theory, he
explained that there was no security interest in the river-the security
interest was in each of the individual fish as it was caught.'t°
The result of applying these theories was to validate all security in-
terests in after-acquired property that were timely perfected. Most the-
ories could have been applied even if the security interest were not in
collateral which was a shifting mass, and even if there were an anoma-
lous build-up in collateral during the four-month period.' 0'
Once notice of the debtor's insolvency became irrelevant to the new
preference scheme, the predominant purpose of preference law more
clearly became creditor equality. 0 2  Therefore, the state of affairs
accounts, tracing of proceeds will become increasingly difficult in each subsequent generation of
accounts,
Some support was also sought in the "negative implication" of § 60(a)(6). Under that section,
part of the 1950 revision, only an equitable lien was created if the steps for perfection consistent
with state law and § 60(a)(7) had not been timely made. This section expressly made equitable
liens avoidable. It continued to repudiate the relation back doctrine that led to the 1938 amend-
ment. According to the "negative implication" theory, if there was no tardy perfection, no prefer-
ence should be found. Coogan & Bok, supra note 88, at 244-45. Although this subsection enforces
a policy m favor of timely perfection, it cannot be read as designed to validate forms of financing
not extant at the time of adoption.
Similarly, no comfort could be derived from § 60(c) or § 60(a)(8) unless new credit had been
extended or a future loan had been made. Coogan & Bok, supra note 88, at 245. However, the
release of collateral may be new value for § 547(c)(4) purposes. See infra text accompanying notes
295-96.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
99. In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 3 UCC REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 194 (D. Or.
1966), rey'd, 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Or. 1967), aqffldsub nonm DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th
Cir. 1969).
1W0. 3 UCC REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) at 219.
101. Theories which somehow moved the transfer back to the creation of the debt or outside
the four-month period protect the creditor even if there is an unlikely build-up of collateral. If the
build-up was forced by the creditor or initiated by the debtor to prefer the creditor, the transfers
could be attacked under § 67(d) or § 70(c). See GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at
20. Although language in some opinions seemed to limit the protection to the extent there was no
improvement of position during the critical period, only the substitution theory made this limita-
tion explicit. The relaxed substitution theory permitted transfers to the extent the aggregate of
transfers did not increase the value of collateral. see, ag., Grant Merchants, 408 F.2d at 217-18.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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which existed under these theories was no longer tolerable. A proper
result required a balancing of the equities of the unsecured creditors
with those of the Article 9 creditor with a floating lien. The essence of
the floating lien is the change in the composition of the debtor's prop-
erty; collateral will be sold or cease to exist and new collateral will be
acquired. Any approach that only recognized the acquisition of collat-
eral, and therefore treated all acquisitions during the months before
petition as voidable preferences, would seriously undermine the float-
ing lien.103 On the other hand, the secured party should not be able to
improve his position if the debtor's money is channeled into collat-
eral.1c 4 At each stage of drafting, the new preference section struck a
balance between the interests of the floating lien creditor and the inter-
ests of the general creditors.' 5 The floating lien was protected, but
only to the extent that the creditor's position did not improve.
Section 547 utilizes a direct approach to achieve this balance. First,
Congress opted for "the fish rather than the river" theory in defining
transfers of security interests in after-acquired property. Under section
547(e)(3) a transfer of a security interest in personal property cannot
occur before the security interest has attached, that is, until the debtor
has rights in the specific collateral.' °6 If the debtor already has rights in
103. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
104. If equality in distribution replaces the intent of debtor and creditor as the cornerstone of
the preference section, the creditor is not entitled to a windfall. This is true not only when the
creditor insisted on the channeling, but also when the debtor chose to channel, or when channel-
ing occurred by chance.
105. The Gilmore Committee Report contained the initial formulation of the improvement of
position test, § 60(a)(4)(IV), for inventory and receivables. GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 210-12. The Committee was split on whether a "reasonable cause to believe in debtor's
insolvency" should be an element of a preference. Id at 209-10. However, this element was
eliminated in § 60(a)(4)(IV) for inventory and receivables, a change that would have placed the
creditor financing inventory and receivables in a theoretically less advantageous position than
other creditors. The reason for this was purely administrative; the litigation aimed at determining
when the creditor had reasonable cause to believe and the process of identifying which transfers
came before and which after that point was labeled as complicated, expensive, tedious and asset-
exhausting. Id at 213. The change suggested by S. 2000 would create the same administrative
problems in § 547(c)(5) which the Gilmore Committee sought to avoid. See supra note 15.
Under the Commission Bill, the policy of equality of distribution was already dominant. COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 170 n.10. This was accomplished by elimination of the "reason-
able cause to believe" element. The improvement of position test of § 4-607(d) was viewed as a
compromise between the DuBay position, unfair to other creditors, and a true equality principle.
Id at 210.
106. Section 547(e)(3) provides: "For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
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the specific collateral at the time the debt and security interest are cre-
ated, and if the security interest is perfected in a timely fashion-ten
days-the transfer dates from the time of attachment of the security
interest.107 Unless the security was granted after the debt was created,
there will be no transfer for antecedent debt and no preference. For
collateral, which is acquired after the effective date of the debt, how-
ever, the transfer cannot occur until the debtor acquires rights in the
collateral.' Congress has swept aside the theories supporting DuBay
and Grain Aerchants.0 9
As will be demonstrated in the next section of this Article, security
interests in collateral acquired after the effective date of the debt and
within the critical pre-petition period will almost certainly be prefer-
ences.1' If they are not preferences it is because the security interests
are superfluous, that is, unnecessary to secure the ultimate satisfaction
of the debt. If the creditor needs the collateral to "secure" the debt, he
will "receive more" with the transfer of the security interest than he
would have received without it. The requirements of section 547(b)(5)
will then be satisfied. Once a transfer is labeled a section 547(b) prefer-
ence, the creditor will have to rely on section 547(c) to protect the trans-
107. Section 547(e)(2) provides: "For the purposes of this section, except as provided in para-
graph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made-(A) at the time such transfer takes effect be-
tween the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after,
such time," Id. § 547(e)(2)(A).
Section 547(e)(2)(A) uses the phrase "at the time such transfer takes effect between the trans-
feror and transferee." Under U.C.C. § 9-203(1), a security interest is effective between the parties
after there is a grant of security interest by possession or a signed written agreement, value is
given, and the debtor has rights in the collateral. A security interest in property already owned by
the debtor, therefore, takes effect after the granting of a security interest or the giving of value,
whichever comes last.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
109. NBC Bankruptcyc1 of 1975, supra note 60, at 364; SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 89;
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 372; COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 1), supra note 8, at 208-10; Com-
MISsION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 174-75.
The express language of§ 547(e)(3) does not deal precisely with the definition of the "property"
in whych the debtor must acquire "rights" before a transfer is "made." Arguably, therefore, the
"entity theory" can still be read into § 547(e)(1) because the undifferentiated mass is the "prop-
erty" referred to in § 547(e)(3). See V. COUNTRYMAN, A KAUFMANN & Z. WISEMAN, COMMER-
CIAL LAW 288-89 (1982) [hereinafter cited as V. COUNTRYMAN]. This argument would certainly
try the patience of the draftsman who clearly intended § 547(e)(3) to reach and dispose of the
entity theory. "Property" must be given its ordinary meaning here. The focus is on discrete items,
not on a generic description of the form of wealth. See MARK-UP MINtrrES, supra note 12, at 555-
A. It is clear from this discussion that in drafting § 547(c)(5) the subcommittee intended to dis-
po.se of all theories underlying DuBa, and Grain iferchants.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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fer. If the collateral is accounts or inventory, section 547(c)(5) provides
a measure of protection."' To a limited extent sections 547(c)(1),
547(c)(3), and perhaps 547(c)(4) also provide some protection for trans-
fers of security interests preferential under section 547(b).12
2. "Traner. ..to or for the benefit of the creditor"
A section 547(b) preference must be a "transfer . . to or for the
benefit of the preferred creditor." "Transfer" is defined broadly in sec-
tion 101(40) to include indirect modes of transfer." 3 There is little dif-
ference between this and the old section 1(30) definition."14 Similarly,
section 547(b)(1) uses the identical language contained in section 60(a),
recognizing that a preferential transfer must be either "to or for the
benefit of a creditor."" 5 The sweep of the language is the same but has
greater significance in the new preference scheme. The broad defini-
tion of transfer and the inclusive concept "to or for the benefit" com-
bine with the other generally mechanical directives of section 547(b) to
produce radical results. Many more transactions will initially be de-
fined as preferences.
"Transfer" and "benefit" within section 547(b) are particularly im-
portant concepts to understand when examining transactions common
to after-acquired property financing. Obviously, payments made di-
rectly to the creditor are transfers to him. So are the continuing acqui-
sitions of security interests in discrete items of personal property
covered by the description of collateral in the security agreement.
Moreover, work done to improve the collateral can be viewed as an
indirect mode of transfer to the secured creditor. Additionally, trans-
fers to third parties, although not transfers to the creditor, may be pref-
erential to him if they are ultimately "for his benefit." Despite these
various forms of "transfer," not every event which benefits the creditor
will be a transfer. Although both the concepts of "transfer" and "bene-
111. See infra text accompanying notes 143.44.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 237-94.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp. V 1981).
114. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30). See supra note 93.
115. Courts often see no distinction between indirect transfers "to the creditor" and transfers
"for the benefit of the creditor." Within the context of commercial financing the conceptualization
of what is transferred may sometimes make the distinction significant. See infra text accompany-
ing note 315-18. More often the distinction is not practically significant because courts find "bene-
fit" in all direct transfers; and transfers to third parties which benefit the creditor can be seen as
indirect transfers "to" the benefited creditor.
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fit" have an important relationship in the section 547 scheme, they are
separate concepts. It is necessary to distinguish between nontransfer
events, transfers to third parties for the benefit of the creditor, and indi-
rect modes of transfer to the creditor.
Some events which increase the value of a security interest will be
transfers; others will not. The mere appreciation of property already
subject to a security interest is not by itself a transfer. This is true even
if the property had been acquired during the critical period and subse-
quently appreciated. A transfer of security, however, does occur when
the property is acquired. If that transfer is preferential, the trustee can
retrieve the property at its appreciated value.' 1 6
A direct transfer to a third party may increase the value of the secur-
ity interest to the secured party, and therefore be "for his benefit." This
is distinguished from indirect modes of transfer "to the creditor" which
also increase the value of his security interest. A few examples will
help to illustrate this distinction." 7
CASE 1. A creditor (C) was owed $20,000 by debtor (D), secured by
an interest in two drill presses, each worth $10,000 at the beginning of the
ninety-day period. C had the only security interest in drill press #1. C's
security interest in drill press #2 was second in priority to a fully secured
purchase money party (S).i 18 S had sold drill press #2 to D before the
ninety-day period began. At the outset of the critical period, S was still
116. A recent Article on § 547 concludes that a transfer in substitution would be subject to
preference attack if the creditor was undersecured at the transfer and subsequent events produced
an appreciation of the substituted collateral, thus improving the creditor's position over what it
would have been absent the substitution. Kaye, Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54
AM. BANKR L.J. 197, 200 (1980). The author correctly perceived that the elements of a prefer-
ence, including § 547(b)(5), are measured as of the date of bankruptcy. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 128-39. Acquiring the security interest in the new collateral enables the creditor to
"receive more" than he would without the security interest. The creditor would "receive more"
even if the collateral did not appreciate.
In Kaye's hypothetical, however, the transfer falls within the § 547(c)(1) exception; an exception
which only applies if all the § 547(b) elements are met. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code suggests
that the § 547(c)(1) exception is measured at the time of the petition. Furthermore nothing in
§ 547 suggests that the § 547(c)(I) exception depends on the stability of the value of the substituted
collateral. To the contrary, § 547(c)(1) only requires that a contemporaneous exchange be con-
templated and that the executed exchange be at least substantially contemporaneous. The focus
under § 547(b) is not a comparison between the creditor's position with old collateral and with the
new. Instead, the subsection requires a comparison of liquidation positions with the substitute
collateral and without it. See ifra text accompanying notes 227-29.
117. For a full analysis of these illustrations under §§ 547(b), 547(c), see infra text accompany-
ing notes 315-18.
118. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
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owed $10,000 on drill press #2. During the critical period, the debtor
completely extinguished the debt to S. Drill press #2 is still worth
$10,000.
The trustee may reasonably argue that the payments to S, the
purchase money party, constitute a preference to C, the junior secured
party. The payment to S clearly is a transfer, but is not preferential to
him, because he was fully secured at all times. He therefore has not
"received more" as a result of the transfer. C, however, has clearly
benefited from this transaction. His security interest in drill press #2,
valueless at the outset of the ninety-day period, is now worth $10,000.
C, originally partially secured, has become fully secured as a result of
the payments. The payments have enabled him to "receive more" than
he would have in liquidation had the payments not been made. The
payments by D to S are transfers "for the benefit" of C and, because all
other section 547(b) elements seem to be present, C has received an
avoidable preference." 9 C will therefore not be entitled to satisfy his
debt out of drill press #2. C can reach only the $10,000 attributable to
drill press #1.
On many occasions, courts employing section 60 have showed reluc-
tance to "punish" a creditor who has benefited from a transfer to an-
other. 20 There was no real statutory support for this reluctance, but it
was consistent with the old Act case law approach which insulated
transfers to creditors who did not "behave badly." There should be no
such reluctance under the new preference scheme.
The indirect mode of transfer will occur when the debtor takes action
to increase the value of collateral. The debtor may transfer some of his
property to third parties to pay for these improvements. These trans-
fers might be preferences, if all section 547(b) elements are present. 12'
At the same time, the debtor has indirectly made a transfer to the se-
cured party. This transfer may also be a preference. Consider the fol-
lowing illustration:
CASE 2. A debtor (D), a month before the petition, paid $1000 to
repair some factory equipment which is collateral for a loan from S.
119. See V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 453 (1974).
120. See Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 891 (lst Cir. 1981).
121. While all the elements of§ 547(b) may be satisfied as to these direct third party transfer-
ees, these transferees may be employees or ordinary course current expense creditors who have
limited protection under § 547(c)(2). See supra text accompanying notes 47-65 & infra note 318.
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Without the repair, the equipment would have been worth $500. The
repair increased the value to $1500.
The debtor, by raising the value of the collateral, indirectly trans-
ferred an interest in property to the secured party. This kind of trans-
action might not have been preferential under section 60 because of
DuBay-like theories.'22 Under section 547, the earliest the transfer will
be "deemed to occur" will be at the time the value is added; the trustee
can successfully seek avoidance of the transfer."2 Courts should resist
the temptation to seek alternative protection for the secured party by
narrowing the definition of transfer.
A similar analysis under section 547(b) is required when the debtor is
completing work-in-process. Often a secured party will have a security
interest in inventory at all stages in its manufacture. Obviously, the
completed, or more complete, inventory will be more valuable. This
channeling of value into the collateral is also a transfer, and likely a
preference. Part or all of such a transfer may be protected from avoid-
ance under section 547(c)(5).1Y4 Whatever is unprotected ought to be
avoided by the trustee.
3. "That enables such creditor to receive more.
a. The New Test
Unlike the other elements of section 547(b), subsection (b)(5) does
not track section 60 language. Section 547(b)(5) simply requires that
122. This transfer may not have been preferential under § 60 case law if the indirect transfer
was deemed to occur before value was added because it was "so far perfected." See supra text
accompanying notes 90-101.
123. Dating of this transfer is not clearly addressed by the statute. Based on the legislative
history of the work-in-process problem, Congress probably intended to date transfers for the pur-
pose of increasing the value of inventory collateral at the time the value is added. See infra note
313. In § 547(e)(2), "takes effect" could easily refer to the time of payment for the improvements
or to the time when the debtor had a contractual right to receive the improvements. In fact, the
secured party could be a third party beneficiary of this contract right.
124. It is also difficult to determine whether these transfers are payments or transfers of secur-
ity interests. Apparently, Congress believed, at least in cases of work-in-process, that these are
transfers of security interests, because they are treated under § 547(c)(5). The phrase "to the
prejudice" in subsection (c)(5) was inserted to distinguish between increases in value of the secur-
ity interest caused by transfers or other expenditures of the debtor's assets and increases attributa-
ble to the fact that completed goods are more valuable. The creditor is not penalized under
subsection (c)(5) for increases in value above the cost of completing the goods. When improve-
ments take the form of repair to equipment, however, the conceptualization of the transfer as a
security interest is unfair to the secured party. See infra text accompanying notes 315-18.
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the transfer enable the creditor to "receive more" than he would have
received in liquidation without the transfer. 125 This new language is a
departure from the requirement of section 60 that the transfer enable
the creditor to "obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditors of the same class."' 126 A fresh approach is expressly invited by
this break from the vocabulary of section 60. The purpose of this ele-
ment is to measure whether a creditor has gained an advantage by vir-
tue of the transfer. The "greater percentage test" required a difficult
analysis of creditor classification and a complex calculation. 127 If fol-
lowed literally, the, section 547(b)(5) test is fairly simple and
mechanical.
Case law specifying the precise point for measuring the improve-
ment-the date of bankruptcy-was clearly retained. In this one in-
stance, the legislative history is explicit.' 28 Unfortunately, other section
60 case law concepts, ostensibly displaced by the new language, persist
in creating difficulty. Unbelievably, some courts and commentators
have applied the section 547(b)(5) test in terms of the greater percent-
age test of section 60.129 Even more alarming is the re-emergence of
125. Section 547(b)(5) provides:
(5) [S]uch creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
I1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
126. The Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1) provided:
A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a debtor to
or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered
by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against
him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will
be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class.
127. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.34 (14th ed. 1977).
128. The new Code has readopted rule of Palmer Clay Prods. Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227
(1936). Construing the Act's "greater percentage" test, the Palmer case held that the effect of a
transfer is measured on the date of bankruptcy, not a hypothetical liquidation on the date of
transfer. The Commission Bill expressly referred to the date of the petition in § 4-607(b)(3).
Commission Report (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 171. This express reference was deleted in response to
a recommendation by the National Bankruptcy Conference. The recommendation was viewed as
"merely clarifying" other matters and was not intended to affect the substance of the Commis-
sion's incorporation of the Palmer rule. NBC BankruptcyAct of 1975, supra note 60, at 333, 363.
129. See In re Fulghum Constr. Co., 14 Bankr. 293, 303 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981), aft'g, 7
Bankr. 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Gestaldo, 13 Bankr. 808, 809-10 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981). See also In re Derritt, 20 Bankr. 476, 477-80 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (payment clearly
within the § 547(b)(5) definition held not preferential because each secured creditor in a separate
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/1
PREFERENCE RULES
the "diminution of the estate" element, conceivably derived from the6greater percentage" test.' 30 From this derivative element sprang addi-
tional case law exceptions to section 60, most notoriously the "case law
net result" rule. This rule, which had doubtful validity under section
60, has been applied to section 547(b)(5). 13 1
If the preference scheme is to work fairly in the context of com-
mercial financing, courts must apply section 547(b)(5) in a sensible
way. A number of important integration questions must be addressed:
(1) How are the mechanics of the "receives more" test applied to
transfers incident to after-acquired property financing? When is such a
secured creditor actually fully secured, so that neither payments nor
acquisitions of collateral by the debtor enable him to "receive more"?
(2) What relevance does the old Act "greater percentage than credi-
tors of the same class" test have?
(3) Can the "diminution of the estate" element be read into section
547(b)(5)? Should the case law net result rule ever be applied to save
otherwise avoidable transfers?
b. The Concept of Full Security
As was the case under the old Act, transfers in the form of payments
or additional "after-acquired" security to an already "fully" secured
creditor would seem immune from preference challenge.1 32 If the cred-
itor were truly fully secured, and if the case went to liquidation, he
class; court protected an approved affirmation); In re Conn. 9 Bankr. 431, 433-34 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1981) (discussed infra at note 146); In re Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(repossession of property subject to unperfected lien; not preference since no other secured credi-
tors in class).
The Gestaldo case cites Mann, "Greater Percentage" in the Preference Section of the New Code,
86 COM. LJ. 49 (1981). In re Gestaldo, 13 Bankr. at 810. Mann suggests that the trustee will have
intolerable proof problems under § 547(b)(5). Unfortunately, the author assumes that the trustee
must compare the percentage recovery of the creditor with other members of his class. He also
assumes that the trustee must therefore prove what percentage the other class members would
receive. If § 547(b)(5) is correctly and literally applied, the trustee's proof problems should be
considerably eased." See, eg., Inre Hale, 15 Bankr. 565, 567 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981). See also D.
EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 468 (2d ed. 1982).
130. See infra text accompanying notes 161-207 & note 167.
131, In re Fulghum Constr. Co., 7 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980), aft'd, 14 Bankr. 293
(M.D. Tenn. 1981).
132. Small v. Williams, 313 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1963) ("Act" case); Mercantile Trust Co. v.
Schlafley, 229 F. 202 (8th Cir.) ("Act" case), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 614 (1924); In re Hale, 15
Bankr. 565 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) ("Code" case). See also R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J.
WHITE, COMMERCIAL & CONSUMER LAW 399-402 (3d ed. 1981).
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would not receive more because of the transfer. The secured party
could claim only the amount of his debt as determined and appor-
tioned by section 506.'13 In other words, the transfer of additional col-
lateral would best be viewed as superfluous.
The concept of full security, however, is not as simple as it seems.
For example, a creditor may appear to be fully secured at the time any
discrete transfer is made to him. Nevertheless, he may have been un-
dersecured at the beginning of the ninety-day period and have
achieved "fully secured" status only by virtue of other preferential
transfers made during the period. Similarly, the value of the collateral
might have remained above the debt at all times, but the particular
items of collateral may have turned over substantially, or even com-
pletely, during the period. If the transfers of security interests in the
newly acquired collateral are avoidable, the creditor's apparent "fully
secured" position at any time might be "preference-built." Such credi-
tors are not fully secured for purposes of applying the section 547(b)(5)
test. Consider the following illustration.
CASE 3. On January 1, a secured party (S) entered the ninety-day
period with a security interest in two of debtor's (D) machines, worth
$50,000 each, as well as a security interest in after-acquired machines. D
owed S $150,000 at that time. On February 1, 19 acquired a new
machine, also worth $50,000. On March 1, D acquired another $50,000
machine, raising the total value of collateral within the grant of the secur-
ity agreement to $200,000. There were no further acquisitions and no
payments as of April 1 when a petition was filed.
Is the last transfer of collateral on March 1 protected from a section
547(b) challenge because the creditor would not "receive more" within
the meaning of section 547(b)(5)? The secured creditor might argue
that the trustee has the right to recover collateral transfers only to the
point where the value of collateral becomes equal to the debt. Just
before the March 1 transfer, the debtor had rights in collateral worth
$150,000, and the debt was for the same amount. After that, section
547(b)(5) envisions no additional recovery, the argument continues, be-
cause subsequent transfers are to a fully secured creditor. In reality,
however, the creditor's fully secured position is "preference built," and
both subsequent transfers do improve the creditor's liquidation posi-
133. Section 506 of the Code allows a secured party to reach collateral to the extent of his
claim plus interest on such claim, costs, and other charges provided for in the security agreement.
The trustee first deducts the reasonable, necessary costs of preserving or disposing of the collateral.
[Vol. 61:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/1
PREFERENCE RULES
tion. In Case 3, the February 1 acquisition is clearly avoidable as a
transfer of a security interest to an undersecured creditor.1 34 Therefore,
before the March 1 acquisition is considered, S would be entitled to
only $100,000 in collateral on liquidation. S would still have an un-
secured claim for $50,000 as a result of the avoidance of the security
interest in the machine acquired on February 1. If the March 1 transfer
is protected because the creditor was apparently fully secured, the credi-
tor would receive a liquidation interest in three machines with a value
of $150,000. He would become fully secured in bankruptcy by receiv-
ing interests in collateral in two stages. In the first stage, the acquisition
of collateral extinguishes the gap between debt and security. In the
second stage, additional, apparently "extra," collateral is acquired.
Section 547(b)(5) was not designed to sanction this result attained
through an "over-improvement" of position, whether or not inten-
tional. The creditor whose apparently fully secured position was built
by prior preferential transfers should never be able to protect subse-
quent additional transfers by ignoring the effect of section 547(b)(5) on
prior transfers. The literal language of section 547(b)(5) does not sanc-
tion this unintended result, since the creditor does "receive more" with
the March 1 transfer than without it.
The intended result becomes more clearly supportable if we measure
"full security" at bankruptcy rather than at the time of transfer. From
this vantage point, the trustee can discard all preferential transfers and
determine whether a fully secured position is preference built or not.
In Case 3, the February 1 transfer is clearly avoidable, and therefore
the March 1 transfer is to an undersecured creditor. Of course, the
same result could be achieved, with less clarity, by applying a time of
transfer test, as long as the February 1 transfer is considered first and
treated as avoidable when the March 1 transfer is analyzed. Examining
prior transfers in the critical period, however, is only one of the
problems of applying the section 547(b)(5) test. Events subsequent to
any particular "subject" transfer are also important. Testing effect at
the time of transfer cannot take account of these events.
Other cases can be easily envisaged in which apparently superfluous
transfers of collateral to an already fully secured creditor become im-
134. The acquisition of the machine is a transfer within the 90-day period under § 547(e)(3).
if the transfer had not been made, the creditor would not have been fully secured, but would have
had a $50,000 unsecured claim. The transfer obviously enabled him to "receive more." All other
§ 547(b) elements are apparently satisfied.
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portant because of the subsequent loss of collateral. A time of transfer
test would require a determination of whether the creditor "received
more" than his entitlement in a hypothetical liquidation without the
transfer on the date of the transfer. On the other hand, if the date of
petition test is applied, section 547(b)(5) is satisfied if events after trans-
fer and before the date of the petition enable the secured party to re-
ceive more in the actual liquidation. Consider the following
illustration:
CASE 4. On January 1, at the beginning of the ninety-day period, the
secured party (S) had an interest in both D's existing and after-acquired
machines. At that time, D had two machines worth $50,000 each and
owed S $100,000. On January 2, D acquired a third machine, also worth
$50,000, raising collateral value to $150,000. No further transfers oc-
curred before the date of the petition. Due to an industry-wide techno-
logical breakthrough, however, the machines are worth only $30,000 each
on the date of the petition.
Does the transfer on January 2 enable the creditor to "receive more"
under the section 547(b)(5) test? The creditor appeared to be fully se-
cured when the transfer was made. A hypothetical liquidation at time
of transfer would indicate that the secured creditor did not "receive
more." Although the time of transfer will be relevant in determining if
the transfer is for antecedent debt or whether the transfer might be
saved by certain exceptions in section 547(c), it is not relevant to the
application of the section 547(b)(5) test.135 The actual effect on the date
of bankruptcy is the focus of section 547(b)(5). In Case 4, the creditor's
real position was improved by the transfer. If the transfer had not oc-
curred he would have had $60,000 in collateral and an unsecured debt
for the $40,000 balance. With the transfer he has $90,000 in collateral
and an unsecured debt for only $10,000.
The language of section 547(b)(5) suggests, and the legislative history
clearly indicates, that the creditor "receives more" if his liquidation po-
sition on the date of bankruptcy is improved. The creditor's position as
a result of the transfer is compared with what the creditor would re-
ceive if "the transfer had not been made and such creditor received
payment to the extent provided by this title."1 36 Although Congress
135. For example, § 547(c)(1) will only apply if the transfer is substantially contemporaneous
with the new value given. See infra text accompanying notes 240-42.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)(B), (C) (Supp. V 1981). The extent that a creditor would receive
payment as "provided by this title" can only be determined as of the date of petition.
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abandoned the "greater percentage" test for measuring creditor advan-
tage, it intended to readopt the rule in Palmer Clay Products Co. v.
Bro, n. 137 The opinion in Palmer Clay Products directly addressed this
issue. A preference was measured not by assuming a liquidation and
distribution at the moment of transfer, but by its actual effect on credi-
tors in the bankruptcy which followed. Despite the absence of an ex-
press statement in section 547(b)(5), the timing standard in Palmer Clay
Products was cited approvingly as the new preference section was de-
veloping.' 38 Through all the mechanical changes leading to the "re-
ceives more" test, nothing in the legislative history suggested a
departure from the Palmer Clay Products standard. 39
Furthermore, utilization of the time of transfer test, as opposed to the
date of petition test, theoretically increases the creditor's vulnerability
in a way that could never have been intended. If section 547(b)(5)
speaks to date of the petition, only transfers of specific property or the
proceeds of that property still held by the debtor at bankruptcy enable
the secured creditor to "receive more." If in Case 4, the third machine
had been sold with the creditor's authorization, and the proceeds had
been squandered, the creditor would have lost his security interest in
both the machine and identifiable proceeds. The creditor would not
"'receive more" in the actual liquidation as a result of the transfer.
Even in the unlikely event that ordinarily stable collateral, like equip-
ment, turned over several times during the preference period, the
trustee under the date of petition test could only avoid transfers of col-
lateral still retained by the debtor on the date of bankruptcy. Under
the time of transfer test, however, a secured creditor who did not police
the proceeds might be liable for more than the value of property on
hand. Consider the following illustration:
CASE 5. On January 1, the debtor (D) enters the ninety-day period
with two machines worth $50,000 each securing a debt to S. On this date
D owed $150,000. On January 2, D purchases a third machine worth
$50,000. D becomes dissatisfied with this machine. In February, D sells
the machine with S's permission, but squanders the proceeds. On March
137. 297 U.S. 227 (1936).
138. COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 171 n.13.
139. See supra note 128. Moreover, a spokesman for the Conference specifically referred to
this change in his statement to a House Subcommittee. His comments expressly recognize, with-
out criticism, the fact that the "test is to be applied as of the date of the petition." 1976 House
Hearings, supra note 43, at 1841-42 (statement of Leon Forman on behalf of the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference).
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1, a fourth machine worth $50,000 is purchased. On April 1, the petition
is filed.
If the time of transfer test is applied, a $50,000 preference occurred
on both January 2 and March 1. In both cases, a security interest worth
$50,000 was transferred to S, who was undersecured at the time of
transfer. This sequence could continue as long as new collateral was
acquired and old collateral sold off. Under this erroneous application
of the section 547(b)(5) test, the creditor's initial liability could conceiv-
ably be limitless. However improbable, the result is a logical extension
of an incorrect test which in reality would work more often to the credi-
tor's benefit. t4 ° All applications of the time of transfer test would be
radical departures from any past or present concept of preferential
transfers.
Preserving the date of bankruptcy as the focus of the "receives more"
test is essential in the integration of the new preference section. Prop-
erly viewed, the section 547(b)(5) test permits a remarkably simple clas-
sification of all collateral transfers which occur during the critical
period.
All collateral acquired by the debtor during the ninety-day period
will enable the creditor to "receive more" as long as the collateral is
still present in its original form or as identifiable proceeds, and claimed
by the secured creditor as necessary to satisfy his debt. Thus, only in a
narrow set of circumstances will transfers of collateral during the criti-
cal period fail to meet the section 547(b)(5) test. First, the creditor must
be fully secured at the beginning of the period. Second, he must hold
so much of the same collateral or its identifiable proceeds at bank-
ruptcy so as to equal or exceed his maximum possible secured debt as it
is adjusted upwards if preferential payments are recaptured.'14  Under
140. In Case 5, the time of transfer test would have benefited the creditor in a manner incon-
sistent with the new preference scheme. At the time of acquisition of the third machine, the credi-
tor was fully secured. Focusing on that date, there is no preference even though the third machine
enables the creditor to "receive more" in the actual bankruptcy liquidation.
141. The maximum possible claim is the creditor's total adjusted claim after he has returned
preferential payments and includes any expenses allowed by § 506. This calculation may appear
to be difficult because payments will not enable the creditor to receive more if he is fully secured.
Moreover, some payments might be unavoidable because of § 547(c) exceptions. Unless some
ordering principle is applied, the trustee is caught in a circle. A payment is a preference if the
creditor is undersecured. A creditor is undersecured if collateral is insufficient to meet his claim
after the claim has been adjusted to take into account the return of preferential payments. The
circle is broken by first assuming all payments will have to be returned. This gives a number
equal to the largest potential claim. This number is used to determine which acquisitions of col-
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these circumstances, the transfers are not preferential because resort to
the collateral is unnecessary to satisfy the creditor's claim.
The application of the section 547(b)(5) test in all other cases is
merely axiomatic. Any security interest transferred during the critical
period and necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim obviously enables
him to receive more than he would have received without the transfer.
Without the transfer, that portion of debt now secured by the "suspect"
security interest would be unsecured. 42
Many transfers, preferential under section 547(b), will nevertheless
be unavoidable because of the exceptions in section 547(c). For exam-
ple, if in Case 4 the collateral had been accounts or inventory instead of
equipment, the ultimate result would have been different. The transfer
of the security in the final $50,000 in collateral satisfies all the elements
of section 547(b), including subsection (b)(5). 143 The transfer, however,
would nonetheless be unavoidable because of the section 547(c)(5) ex-
ception. 144 This is the way the section was designed to operate.
c. Displacing the "Greater Percentage" Test
As has been indicated,145 the measure of improvement in section 547
lateral are superfluous. Possible § 547(c) exceptions insulating transfers of collateral are then ap-
plied. After the trustee first determines what collateral is actually available, he may then claim
that all payments which apparently reduced the debt below the value of unavoidable security
interests "enabled the creditor to receive more." Except to the extent that the § 547(c) exceptions
save some of those payments, they will be avoidable by the trustee. For an explanation and illus-
tration of this ordering, see infra text accompanying notes 208-14.
Of course, this discussion realistically assumes the creditor would not receive 100% of his un-
secured claim in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 129, at 468.
142. This is true even when the transfer of collateral is saved by a § 547(c) exception. Argua-
bly, application of the "receives more" test might be read to require a premature application of
§ 547(c) in order to make the comparison envisioned by § 547(b)(5). Section 547(c), however,
only applies to transfers already found preferential under § 547(b). This apparent circularity is
not mandated and should not undermine the clear, inclusive test proposed by § 547(b)(5). See
infra text accompanying notes 215-23.
143. Again, the assumption is the creditor would not receive 100% of his unsecured claim in
Chapter 7 liquidation.
144. This result is required under § 547(c)(5) because there was no gap between the value of
collateral and the debt at the beginning of the critical period. There could, therefore, be no im-
provement of position by decrease in this gap under the § 547(c)(5) test. Section 547(c)(5) ignores
fluctuations during the period and merely compares the extent that the creditor is undersecured-
the gap-at the beginning of the period with the gap on the date of the petition. Transfers of
security in inventory or accounts may be avoided only if they cause the gap to decrease. For a
more complete explanation of the § 547(c)(5) exception and its mechanics, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 296-319.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 125-44.
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is a "receives more" test which no longer refers to either "greater per-
centage" or "creditors of the same class." Encouraged by language
from the House and Senate Reports, however, these old Act concepts
linger on in the cases and literature. 46 While this confusion would not
be critical in most cases, a careful examination of the development of
the present section 547(b)(5) language points to a change in the focus of
the test for creditor improvement. Most significantly, the comparison
of the present test is far less confusing than the comparison necessitated
by the "class" standard as developed in section 60 case law.
A major cause of the change from the old Act language was an
anomalous result that occurred when the class analysis was used.
Under the old Act, a creditor, such as a landlord, might have received a
payment which enabled him to receive a greater percentage than credi-
tors of a higher class. If he was the only creditor in his own class,
however, the transfer could not be called a preference. t47 The new lan-
guage clearly avoids this result.
The new language of section 547(b)(5) no longer requires a compari-
son with other members of the same or other classes. Rather, the sub-
section calls for a simple comparison of the creditor's liquidation
positions with the transfer and without the transfer. Unless the creditor
would be entitled to a 100% recovery in liquidation, or 100% of that
portion of the debt represented by the transfer, the transfer will have
enabled him to receive more.
Although not used for the standard of comparison in section
146. The reports use the language "greater percentage of his claim" to describe the key calcu-
lation in § 547(b)(5). This is an unfortunate choice of words. It suggests the continued validity of
the § 60(a) test. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 87; HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 372.
The commentators have relied on this language. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 547.35 (15th
ed. 1982); Mann, supra note 129; Young, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54
AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1980); Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee'r Avoiding Power, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 173(1979). Many cases have also relied on the language. See In re Music House,
Inc., 11 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1981); In re Conn. 9 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981);In re
Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
In re Conn is another in a series of inexplicable decisions declaring that installment payments
to an undersecured creditor during the critical period were not preferences. In Conn, the court
stated that the trustee had failed to meet his burden of proof. According to the court, he had
failed to show that an Oldsmobile Omega purchased used nearly a year before bankruptcy was
not worth $300 more on the date of petition than when first purchased.
147. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.34 (14th ed. 1976). Theoretically, the same result could
have occurred if all creditors of a class were equally preferred. The reported cases do not indicate
that this anomoly caused any problem. The problem caused by the literal language, however, was
addressed in both the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill, § 4-607(b)(3).
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547(b)(5), reference to the priority categories in section 507 may be im-
portant in determining what an individual would have received in a
Chapter 7 liquidation had the transfer not been made. Consider the
following illustration:
CASE 6. D has fallen behind in paying his employees. One key em-
ployee (A) threatens to resign if not paid on July 25. A receives $2000, his
salary for the month of June. On August 1, D files a voluntary petition.
Under section 507, wage, salary and commission claims up to $2000
are in the third level of priority. 148 If the estate has assets sufficient to
fully satisfy these limited third-priority wage claims, then A would
have received the $2000 anyway. He has not, therefore, "received
more," so there is no preference. A would be preferred if the assets of
the estate were insufficient to satisfy wage claims up to $2000. Since he
would have received less than the full $2000 in the Chapter 7 proceed-
ing, the transfer enabled him to receive more. He would have been
preferred even if there were no other wage claimants so long as the
assets of the estate would be depleted before A's third-priority claim
could be paid in full. In that case, A would have received less than
$2000 in the actual Chapter 7 liquidation.
Because of the $2000 limit on third-priority wage claims, it is possi-
ble that A, the hypothetical employee, could receive a greater percent-
age of unpaid wages than members of his class, and still not be
preferred. 149 In fact, the present language makes this clearer than the
language of section 60(a). 150 For example, suppose A's wage claim
148. Section 507 does not use the term "classes;" neither did § 64 under the old Act. Since
§ 60 referred to classes, these priority categories became known as classes. Swarts v. Fourth Nat'l
Bank, 117 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1902). Since § 547(b)(5) does not refer to classes, there is no reason to
refer to the priority categories of § 507 as such. The practice is likely to continue, however, be-
cause of the language in the House and Senate Reports. See supra note 146.
149. See also Levin, supra note 146, at 190 (transfer of property to a consumer who has made
a prior deposit, § 507(a)(5)).
150. The National Bankruptcy Conference first suggested that the class comparison language
be dropped. The Conference proposed the following language in its stead: "The result of the
transfer does not enable the creditor benefitted to obtain a greater percentage of his claim than he
would be entitled to under the distributive provisions of this Act." Resolutions of the National
Bankruptcy, Conference. Annual Meeting. 1975, reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 43, at
1848. See also NBC Bankruptc
, 
Act of1975, supra note 60. The Conference stated that the Com-
mission language in § 4-607(b)(3) was "unclear as to whether all payments on liens and priority
claims are to be deemed preferential, even though such claims may be reached in bankruptcy
distribution." 1976 House Hearings, supra note 43, at 1841-42 (statement of Leon Forman on
behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference).
Note that both the Commission Bill and the Conference redraft considered all transfers during
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would have been $2000 had he not received the transfer. Suppose
other wage claimants have $3000 wage claims. If the assets of the es-
tate were sufficient to satisfy all section 507(a)(3) wage claims, each
claimant would receive $2000. 11 If the estate is depleted before un-
secured creditors are completely paid, the wage claimants other than.A
will receive less than 100%. A, on the other hand, had only a $2000
claim, which would be fully satisfied in Chapter 7 liquidation. There-
fore, although he has received a greater percentage than other wage
claimants, A has not been preferred. Under the "receives more" test,
he is no better off with the transfer than he would be without it.52
The misleading language in the House and Senate Reports is in part
attributable to the fact that earlier drafts retained the "greater percent-
age" test and merely added the language requiring a comparison to the
higher classes. 53 This narrow approach was abandoned on the recom-
mendation of the National Bankruptcy Conference, which concluded
that the section should be clarified by a simple comparison test.1 54 The
Conference substituted language to indicate that there could be no
preference if the creditor would be entitled to the same payment in
liquidation due to a valid lien or priority claim.' 5  This clarification
was made necessary because of a possible misapplication of the
"greater percentage" test under which the trustee theoretically could
recapture payments only to return the same amount to the creditor in
liquidation.'56 After this clarification, the focus of the section was no
longer a comparison with other "class" members but a comparison of
liquidation positions with and without the transfers. All subsequent
the critical period to be preferences. A payment which did not result in a creditor obtaining "a
greater percentage" was an exception to the definition of a preference. The first congressional
redraft, H.R. 6, the so-called "compromise bill," retained the liquidation comparison test, but
substituted the "receives more" language for the "greater percentage" language. Otherwise, the
changes in language are merely stylistic. This test, however, was reincorporated in the definition
of a preference, restoring the burden of proof on this element to the trustee. See supra note 76.
151. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981). See also H. DRAKE & A. MULLINS, BANKRUPTCY
PRAcTIcE § 7.06 (1980).
152. The date of the bankruptcy is the proper time for the comparison. See supra text accom-
panying notes 136-39.
153. The Commission & Judges' Billb, § 4-607(b)(3), made a transfer avoidable unless the
creditor received no "greater percentage of his claim than other creditors of the same class and
there are no unpaid creditors of a higher class."
154. See supra note 150.
155. See 1976House Hearings, supra note 43, at 1841-42 (statement of Leon Forman on behalf
of the National Bankruptcy Conference).
156. Id
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drafts contained the "receives more" language. 157
Although this new emphasis may not change the result in most cases,
it should not be ignored. Despite the House and Senate Reports, the
literal language of section 547(b)(5) and the context in which that lan-
guage was chosen should be controlling.'58 Undue emphasis on these
reports would be unfortunate in those cases where the new standard-
the clean, mechanical comparison required by section 547(b)(5)-is
critical to the outcome."59
Moreover, there are compelling reasons to abandon the "greater per-
centage" test. This test was the source of much of the contorted case
law which undermined the equality of distribution principle under the
old Act. The "greater percentage" test is often considered the statutory
basis for the phantom element of section 60: the necessity for an over-
all "diminution of the estate." This element, in turn, when combined
with certain fictions, gave rise to a gradually expanding case law net
result rule. As the next section of this Article demonstrates, this ele-
ment, and more specifically, the case law net result rule, are eliminated
from the new preference scheme. Nonetheless, courts are still using
this element to create exceptions through section 547(b) not specified in
section 547(c). 160 The overall integrity of the preference scheme might
better be assured if preference questions were analyzed without resort
to unnecessary and unwarranted section 60 language.
d. "Diminution of the Estate"
The section 60 case law concept most destructive to the new integra-
tion was born in the most innocent of contexts. The original 1898 ver-
sion of section 60 required, as a condition to the avoidance of a
preference, that the transferee have a "reasonable cause to believe that
157. See supra note 150.
158. The statements in the House and Senate Reports, see supra note 146, were apparently
designed to explain major substantive changes in a nontechnical manner. These explanations of
the preference section are short and make no attempt at detailed analysis. The introduction to the
discussion of the § 547(b)(5) phrasing in each begins with a statement that it "changes the applica-
tion of the greater percentage test from that employed under current law." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 12, at 87; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 372. It is therefore not surprising that these
reports refer to the "greater percentage" test and the comparison with members of the creditor's
claN and higher classes. The reports refer to the substantive change that was made in order to
deal with the potentially anomolous result under the old class comparison test. See supra text
accompanying note 147.
159. For the text of § 60(a), see supra note 4.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 192-207.
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it was intended thereby to give a preference."1 6' At the same time,
section 57(g) required the creditor to return all preferences, whether or
not they were avoidable, before his claims against the estate would be
"allowed."' 162 This resulted in particular hardship to the running ac-
counts creditor, who often received many unavoidable preferential
payments during the four-month period.
This silly and unfortunate rule was eventually rectified by Con-
gress.163 By the time Congress acted, however, the courts had already
intervened on behalf of the beleaguered running accounts creditors.
Since all section 60(a), or so-called "technical," preferences had to be
returned, the courts sought to take these payments out of the section
60(a) definition altogether. Courts read into section 60(a) a require-
ment that there be a net "diminution of the estate." This requirement
seemed to be tied to the language of the "greater percentage test," al-
though some language in the opinions also related to the "antecedent
debt" requirement. 164 In most of the cases, the response to the section
57(g) problem was a measured one. The technical preference that the
creditor was required to refund was reduced only by subsequent credit
extensions. 165 The First Circuit, however, adopted a broad approach to
the section 57(g) problem which the Supreme Court ultimately
adopted.' 66
The First Circuit and Supreme Court chose to treat all transactions
between the debtor and running accounts creditor which occurred dur-
ing the critical period as a single transaction. Providing relief from sec-
161. See supra notes 2 & 4.
162. As originally enacted, § 57(g) of the 1898 Act provided that "[tihe claims of creditors who
have received preferences shall not be allowed unless the creditors shall surrender their prefer-
ences." Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 57(g), 30 Stat. 544 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 502(d)
(Supp. V 1981)).
163. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 12, 32 Stat. 799.
164. See, eg., C.S. Morey Mercantile Co. v. Schiffer, 114 F. 447, 448-49 (8th Cir. 1902); Kim-
ball v. Rosenham Co., 114 F. 85, 88 (8th Cir. 1902).
165. The reasoning of these cases varied. Some courts read § 60(a) and § 60(c) together in an
attempt to define the creditor's § 57(g) responsibility to return a technical preference. Because
§ 60(c) provided for credit against preferential payments only to the extent of subsequent credit
remaining unpaid, only subsequent credit was considered in mitigation of the rigor of old § 57(g).
Gans v. Ellison, 114 F. 734, 736 (3d Cir. 1902); McKey v. Lee, 105 F. 923, 925 (7th Cir. 1901).
166. Jaquith v. Alden, 189 U.S. 78 (1903), aft'g 118 F. 270 (1st Cir. 1902). The reasoning was
originally set out in Dickson v. Wyman, 11 F. 726 (1st Cir. 1901), although the limitation of the
"set-off' to subsequent extensions of credit was not specifically abandoned until In re Topliff, 114
F. 323 (D. Mass. 1902). The issue was again raised in the lower court opinion in Jaquih and the
abandonment of the limitation was sustained by the First Circuit. 118 F. at 271.
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tion 57(g), the courts abandoned the limitation based on credit
extended after payment, a limitation which was consistent with the
premise of section 60(c). The creditor could utilize all credits during
the critical period to offset payments, and only the excess of payments
over credits were technical preferences subject to return under section
57(g). This "net result rule," was logically tied to the "greater percent-
age" test.167 If there was "no diminution of the estate" by the total
transactions within the critical period, the payments did not enable the
creditor to receive a "greater percentage. . . than any other creditor of
the same class."' 16 8
All the early federal cases, including the Supreme Court case, had
two elements in common. First, each case involved a running accounts
creditor. Second, in none of the cases had the trustee proved the "rea-
sonable cause to believe" required by section 60(b) for trustee avoid-
ance. 169 As a result, the original case law net result rule addressed only
the technical problem of the running accounts creditor under section
57(g) and affected only payments which the trustee could not have ulti-
mately avoided. The innocence, if not the integrity, of the rule was
maintained.
Although the basis of these cases became obsolete after the 1903
amendment to section 57(g), these cases had two lasting effects on sec-
tion 60.17' First, "diminution of the estate" made its way into the vo-
167. To the extent that the debtor's payments result in the creditor's subsequent decision to
extend credit, the payments can be analogized to the cash purchase of goods by the debtor. The
debtor is purchasing the opportunity for future credit extensions. The payments would not be "for
an artecedent debt" to the extent that they actually "bought" subsequent extensions. See, e.g.,
Kimball v. E.A. Rosenham Co., 114 F. 84, 88 (8th Cir. 1902). This reasoning has led some com-
mentators to tie the "diminution of the estate" requirement, at least in part, to the antecedent debt
element of a preference. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.20 (14th ed. 1976). The problem
with this tie-in i- obvious when there is an excess of payments over credits. If the payments are
not for antecedent debt, not even the excess would have to be returned. The statute, however,
clearly required such excess be returned. See, e.g., Gans v. Ellison, 114 F. 734 (3d Cir. 1902).
1 0. Dickson v. Wyman, Ill F. 726, 728 (1st Cir. 1901).
169. At that time, the trustee had to prove that the transferee had reasonable cause to believe a
prefcrene -A, intended. See supra text accompanying note 161. In a case in which a creditor
give\ credit and receives payments in the normal pattern, proof of this element, absent an admis-
Nion, would have required extraordinary evidence of the creditor's knowledge of the debtor's pur-
pow.e The purpose of the "net result" fiction was to protect running accounts creditors to whom
pay'ments were rarely avoidable.
170. See supra note 163. In two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court utilized the rule in
Jaquah ;. Alden. Both cases, however, arose from bankruptcies governed by the preamendment
verFTon of § 57(g). See Joseph Wild & Co. v. Provident Life & Trust Co., 214 U.S. 292 (1909);
Yaple v. Dahl-Millikan Grocery Co., 193 U.S. 526 (1904). The latter case is interesting because
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cabulary of the section 60(a) definition of a preference. For some time
after the 1903 amendment, case law insistence on a "diminution of the
estate" remained innocent and basically harmless. In most cases, the
element is merely an obvious restatement of the greater percentage
test-when the creditor gets more, the estate gets less. For example, the
element was most often utilized to protect transfers that were obviously
not preferences, such as payments in exchange for the release of valid
liens or payments to which the creditor would be otherwise entitled
under section 64.171 This element, however, also provided a convenient
device for protecting other transfers deemed worthy by the courts even
though such transfers seemed to fit the explicit section 60(a) definition
of a preference.17 2
The second related effect was the continued use of the net result rule
despite the amendment to section 57(g). 73 Here again, in nearly every
case, resort to the rule was unnecessary, largely because the trustee had
not proved that the creditor had "reasonable cause to believe in the
debtor's insolvency."'174 For a time, application of the rule was limited
the Supreme Court overruled the Third Circuit which was apparently dissatisfied with the rule in
Jaquith and seized upon the fact that the last transaction in that case was a sale of goods on credit
for $182.70. This followed a payment of over $534.78. The court attempted to limit the Jaquith
rule to those cases where the last transaction between the parties was a credit, however small.
Joseph Wild & Co. v. Provident Life & Trust Co., 153 F. 562 (3d Cir. 1907), a 'g 146 F. 142 (E.D.
Pa. 1906). The Supreme Court rejected this desperate attempt to limit the breadth of Jaquih. 214
U.S. at 297.
171. Johnson v. Root Mfg. Co., 241 U.S. 160 (1916); Stewart v. Platt, 101 U.S. 731 (1879);
Girand v. Kimbell Milling Co., 116 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1941); In re Read & Knight, 7 Am. Bankr.
R. Ill (S.D.N.Y. 1901).
172. Marshall v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 112 F.2d 380, 381 (5th Cir. 1940) (payments to ware-
house company vital to preserVing debtor's collateral); Richmond Standard Steel Spike & Iron Co.
v. Allen, 148 F. 657, 661 (4th Cir. 1906) (payments of salary to company president necessary to
keep establishment in operation); Dunn v. E.L. Gayvert & Co., 263 A.D. 785, 785, 31 N.Y.S.2d
370, 371-72 (1941) (disbursements for utility services "essential to the operation"), appeal dis.
missed, 288 N.Y. 669, 43 N.E.2d 72 (1942).
173. Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967);
Ricotta v. Bums Coal & Bldg. Supply Co., 264 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Fred Stem & Co., 54
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1931); Wilson v. Kanter, 275 F. 832 (7th Cir. 1921); In re Stewart, 233 F. Supp.
89 (D. Or. 1964); In re Grocers' Baking Co., 266 F. 900 (M.D. & N.D. Ala. 1920), affd sub nom
Eggleston v. Birmingham Trust & Say. Co., 277 F. 1015 (5th Cir. 1921); Dunlap v. Seattle Nat'l
Bank, 93 Wash. 568, 161 P. 364 (1916).
174. Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); In re
Fred Stern & Co., 54 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1931); In re Grocers' Baking Co., 266 F. 900 (M.D. & N.D.
Ala. 1920), af'dsub nom Eggleston v. Birmingham Trust & Sav. Co., 277 F. 1015 (5th Cir. 1921);
Dunlap v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 93 Wash. 568, 161 P. 364 (1916). Although recognizing its signifi-
cance as precedent, Learned Hand twice commented on the lack of a rational basis for the rule. In
reference to the three Supreme Court cases, he stated, "I am not sure that I understand on what
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to running accounts cases, although some courts later "deemed" other
credit arrangements analogous to running accounts and applied the
rule. 17
5
The expansion of the net result rule reached an unprecedented level
in Farmers Bank n. Julian.176  The application of the rule was unneces-
sary in that case, because the creditor, a bank lending against the
debtor's equipment, had no knowledge or notice of the debtor's insol-
vency.' 77 Nonetheless, the court in clear dictum stated that the net re-
sult rule would have applied even if section 60(b) had been satisfied.
Notably, the creditor was not a running accounts creditor, but rather an
installment lender which received a $12,000 preference, but subse-
quently advanced $16,000. 17 This is precisely the kind of case in
which section 60(c), the so-called statutory net result rule, was meant to
apply. 79 Section 60(c) limited the amount that could be set off against
principle those cases rest, but I cannot distinguish them on the facts." Federal Int'l Banking Co. v.
Childs, 54 F.2d 478, 481 (2d Cir. 1931) (Hand, J., concurring). In Childs, the trustee failed to meet
his burden of proof under § 60(b). In dictum in a later case which did not apply the rule, Hand
stated "It]he doctrine is somewhat anomolous at best, and can be defended in principle only by
thefction of treating all items of the account as one. ... Wilcox v. Goess, 92 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 647 (1938) (emphasis added).
175. Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); In re
Stewart, 233 F. Supp. 89 (D. Or. 1964); Dunlap v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 93 Wash. 568, 161 P. 364
(1916) Sewiari was a variation of a running accounts arrangement. The debtor and creditor
agreed that the creditor would not deliver more gasoline to the debtor until the debtor paid for a
prior load. This arrangement was entered into after the creditor became aware of the debtor's
financial problems. This is not a "like-cash" transaction typical of the running account credit
arrangement. This was a conscious arrangement of additional credit in exchange for a payment of
an existing debt, an ideal case for § 60(c) treatment. The court found no reason to reach the
question of the applicability of § 60(c). 233 F. Supp. at 93.
The Dunlap case involved the accounts of the bankrupt bank with another bank. The court
analogized this to a "mutual running account." Once again, § 60(c) would have been a proper
route, with the overdraft withdrawals of the bankrupt qualifying for § 60(c) treatment. 93 Wash.
at 5X0, 161 P.2d at 369. For a discussion of the Julian case, see infra text accompanying notes 176-
85.
176. 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert denied 389 U.S. 1021 (1967).
377. Id at 326-27.
17s. The debtor paid back $9000 on account of the $12,000 loan. When the $16,000 advance
was made, $3000 was applied to the antecedent debt. Id at 326.
179. The Bankruptcy Act §60(c) provided:
If a creditor has been preferred, and afterward in good faith gives the debtor further
credit without security of an) kind for property which becomes a part of the debtor's
estate, the amount of such new credit remaining unpaid at the time of the adjudication in
bankruptcy may be set off against the amount which would otherwise be recoverable
from him.
Because of limitations on the set-off, § 60(c) was not really a "net result rule," but the name has
been consistently applied. There has been understandable confusion because of the attention
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recoverable preferences to new credit advanced after the preferences. 180
The amount of this set-off was further limited to the subsequent ad-
vances which remained unpaid.' 8 ' In this case, an allowable section 68
set-off reduced the "credit remaining unpaid" under section 60(c) to
approximately $6000.182 The trustee therefore claimed that the remain-
ing amount of approximately $6000 was still avoidable. Dissatisfied
with the extent of the relief provided by section 60(c), the court applied
the more generous case law net result rule. 183 The court reasoned that
the subsequent advance was made only because the debtor made the
preferential payment. Since the advance was greater than the prefer-
ence, the estate was not diminished. The opinion in Julian also ex-
tended the case law net result rule beyond the running accounts
creditor. The court justified this extension on the grounds that "the
equitable principles that would govern that class of cases" were equally
applicable to a loan payment and subsequent advance184 The new
extension of credit was prompted by the prior payment, and no doubt
the lender assumed the payment valid. The statutory formula in sec-
tion 60(c) was designed to apply to this very situation. The fact that the
court or creditor was dissatisfied with the amount "saved" by section
given to the case law "net result rule" derived from Jaquith. The confusion could be avoided by
referring to the statutory rule as simply § 60(c). Because the cases and literature use the "net
result rule" label, however, confusion is avoided by reference to either the "case law net result
rule" or the "statutory net result rule."
180. Id
181. This requirement led to some injustices. The basic theory is sound, because if the ad-
vances were paid back, the creditor did not redeem prior preferences by restoring the money to the
estate. Unfortunately, the payment on these advances might also have been preferential. The
trustee would argue that the new credit did not remain unpaid, yet at the same time seek return of
those payments as preferences. See Grandison v. National Bank of Commerce, 231 F. 800 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 644 (1916) (trustee successfully advanced this argument). Contra In re
Ace Fruit & Produce Co., 49 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). For an excellent discussion of this
problem and other accounting problems under § 60(c), see Note, The Proposed Amendment to
Resolve the "Remainimg Unpaid" Paradox of Section 60c of the Bankruptcy Act, 64 YALE L.J. 293
(1954). These problems have been eliminated under § 547(c)(4). See infra text accompanying
notes 284-89.
182. Section 68 of the Act allowed mutual debts and credits between the bankrupt to be set off
against the other. The set-off should not be confused with § 60(c), which allowed a set-off against
the amount of recoverable preferences to the extent of subsequent advances which remain unpaid.
In Julian, the availability of a § 68 set-off reduced the amount of new credit that remained unpaid
under § 60(c).
183. 383 F.2d at 327. Note that the "injustice" was caused by the "remaining unpaid" lan-
guage of § 60(c), not the requirement that advances be subsequent to the preferences,
184. Id at 328.
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60(c) seemed meager justification for the nonstatutory net result rule.18 5
There is substantial mischief in the extension of the "diminution of
the estate" element and its corollary case law net result rule beyond the
original justifications. Any court can extend these devices to any set of
facts if it desires to save a transaction it deems worthy. In fact, some
courts have indicated a willingness to go beyond the net result rule and
create an additional exception based solely on the derived element of
"diminution of the estate." These courts seemed to indicate that the
estate is not diminished if payment is made to a creditor whose role is
crucial to "the ability of a business to operate and thereby, at a mini-
mum preserve the value of its assets for all creditors."' 1 6 In some of the
185. One commentator has taken the position that a court should apply the case law net result
rule when dissatisfied with § 60(c). Taylor, Section 60(c) of the Bankruptcy Act: Inadequate Protec-
tion for the Running Account Creditor. 24 VAND. L. REv. 919, 923 (1971). Although the applica-
tion of the rule seems clearly improper when defended on that ground, the court in Julian relied
on this justification.
186. See, e.g., In re National Home Prods., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1295 (E.D. La. Nov. 6,
1978) (utility payments). The court rejected a Sixth Circuit decision, In re Columbus Malleable,
459 F.2d 118, 121 (6th Cir. 1972), which had correctly stated that the estate is diminished when-
ever a creditor received a larger percentage than creditors of the same class. The estate is dimin-
ished because it has less than it would have had if the preference were recovered. In order to
circumvent this fact, a court must indulge some fiction. In the original case law net result rule
opinions, the courts treated a number of payments and credits as a single transaction. Other
courts have distorted the "greater percentage" test by use of a unique hindsight device. These
cases have held that a transfer does not diminish the estate if in hindsight the transfer enabled the
debtor to continue his business or obtain further credit from the transferee. The theory here seems
to be that if the creditor had known the payment would be avoided, he would have defaulted the
debtor and ceased doing business rather than pursue the course actually taken. See 4 BANKR. CT.
DEC, (CRR) at 1297-98; Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d at 327-38.
Recently, a court has misapplied § 547(b)(5) by resort to the same type of hindsight. See In re
Bullen, 11 Bankr. 440 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981). The creditor, GMAC, had received installment
payments on a car loan during the critical period. The court reasoned that the creditor did not
receive more because if the payments had not been made, the creditor would have repossessed the
car at an earlier time, when it was worth more money. The creditor was greatly undersecured at
bankruptcy, and apparently was also undersecured during the entire 90-day period. The trustee
correctly reasoned that the payments enabled GMAC to receive more of the unsecured portion of
the loan. Section 547(b)(5) does not require the trustee or court to speculate on the creditor's
activity had the preferential payment not been made. For a case decided correctly on facts identi-
cal to Bullen, see In re McCormick, 5 Bankr. 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
The clean, mechanical § 547(b)(5) test authorizes no such speculation. It demands a simple
comparison: has the creditor received more than what he would have received in liquidation had
the transfer not been made? The principle of equality in distribution gives no greater rights to
parties who have received preferences and continued doing business with the debtor in the ordi-
nary fashion as compared to those who have not received preferences. All have not anticipated
the debtor's bankruptcy, and those who receive payments should not be better off. Those cases in
which a creditor is permitted "preferred" treatment are contained in § 547(c).
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section 60 cases, the transfers were truly "worthy," and the end result
could be justified on independent policy grounds.'8 7 In fact, many of
those transfers are now specifically protected under section 547(c).188
Unfortunately, when these cases were decided, section 60 did not pro-
vide a direct route to achieve this protection.18 9
Cases like Julian, however, are far less justifiable. This kind of ad
hoe exception undermines The equality of distribution principle even
more central to section 547 than to old section 60. The problems with
section 60(c) 90 have been corrected in section 547(c)(4). This accom-
plished, the diminution of the estate element and its case law corol-
laries are at best unnecessary. At worst, continued resort to this
requirement and its progeny will lead to cases that distort the new pref-
erence scheme.' 91
Such a distortion occurred in the case of In re Fulghum Construction
Co. 192 The creditors were major shareholders of the corporation and
had extensive knowledge of its dire financial condition. They loaned
additional money to the corporation during the critical period, which
enabled the corporation to complete certain jobs. The payments from
those jobs were subsequently transferred to these creditors in payment.
The trustee sought to avoid these clearly preferential transfers under
187. Each of the judicially created exceptions to § 60 has some independent policy basis. For
example, many of the "current expense" cases involving payments to trade creditors, employees or
utilities, supra note 50, were prompted by a need to protect these transfers. These services are
essential to continuation of the business and therefore preserve the "going-concern" value of the
enterprise. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45. The original case law net result rule as
applied to running accounts creditors may be similarly justified. Those rules designed to protect
the floating lien secured creditor are also probably based on a judicial determination that these
secured credit arrangements should be protected despite the absence of an explicit basis in the
statute. See supra text accompanying notes 81-95.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
189. 4 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR), at 1297-99.
190. For a discussion of the problems with § 60(c), see supra text accompanying notes 181-83.
See also infra text accompanying notes 284-89.
191. Equality of distribution is the cornerstone of § 547. See supra note 43. Factors such as
creditor knowledge, intent to gain advantage, or participation in the race of diligence are no
longer relevant. 'Litigation over "bad" preference behavior has been reduced for the sake of effi-
ciency. One court, although sympathetic to the creditor who received payment in good faith,
correctly and vigorously applied the § 547 test. In re Keeling, 11 Bankr. 351, 362 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1981). While the court expressed some doubt about the justice of the mandated result, its
doubt was misplaced. Section 547 does not punish creditors who have received payment. It
merely places them in the same position as others who have not.
192. 7 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980), af'd, 14 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
The district court summarily adopted the reasoning of the bankruptcy court in applying the case
law net result rule.
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section 547. The creditors successfully argued that there was no prefer-
ence under the case law net result rule. The bankruptcy court accepted
the creditor's argument that diminution of the estate remained an ele-
ment of a preference under section 547, and on appeal the district court
agreed. 93 Moreover, both courts concluded that the corollary case law
net result rule was also reincorporated into new section 547(b) in the
absence of legislative history to the contrary. 194 Although such legisla-
tive history did exist, it was not mentioned in either opinion.195 Like
the earlier Julian case, Fulghum applied a rule derived from section
60(a) case law even though an explicit exception designed to provide
credit against preferential transfers failed to go far enough to satisfy
these creditors. Fulghum provides even less justification for applying
the case law net result rule than did Julian. Fulghum involved insider
creditors who, as major shareholders, were trying to preserve their in-
vestments. Both Fulghum opinions went to great lengths to extend the
rule to cases where the creditor had knowledge of the debtor's insol-
vency. Finally, both courts took for granted the validity of a section 60
concept in the new section 547 structure. 96
In Fulghum, the bankruptcy court and the district court both rea-
soned that the estate was not diminished because the additional loans
enabled the corporation to complete the jobs and obtain payment. Of
103. Id at 643, 647; 14 Bankr. at 304.
194, Id at 647; 14 Bankr. at 304.
195. Both the Gilmore Committee Report and the Commission Report recommended subse-
quent advance exceptions derived from old § 60(c). GILMORE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 9,
§ 60a(4)(II); Commission Bill § 4-607(c)(2). Both the Gilmore Committee Report and Commis-
sion Report recognized the existence of the case law net result rule and indicated that the new
subsection was replacing those cases, GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 215. The
clearest statement was contained in the Commission Report:
The Commission's recommendation does not, however, go as far as the "net result
rule" established by some early cases. A true "net result" rule would total all payments
and all advances and offset the one against the other. This is not allowed under the
Commission's recommendation, since the advance to be offset must be subsequent to the
preference.
COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 1), supra note 8, at 210-11.
Although § 547(c)(4) was subsequently redrafted to deal with the "remaining unpaid" and se-
curity problems, the requirement that the advance occur subsequent remained unchanged. There
was no indication of any attempt to resurrect the case law net result rule.
The House and Senate Reports, not surprisingly, make no mention of the case law net result
rule. They do, however, recognize that the § 547(c)(4) formula covers cases in which "the creditor
and the debtor have more than one exchange during the 90-day period. House REPORT,
supra note 12, at 374; SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 88.
196. 7 Bankr. at 647; 14 Bankr. at 305.
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course, every creditor of the bankrupt, including suppliers, employees,
and other unsecured lenders could make the same argument. The sole
difference between these shareholders and other creditors was that the
shareholders received payment. This is precisely the inequity section
547 was designed to prevent. The shareholders had no security interest
in these payments. The other unsecured creditors are entitled to share
at least equally with these shareholder creditors. Moreover, some un-
secured creditors have been designated for priority over these share-
holder creditors. 197
The Fulghum courts were apparently dissatisfied with the congres-
sional limits on the credit set-off expressly available against preferential
transfers. Under section 547(c)(4), as under section 60(c), 198 the credi-
tor is entitled to set off against specific preferential transfers subsequent
qualifying new value. 199 In Fulghum, only some of the creditor's ad-
vances were subsequent to the preferential payments °.2  The trustee
unsuccessfully argued that the creditors were only entitled to the exclu-
sive and more limited relief of section 547(c)(4). He argued that this
exception only applied after all the elements of section 547 had been
proved, and that no case law net result rule should be injected into
197. Some unsecured creditors such as employees, consumer customers, and taxing govern-
mental units would have limited priorities under § 507 over general unsecured creditors like the
shareholders in Fulghum.
198. See, e.g., Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1021
(1967).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83; infra text accompanying notes 284-95.
200. Because the defendants, Ranier & Associates, were "insiders" as defined in § 10 1(26), the
relevant period was the one year prior to the filing of a petition on January 5, 1980. The balance
sheet reflecting this one year period was made available to the authors by the trustee, Robert H.
Waldschmidt of Cosner, Waldschmidt & Cracker, Nashville, Tennessee. During this period, ap-
proximately 70 transactions took place between Fulghum Construction and Ranier & Associates.
Some of these transactions involved rental payments for certain construction equipment which
was sold by Fulghum to Ranier in a disputed sale and leaseback arrangement. This arrangement
was upheld by both the bankruptcy and district courts. 14 Bankr. at 297-300. These rental pay-
ments, however, were also preferential and at least some of them were not made within the 45
days set out in § 547(c)(2). Unless Ranier & Associates met their burden under § 547(c)(2), all of
these payments would be recoverable. It is not clear whether the trustee attempted to recover all
these as preferences, but he did try to recover those paid after July 27, 1979.
Although these transactions are difficult to reconstruct, a few facts are clear. Most important,
Fulghum made a preferential payment of $300,000 to Ranier & Associates on November 30, 1979.
No advances were made after this date and this entire amount was recoverable. Between July 27,
1979, when Ranier received a $100,000 preference, and November 11, the date of the last advance,
Ranier received preferences totalling $931,400. Ranier made advances qualifying as § 547(c)(4)
credit totalling $837,000. The trustee should therefore recover an additional $94,000 in
preferences.
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section 547(b).2 ° ' The Fulghum courts rejected these arguments finding
that two net result rules, one in section 547(b)(5) and a narrower one in
section 547(c)(4), must exist side by side in the preference section.20 2
The section 547(c)(4) distinction between prior advances and ad-
vances made after preferential transfers is not only clear, it is sound. A
person who receives a preferential payment and then enriches the es-
tate with new value has "redeemed" himself. A person who advances
credit before receiving a preference is no different than any other credi-
tor who has given money, goods, or services to the debtor with one
exception. He has been paid! Furthermore, a creditor who makes ad-
vances during the critical pre-petition period and subsequently receives
a preference is no different than his counterpart who advances money
just before the critical period and subsequently receives a preference.2 °3
Another recent case has denied an arguably more deserving good faith
creditor the benefit of the case law net result rule because it undermines
the legislative judgment behind section 547(c)(4).2 4  Indeed, the
Fulghum result undermines the selective legislative judgment behind
all of the section 547(c) exceptions.
A broad "injection" of the case law net result rule into section 547(b)
would make section 547(c) largely superfluous. As long as a creditor
gave as much or more credit than the payment received, he could argue
that the estate was not diminished. What need for section 547(c)(1),
protecting substantially contemporaneous exchanges? If the value
given and the debtor's transfer have equal value, the net result rule
could protect the transfer even if it is not substantially contemporane-
ous. Why have section 547(c)(2) protecting ordinary course payments
20]. 7 Bankr. at 647; 14 Bankr. at 303.
202 Id.; 14 Bankr. at 304.
203. In defense of a common law net result rule at least one commentator has taken the posi-
tion that pre-preference credit during the critical period should be treated the same as post-prefer-
ence credit during the period. See Taylor, supra note 185, at 921. However, the creditor who
extends unsecured credit before being preferred is certainly different from the creditor who, subse-
quent to a preference, redeems the transfer with an infusion of new credit. The pre-preference
credit extension was not in any sense induced by the particular preferential payment in question.
Only the arbitrary time frame of the critical period makes the pre-preference advance within the
period distinguishable from all those extensions of credit just before the beginning of the critical
period.
204 In re Rustia, 20 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also In re Thomas W. Garland,
Inc., 19 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982). All utility bills that are timely paid, as they were in
Garland, will be protected if Congress acts to expand the § 547(c)(2) time frame. See supra note
15. The drafters of § 547 clearly intended to protect these payments and this change would be
warranted. See supra text accompanying notes 47-65.
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made within forty-five days of the debt? As long as the payments were
for equal value received, the estate would not be diminished even if the
payments came after forty-five days or outside the ordinary course.
Would section 547(c)(3) be necessary because an enabling loan by defi-
nition enables the debtor to purchase goods which enrich the estate?
Why have section 547(c)(4) give a set-off for subsequent advances? Af-
ter all, the case law net result rule provides a set-off for subsequent and
prior advances.20 5
Although no court would give such broad application to the rule to
reach this absurd result, selective application of the rule is no more
justifiable. It allows some creditors to receive better treatment than
other creditors who have not been paid, even though Congress has not
provided them with exceptional treatment under section 547(c). 20 6
It should be noted that section 547(c) provides considerable protec-
tion for insider creditors such as those in Fulghum. They were, of
course, entitled to the more limited protection of section 547(c)(4).
Moreover, had they taken and perfected a security interest in the ac-
counts, they would have been entitled to the considerable protection of
section 547(c)(5).2°7
The case law net result rule began under section 60 to protect the
running accounts creditor against a technical injustice. Its continuing
validity under section 60, even in the running accounts cases, was
doubtful. Its application to creditors such as the Fulghum shareholders
seems most inappropriate even under old section 60, and certainly it
has no place in the new preference scheme.
205. 7 Bankr. at 646. The application of the case law net result rule in the face of the § 547(c)
exceptions recalls to mind the story of the farmer who cut two holes in his barn: one for his big
dog, one for his little dog.
206. See supra note 43.
207. If the creditor had taken a security interest in the accounts, he would have been entitled
to all bankruptcy accounts, except to the extent that the gap, if any, between collateral and indebt-
edness was narrowed during the period described in § 547(c)(5). See infra text accompanying
notes 296-308. Because the indebtedness was apparently small at the beginning of the relevant
period, § 547(c)(5) might have protected almost all of these transfers. The creditors, however,
neglected to obtain a security agreement. They have no one but themselves to blame for their less
favorable treatment as unsecured creditors. Nor should the court utilize a contrived device such
as the case law net result rule to protect these creditors from their own mistakes. In fact, if the
shareholders had taken a security interest and perfected it, other creditors might have been given
helpful notice of the state of the debtor's financial affairs.
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C. Some Problems in the Context of Commercial Financing.
Suggested Solutions
L 4cquiring Collateral- The Circularity Problems in Section
547(b) 5)
a. In General
In an after-acquired property financing arrangement, both transfers
of security and payments typically occur during the critical pre-petition
period. As already noted, in applying the "receives more" test of sec-
tion 547(b)(5), the trustee will measure the effects of these transfers on
the creditor's recovery in the actual liquidation.2 °0 If only one type of
pre-petition transfer is involved, and if none of these transfers are pro-
tected by the exceptions in section 547(c), the mechanics of section
547(b)(5) are neatly applied. If only section 547(b) need be considered,
payments on the antecedent debt during the critical period will be
avoidable preferences unless the creditor was truly fully secured or un-
less he would have received the same payment in liquidation.20 9 Col-
lateral transfers during the critical period will be avoidable preferences
unless they are superfluous. 210
b. Payments and Collateral Acquisitions
When both collateral transfers and payments occur during the criti-
cal period, the application of the section 547(b)(5) test appears to be
circular. When payments are challenged, the trustee must prove that
the creditor is not fully secured. In order to prove this, he may have to
determine the extent to which collateral held is the product of avoida-
ble transfers. When these collateral transfers are being challenged, the
trustee must establish which transfers are preferences and which are
merely superfluous. To make this determination, the trustee must ap-
parently decide the extent to which payments are avoidable.21' Where
does the trustee start? At first blush, the trustee cannot start with either
collateral transfers or payments without making circular assumptions.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34 & 146-49.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 14041.
211. The trustee would need to make this determination in order to calculate the size of the
creditor's claim against which the creditor seeks to reach collateral. If payments are avoided, the
size of the claim will of course be increased.
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Assumptions are appropriate, but they need not be circular in order to
faithfully apply section 547(b)(5). Consider the following illustration:
CASE 7. The creditor (Smith) entered the ninety-day period with a
security interest in the debtor's (Jones) machines, now owned or after-
acquired. At that time, Jones owned machines A and B, worth $50,000
each. Jones owed Smith $150,000. On January 10, Jones sold machine A
with authorization but squandered the proceeds. On January 30, in an
unrelated transaction, Jones acquired two new machines, C and D, worth
$50,000 each. On February 1, Jones paid Smith $50,000. On February
15, he acquired one more machine, E, also worth $50,000. On March 1,
Jones paid Smith another $50,000. On April 1, the bankruptcy petition
was filed.
In Case 7, the trustee will challenge both the payments and the col-
lateral transfers. The circularity problem is avoided by starting with
one basic assumption: under the section 547(b)(5) test, the creditor is
only entitled to discrete items of collateral or the proceeds of previously
held collateral on hand both at the beginning of the critical period and
also on hand in its original form or as proceeds on the date of the peti-
tion. All items acquired during the critical period either improve the
creditor's position under the section 547(b)(5) test or are in excess of the
creditor's claim and are therefore superfluous.212
In Case 7, machine B is the only machine which is neither vulnerable
under section 547(b)(5) nor superfluous. If Smith finds it necessary to
resort to his security in any other machine to satisfy his claim, then the
transfer of that security "enables him to receive more." If Smith does
not find it necessary, he can make no claim to the machine. While the
trustee will not be able to place the collateral transfers in one of these
two categories until he determines the extent to which payments can be
recovered, he can assume that the additional collateral must be in one
of these categories, and therefore remains "unavailable" to the credi-
tor.21 3 Since it is clear that no section 547(c) exceptions apply in this
212. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. V 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
213. In Case 7, if both $50,000 payments are preferential and therefore avoided, the creditor's
adjusted claim becomes $150,000. Since this is the maximum adjusted claim, at most the creditor
could recover $150,000 in collateral. Machine E, therefore, clearly falls in the category of super-
fluous collateral. Machines C and D are preferential if the trustee recovers both payments. With
the obligation adjusted back to $150,000, the acquisition of machines C and D enables him to
"receive more," that is, to become fully secured as compared to unsecured for $100,000. If only
one payment is recoverable, only the interest in machine C is a preference, but machine D be-
comes superfluous, since the claim would only be $100,000. Finally, if no payments are avoidable,
only machine B would be necessary to satisfy the outstanding $50,000 claim; the other machines,
[Vol. 61:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/1
PREFERENCE RULES
illustration, the trustee can now determine to what extent collateral is
"available" to the creditor because the transfer is neither avoidable nor
superfluous. Only the creditor's claim to machine B survives this appli-
cation of section 547(b).
Since the trustee can determine the extent to which collateral is prop-
erly "available" to the creditor, he can also determine if payments were
made to a truly fully secured creditor. Because the creditor can claim
only machine B, both of the $50,000 payments made during the critical
period are preferential. Without these payments the creditor's claim in
liquidation would be $150,000 secured by $50,000 in collateral. As a
result, he would get the collateral and have an unsecured claim for
$100,000. With these payments, the creditor holds $100,000 and claims
only $50,000 secured by $50,000 of unavoidable collateral. With the
payments there would be no unsecured claim. Unless the estate is suffi-
cient to completely satisfy all unsecured claims, a virtual impossibility
in bankruptcy, the payments clearly enable the creditor to "receive
more."
Once the trustee has established that these payments meet the section
547(b)(5) test, he can easily determine in which category of "unavaila-
bility" the collateral transfers fall. In Case 7, the creditor now has a
$150,000 claim. If Smith is permitted to reach any machine, C, D, or E,
the transfer will enable him to "receive more. '214
The circularity problem created by the relationship between pay-
ments and transfers of collateral, common to after-acquired property
financing, is therefore overcome by resort to a single, valid assumption.
In applying section 547(b)(5), the creditor is only entitled to collateral
or its proceeds held at the beginning of the critical period and still held
on the date of the petition in its original or proceeds form.
c. The Section 547(b)(5) Comparison and the Section 547(c)
Exceptions
The relationship between sections 547(b)(5) and 547(c) suggests a
C, D and E, would all be superfluous. In all cases, only machine B represents a valid claim in
collateral.
214. For a discussion of Case 3, see supra text accompanying notes 132-34. Of course, if ma-
chines C and D had been available to the creditor, machine E would have been superfluous. The
fully secured position which would make machine E superfluous, however, cannot be preference-
built. In this case, the trustee could simply analyze and avoid the collateral transfers one at a time.
As soon as the transfer of machine C is avoided, machine E is no longer superfluous.
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second potential circularity problem. If a collateral transfer is unavoid-
able because one of the section 547(c) exceptions applies, related pay-
ments might seem safe because of the resulting improvement in the
creditor's secured position. Following this reasoning, section 547(b)(5)
could be read to include a complete section 547(c) analysis as part of
the comparison of liquidation positions required by the "receives
more" test. This approach ignores the purpose of section 547(b) in the
preference scheme and creates a number of serious problems easily
avoided by applying the section 547(b)(5) liquidation comparison with-
out an "advance" application of section 547(c). Consider the following
illustration:
CASE 8. The creditor (Smith) entered the ninety-day period on Janu-
ary 1 with a security interest in two of the debtor's (Jones) machines, A
and B. Each machine was worth $50,000. At that time, Jones owed
Smith $100,000. On January 10, Jones sold machine A with Smith's au-
thorization, granted in return for a security interest in another of Jones's
machines, C. Unfortunately, Jones was tardy in executing the new secur-
ity agreement and did not sign the agreement until January 19. Smith
filed a financing statement on the same day. On February 1, Jones paid
Smith $50,000. No other relevant events occurred until April 1, when a
bankruptcy petition was filed.
Under section 547(e)(2), the transfer of the interest in machine C
cannot occur before January 19, the date the security interest is effec-
tive between the parties.2 t5 This is a transfer of security for an antece-
dent debt. It is clear that section 547(c)(1) eventually protects the
transfer of the interest in machine C.21 6 The authorization to sell the
collateral, which is a release of a security interest, fits the definition of
215. Under U.C.C. § 9-203(I)(a), a security interest is not enforceable and does not attach
until the "debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral."
This occurred on January 19. The phrase in § 547(e) "at the time such transfer takes effect" is not
defined in the Code and apparently refers to effectiveness under applicable state or federal law.
For an Article 9 security interest, this occurs at attachment. Subsection (e) might therefore seem
unnecessary, since attachment can never occur until the debtor has also received value and ac-
quired rights in the collateral. Subsection (e)(3) was added to specifically overrule cases such as
DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969), which dated the transfer back to the time of
filing. This subsection effectively prevents courts from attempting to make a transfer effective
before the collateral is acquired by reading DuBay theory into the state law. For example, a court
in a nonbankruptcy case has dated the perfection of the security interest in after-acquired accounts
as the date of the original filing. Rocky Mountain Ass'n of Credit Management v. Hessler Mfg.
Co., 553 P.2d 840, 842-43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
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new value in section 547(a)(2). 217 The parties intended a contempora-
neous exchange and the exchange was substantially contemporane-
ous.291 If section 547(c) is applied as a part of the section 547(b)(5) test,
the transfer of collateral would be protected at liquidation even though
it enabled the creditor to "receive more." If the collateral is already
viewed as protected when the subsection (b)(5) test is applied to the
payment, then it appears that the payment does not enable him to "re-
ceive more." The payment seems to have been secured by the addi-
tional collateral. The advance application of subsection (c) creates a
misleading impression that the payment was to a fully secured creditor
and also not preferential. If the payment is not preferential, Smith's
claim is only $50,000 and his security interest in machine C is superflu-
ous. When application of section 547(c)(1) is made a necessary predi-
cate to the section 547(b)(5) calculation, the real intent of section
547(c)(1) is warped. Section 547(c)(1) is designed to protect "substan-
tially contemporaneous" transfers. The effect of the advanced applica-
tion of subsection (c) is to protect a payment which is not even arguably
substantially contemporaneous. The substantially contemporaneous
transfer-the transfer of the interest in the substitute machine-has
been rendered superfluous by protecting the payment under subsection
(b)(5).
On the other hand, if the section 547(b)(5) test is applied without first
considering section 547(c), proper characterization of both the transfer
of collateral and the payment is easy. If the trustee utilizes the basic
assumption used to solve the first circularity problem, the transfer of
machine C is either preferential under section 547(b) or superfluous. In
either case, before section 547(c) is applied, Smith can only claim
machine B. With the payment, Smith has $50,000 in cash and a
$50,000 claim secured by $50,000 in collateral. Without the transfer,
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer
was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantial]h contemporaneous exchange;
217, Under U.C.C. § 9-306, security interests continue in collateral unless the sale is author-
zed. The Bankruptcy Code defines new value in § 547(a)(2) as follows:
(2) "new value" means mone or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or
release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transac-
tion that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable
law, but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation;
I1 U S.C. § 547(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
2IN. See, e~g., In re Arnett 13 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
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but before section 547(c) is applied, Smith's liquidation position would
be a $100,000 claim secured by $50,000 in collateral. The payment of
$50,000 is therefore preferential because it enables Smith to "receive
more" under the section 547(b)(5) test. At this point, it is clear that the
collateral transfer is not superfluous since Smith's claim becomes
$100,000 after section 547(b) is applied to the payment. The collateral
transfer, therefore, is preferential under section 547(b). This is the ap-
propriate time for Smith to prove that section 547(c)(1) protects the
tardy substitution of the security interest in machine C. If Smith car-
ries his burden of proof under section 547(c)(1), he will be left with a
$100,000 claim and $100,000 in collateral.219
Why is it important to the new preference scheme that the trustee be
able to avoid a payment, only to validate an equivalent transfer of se-
curity? Often there may be no reason, and the trustee has nothing to
gain by seeking avoidance of the payment.220 If, however, there is
question of value, the parties will receive the asset with which they are
best suited to deal. Essentially, the risk that the value of collateral is
less than the claim falls on the secured party, not the estate.
There are more compelling reasons to follow this approach, reasons
that go to the heart of the new integration scheme. First, the language
of section 547 indicates that transfers meeting all the requirements of
section 547(b) may be avoided "[e]xcept as provided in section 547(c)."
This clearly seems to require application of all the elements of section
547(b) before the exceptions in section 547(c) are relevant. The legisla-
tive history supports this view.221 In addition, this approach is consis-
219. The creditor has the burden of proving that § 547(c) exceptions protect a transfer. See
supra note 76.
220. If the § 547(c)(1) exception applies, the trustee could avoid the payment, but not the
collateral transfer. If he does not avoid the payment, the estate will recapture the collateral be-
cause the creditor has no claim to it. In either case, the estate recaptures the identical amount of
property. If the trustee's compensation is tied to the amount of property brought into the estate,
there is no incentive to recapture preferences which result in the estate losing collateral. There-
fore, the trustee may decide to forego recovery.
221. This structure, a broad general definition of avoidable preferences followed by exceptions
to the trustee's avoidance power, was present in the Gilmore Committee redraft of § 60, the Com-
mission Bill, Judges' Bill and NBC Bankruptcy Act of 1975. Proponents recognized that transfers
within the critical period would fit the general definition of a preference, but these preferences
could be protected by exceptions. See, e.g., 1976 House Hearings, supra note 43, at 1859 (state-
ment of Mr. Forman on behalf of National Bankruptcy Conference). The NBC Bankruptcy Acl of
1975, supra note 60, amended the Commission Bill by adding an introduction to the exceptions
subsection which stated that "notwithstanding subsection (a), the trustee may not avoid any of the
following transfers .. " § 4-607(b), at 362. The NBC Bankruptcy Act made this amendment to
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tent with the proper allocation of the burden of proof. In Case 8, the
trustee met his burden under section 547(b) and initially could avoid
both the collateral transfer and payment. To protect the additional col-
lateral, Smith then was forced to prove all the elements of section
547(c)(1), most importantly, that a contemporaneous exchange was in-
tended. If application of the section 547(c) exceptions were essential to
the comparison required by section 547(b)(5), the trustee would be in
an anomalous position. Because the trustee bears the burden of proof
with respect to the elements of a preference in section 547(b), he would
have to prove that the section 547(c) exceptions did not apply.222
Another compelling reason for applying section 547(b)(5) without re-
sort to section 547(c) is practical necessity. When after-acquired
property financing is involved, numerous payments and collateral
transfers may occur during the critical pre-petition period. The
avoidability of payments may depend on whether the creditor is truly
fully secured or whether his apparently fully secured position is prefer-
ence-built. At best, the incorporation of the section 547(c) exceptions
into section 547(b)(5) makes the "receives more" test unnecessarily
complex. Moreover, certain section 547(c) exceptions, particularly sub-
sections (c)(4) and (c)(5), require initial determinations of the
avoidability of payments or collateral transfers.223
2. Acquiring New Collateral.- The Substitution Problem
An analysis of the "true" collateral substitution demonstrates how
radically different the new definition in section 547(b) is from the old
one in section 60. A "true" substitution occurs when a creditor releases
collateral in a simultaneous exchange for a security interest in new col-
lateral. Substitutions which are slightly tardy are certainly covered by
clarify that "each of the various exceptions to subsection (a) . . . . is available as a defense in any
given case". Id at 363 (emphasis added). See COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 171
n.14; GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 214. See also Kronman, supra note 11, at
140.
Although Congress did not choose to adopt this National Bankruptcy Conference language, it
clearly intended to adopt the same approach suggested by these earlier drafts. The House and
Senate Reports refer to § 547(b) as "the operative provision of the section." HousE REPORT, supra
note 12, at 372; SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 87. The explanation of § 547(c) refers to the
provisions as "exceptions to the trustee's avoiding power" and as protection from avoidance.
HOuLJE REPORT, supra note 12, at 373; SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 88.
222. See supra note 76.
223. For a discussion of the complications that arise in integrating the § 547(c)(4) and
§ 547(c)(5) exceptions, see infra text accompanying notes 320-46.
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the section 547(c)(1) exception.22 4 Under section 60, a substantially
contemporaneous substitution was sometimes treated in the same man-
ner as a "true" substitution, which was not preferential to the extent the
estate was not diminished.225 Under section 547(b), these substantially
contemporaneous exchanges are preferential, but will be protected
under section 547(c)(1) if the creditor can prove that a contemporane-
ous exchange was intended.
Similarly, acquisitions of new inventory and receivables are no
longer protected by a warped interpretation of the "greater percentage"
concept. Under section 60, a "relaxed substitution" theory appeared in
cases involving floating liens. This theory ignored the timing of the
sales and "replacement" acquisitions. To the extent that there was no
improvement of position, these transfers of replacement collateral did
not "diminish the estate" and were held not to be preferential. This
case law has been displaced. All collateral acquisitions are preferences
under section 547(b), but inventory and receivable acquisitions are pro-
tected to the extent provided in section 547(c)(5).2 2 6
How then is the "true" substitution of collateral dealt with under the
new integration? Is this "true" substitution protected by finding the
transfer to be outside the section 547(b) definition? Or is this substitu-
tion in fact preferential, but also protected by an express exception in
section 547(c)? Consider the following illustration:
CASE 9. The creditor (S) is owed $25,000 secured by a security
interest in the debtor's (D) semi-trailer worth $22,000. D wishes to sell
this collateral to raise cash. D has another semi-trailer which is unencum-
bered and worth $22,500. S releases his security interest in the first semi-
trailer in exchange for a security interest in the second. The exchange is
simultaneous. Two months later a petition is fied.
A substitution of collateral was not a preference under section 60(a)
to the extent there was no "diminution of the estate. 227 Congress, in
radically redesigning the preference scheme, has changed the manner
in which this transaction is analyzed. First, the transfer of the security
interest in the substitute collateral satisfies all the elements of a section
547(b) preference. This would be true even if the new collateral were
worth the same or less than the old, instead of more, which is the situa-
224. See supra text accompanying notes 215-19 (discussion of Case 8, involving substitution).
225. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 1315.
226. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
227. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY 60.21 (14th ed. 1976); 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 1315.
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tion in Case 9. Although the release and the transfer are conditioned
on one another, section 547(b) addresses only the transfer to the credi-
tor, not the net effect of the entire exchange. The transfer is clearly "to
or for the benefit of the creditor." The antecedent debt requirement is
met despite the fact that new value, in the form of a release of collat-
eral, is given. In Case 9, the newly transferred security interest still
secures the antecedent debt of $25,000, which would be true under
most commercial security arrangements.228 Since the transfer was
made during the critical period while the debtor was presumptively in-
solvent, a section 547(b) preference will exist if the subsection (b)(5)
test is satisfied. The radical simplicity of the section 547(b)(5) test is
most apparent here. Net "diminution of the estate" is not an element
under section 547(b)(5). The comparison required by section 547(b)(5)
is not a comparison of the creditor's positions with each of the two
semi-trailers. Rather, the section 547(b)(5) test requires a comparison
of the creditor's position with the security interest in the second semi-
trailer and his position if "the transfer had not been made." The sec-
tion 547(b)(5) test does not require or permit a comparison with his
position if the entire exchange had not been made. Without the trans-
fer, he would have no security; therefore the transfer enables him to
"receive more." As a result of the elimination of the "diminution of the
estate" element from the definition in section 547(b), the transfer of the
new security is a preference whether its value is more, less, or equal to
the old security.
Of course, application of the clean, mechanical, and inclusive defini-
tion of a preference in section 547(b) is merely the first step. Some
transfers formerly protected by the "diminution of the estate" require-
ment are, to a more limited extent, protected under section 547(c). In
fact, each of the section 547(c) exceptions is designed to assure relative
equivalency between the transfer and the benefit to the estate. Section
547(c)(1) provides one of these exceptions and it works perfectly in
Case 9 to protect the transfer of the security interest in the second semi-
trailer. The creditor, S, has given new value, the release of collateral,
in exchange for the transfer. The exchange was intended to be contem-
poraneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.
Section 547 (c)(1) protection is not identical to the protection for-
merly given by the "diminution of the estate" requirement. For exam-
228. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, § 45.5, at 1309.
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ple, creditor S in Case 9 fares better under section 547(c)(1) than he
would have fared under section 60. While section 60 case law pro-
tected the substitution only to the extent that there was no "diminution
of the estate," new section 547(c)(1) contains no explicit requirement of
equivalent value. Reasonable equivalency of value, however, is as-
sured by section 548, which permits trustee avoidance of fraudulent
transfers.229 In Case 9, S would be entitled to the entire value of the
new security, assuming that the two semi-trailers have reasonably
equivalent values and that there was no actual intent to defraud other
creditors.
An analysis of the drafting history reveals that the section 547(c)(1)
exception applies to "true" as well as slightly tardy substitutions.230
The Gilmore Committee proposal contained an explicit exception for
both simultaneous and substantially contemporaneous substitutions.
231
This specific exception was abandoned as unnecessary when the fore-
runner to the section 547(c)(1) exception was developed.232 Moreover,
it makes little sense to exclude true substitutions from the coverage of
229. The Bankruptcy Code, § 548(a)(2), allows the trustee to avoid a transfer to a creditor
within a year of bankruptcy if the debtor "received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer ... and was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made." I I
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
230. See supra text accompanying note 12.
231. GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 210, 215.
232. The Commission eliminated the relaxed substitution exception contained in the Gilmore
Committee Report when it added the grace period to the exclusions from the antecedent debt
definition. The Commission, perhaps misled by the literature, apparently assumed that true sub-
stitutions of collateral were not for antecedent debt and therefore not preferential under § 60. See,
e.g., 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.20 (14th ed. 1976). Therefore, the grace period was be-
lieved necessary to protect only tardy substitutions. Under certain pre-Code financing arrange-
ments secured by shifting collateral designed to comply with the requirements of Benedict v.
Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), the creditor received the proceeds of the released collateral. This
extinguished a portion of the debt. The creditor then "released" the money and received the new
collateral in exchange. Under this type of arrangement, the transfer was not "for or on account of
antecedent debt," but rather security for a new loan. Under modem financing arrangements in
shifting collateral, this is not the case. The Uniform Commercial Code permits arrangements in
which the debtor has complete control over the proceeds of collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-205(l); id
comment 1. Although good financing practice would include some policing of the collateral and
its proceeds, financing arrangements which contemplate complete creditor control over the pro-
ceeds are extremely rare. Therefore, in most cases substitutions of collateral were transfers "for or
on account of an antecedent debt." Nevertheless, substitutions were protected to the extent that
there was no "diminution of the estate." See supra text accompanying note 225.
The Commission approach was abandoned, and the protections intended in the Gilmore Report
and in the § 4-607 grace period were drafted into § 547(c)(1). Because the "true" substitution
clearly fits the § 547(b) preference definition and the § 547(c)(1) language seems to protect it, it is
likely that the exception was intended to do so.
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section 547(c)(1), because that would leave true substitutions with less
protection than substitutions which were substantially contem-
poraneous.z33
More importantly, by protecting true substitutions under section
547(c)(I), a court accomplishes a number of things consistent with the
preference scheme. First, the definitional integrity and potential effi-
ciency of section 547(b) are preserved. 34 The role of protecting trans-
fers is placed in section 547(c) and this protection is limited in accord
with the carefully designed qualifications of section 547(c). Second, the
burdens of proof in substitution cases will be correctly allocated be-
tween trustee and creditor. The trustee meets his burden by proving
that the creditor has transferred the interest within the ninety-day pe-
riod on account of money loaned before the transfer. In order to pro-
tect the transfer, the creditor must prove, as he should, that the section
547(c)(1) requirements are met. The creditor must prove that an ex-
change, a release for a substitution, was intended.2 35 It should be rela-
tively easy for the creditor to prove this unless a substitution was not
intended and what actually occurred was merely a transfer of addi-
tional security along with a coincidental but contemporaneous loss. 236
233, If "true" substitutions are protected under the phantom "diminution of the estate" ele-
ment, any excess value is preferential and avoidable. Under § 547(c)(1), this is not the case. Un-
less the substitution is fraudulent, the trustee cannot avoid it. A substitution would be fraudulent
only if there were not a reasonable equivalency of value or if there were an actual intent to de-
fraud other creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (Supp. V 1981).
234. Injecting either the net result rule or a "diminution of the estate" requirement into
§ 547(b) in order to protect these substitutions might encourage further applications of these pro-
tective case law concepts. Some of these potential applications may be damaging to the structure
of the entire preference scheme. For a discussion of the Fulghum case, an example of the danger
cf this approach, see supra text accompanying notes 192-207. If the protection of § 547(c) is
treated as the sole source of exceptions, the protection will more likely be restricted to the limited
cases chosen by Congress. Once the exclusive role of subsection (c) is clearly reinforced in the
courts, creditor resistence to recaptures which are clearly vulnerable should diminish. At the same
time, trustee challenges to transfers clearly within the protection of subsection (c) should also
decline. Before the new structure has had a chance to work, critics have challenged it as being
unfair and inefficient. Although a legislative expansion of the protection for ordinary course
transfers in subsection (c)(2) may be appropriate, the fundamental change in § 547(b) proposed in
S. 2000 is an overreaction. See supra note 15.
235. The relatively insignificant "windfall" to the creditor, made possible by the absence of an
absolute equivalency requirement in § 547(c)(1), is more than offset by the advantages to the
trustee and the estate that flow from this approach. The elimination of the "diminution of the
estate" requirement and the shift to the creditor of the burden of proving the applicability of the
exception will result in the trustee recovering far more property than would otherwise be the case.
236. A creditor authorizing the sale of collateral in exchange for a new security interest should
document the exchange. This can easily be done if a new security agreement is executed. If the
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V. APPLYING THE SECTION 547(c) EXCEPTIONS TO AFTER-
ACQUIRED PROPERTY FINANCING
A. Preface
In section 547(c) Congress has grouped some, but not all, of the pro-
tective concepts formerly inseparable from the old Act's definition of a
preference. The simplification of section 547(b) is in large part the re-
sult of a transfer of protective functions from the definition to an ex-
plicit list. A more detailed consideration of section 547(c) as it relates
to commercial financing is necessary for a number of reasons. First,
the burden of proof under section 547(c) passes to the financing credi-
tor. If the trustee meets the new relaxed burden of proving the unclut-
tered elements of section 547(b), the creditor must prove all the
elements of one of the section 547(c) exceptions in order to protect the
transfer. Second, old Act case law should be relied on only with cau-
tion when applying the section 547(c) exceptions. Although many of
the basic protective concepts of section 547(c) are similar to those de-
veloped under section 60, the section 547(c) exceptions are not identi-
cal. Some changes have been made and some exceptions are far more
carefully and narrowly directed than case law constructs of section 60.
Finally, the statute provides little or no guidance on the integration of
these newly drawn exceptions. An understanding of how each excep-
tion operates in isolation is necessary to any intelligent theory of inte-
gration. A theory of integration is critical, especially when after-
acquired property financing is involved, because typical financing ar-
rangements will bring into play more than one exception. The calcula-
tions required for some of these exceptions depend both upon
assumptions about the impact of section 547(b) and assumptions about
the other section 547(c) exceptions.
To begin, it may be helpful to review the individual exceptions and
resolve some problems about their meaning and scope. Ambiguity
sometimes exists in the language of the statute and the most visible
legislative history does not resolve the difficulty. The statute must be
construed consistently with the basic preference scheme and the com-
debtor intends to purchase new collateral which will be picked up by the creditor under an after-
acquired property clause, however, there is potential danger. Unless the creditor insists on some
documentation of the intended exchange, he might have difficulty meeting his burden of proof
under § 547(c)(1). Of course, he could rely on the debtor to testify that an exchange was intended,
but reliance on this kind of testimony involves more risk than reliance on an easily executed
document.
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promise which underlies it. Although implementing a far stronger
equality principle, Congress overtly sought to protect certain worthy
"ordinary course" transactions. In determining the scope of an excep-
tion, attempts to circumvent the carefully drawn limitations should of
course be avoided. In construing these exceptions, the history of each
exception, especially its form in early drafts, will be helpful in deter-
mining the types of transactions meant to be covered. More generally,
most exceptions have some built-in guarantee that the creditor will
transfer reasonably equivalent value to the debtor within prescribed
time limits. By the same token, the exceptions do not protect unusual
transactions which do violence to the basic equality principle by sanc-
tioning an unfair garnering of the debtor's assets. In other words, since
the section is a compromise between equality of distribution and pro-
tection of certain "worthy" activity, the exceptions should not be used
to create additional protection for unintended creditors. To the extent
that courts encourage creditors to seek section 547(c) protection when
they do not actually qualify, other creditors will suffer. The trustee will
be forced to expend resources of the estate to fend off imaginative ap-
plications of section 547(c).
B. Section 547(c)(1): The Contemporaneous Exchange
L Collateral
Transfers of collateral which are not simultaneous with the original
credit extension and therefore vulnerable under the "strict timing" of
section 547(b) are saved by section 547(c)(1) if the parties intended a
contemporaneous exchange for new value and the transfer is in fact
substantially contemporaneous. 37
This exception has a limited, although perhaps significant, applica-
tion to transfers of security after a debt has been incurred. The transfer
of new collateral in exchange for the release of existing collateral would
qualify as a transfer for new value.238 The exchange, in turn, would be
protected under section 547(c)(1) if the transfer was intended to be con-
temporaneous and was in fact substantially contemporaneous. As al-
237. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981). See also supra note 216.
238 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 217. At least one recent case de-
cided under the new Code contains dicta which states that § 547(c)(1) "is not applicable to situa-
tions involving security interests." In re Christian, 8 Bankr. 816, 819 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
The court may have intended to state that § 547(c)(1) could not be used to extend the grace period
in § 547(c)(3), especially in cases in which the delay in perfection was inexcusable.
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ready noted in Part IV, this section applies even if the release and
substitution were "precisely contemporaneous" and whether or not the
released and substituted collateral have identical values.
23 9
The time for measuring relative equivalency under section 547(c)(1)
is the time of the transfer.240 The creditor should not lose the protec-
tion of section 547(c)(1) if appreciation of the new collateral after the
exchange makes it more valuable than the old collateral.24'
CASE 10. S held a security interest in D's wood stove to secure a $600
debt. D decided to replace his wood stove with a coal stove of compara-
ble value. S agreed to release his interest in the wood stove in exchange
for a security interest in the new coal stove. At the time of this substitu-
tion, which occurred during the critical pre-petition period, the wood
stove was worth $475 and the coal stove $500. Because of unforeseen
market circumstances, the substitute coal stove appreciated in value and
was worth $600 on the date of the petition. At that time, the wood stove
was worth only $450. The substitution has substantially improved S's po-
sition from an undersecured creditor at the time of the exchange to a fully
secured creditor in bankruptcy.
Can the trustee avoid any or all of this transfer under section 547?
The answer should be no. Acquiring the security interest in the coal
stove enables the creditor to "receive more" than he would without the
transfer. This, however, would be true under section 547(b)(5) even if
the new collateral had been equal in value at the time of the exchange
and had not subsequently appreciated.242 While admittedly vulnerable
under section 547(b), the security transfer in the coal stove is saved by
section 547(c)(1) if the creditor can prove the necessary elements. To
the extent that section 547(c)(1) required relative equivalence in the ex-
change, the comparison should be made at the time of the exchange.
The slight discrepancy in value between the wood stove and the coal
239. The phrase "precisely contemporaneous" is made necessary by the phrase "substantially
contemporaneous." The modifiers are both necessary and redundant, since contemporaneous can
mean either simultaneous (precisely contemporaneous) or occurring during the same period (sub-
stantially contemporaneous). H. FOWLER, W. LIrLE & D. COULSON, THE SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1973). The drafters obviously meant "substantially contemporane-
ous" to mean nearly simultaneous.
240. This seems to be required by § 548, although it could be argued that the time of release of
the original security is the relevant time. Assuming these times are "substantially contemporane-
ous," the choice is not critical.
241. See supra note 116. Of course, if the parties knew this would happen, the transfer could
be attacked under § 548(a)(1) as an intentional fraud on other creditors.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 224-29.
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stove at the time of exchange should not affect the outcome. Moreover,
the subsequent appreciation of the coal stove should not defeat the
creditor's section 547(c)(1) defense to a trustee's avoidance action. The
elements of section 547(c)(1) focus only on the date of substitution. Al-
though a comparison of liquidation positions is required under the sec-
tion 547(b)(5) "receives more" test, section 547(c)(1) only requires that
the creditor and debtor contemplate a contemporaneous exchange of
relative equivalents which is executed in a substantially contemporane-
ous time frame. Therefore, the trustee cannot avoid any portion of the
transfer in this illustration. 2
4 3
One commentator has suggested that a "relaxed substitution of col-
lateral" doctrine survives in the new Code and is available to assist
lenders secured by floating liens.2" This protection would be an alter-
native to the protection afforded in section 547(c)(5) when inventory or
receivables are involved and the exclusive protective theory when col-
lateral other than inventory or receivables is involved.245 Once again
the exceptions do not create this protection and the attempts to read
case law exceptions back into the section 547(b) definition are mis-
placed. Even under section 60, the substituted collateral was consid-
ered to be taken to secure an "antecedent debt." The origins of the
relaxed substitution doctrine followed the reasoning of the section 60
"net result" cases.246 The "relaxed substitution" concept was premised
243. See Kaye, supra note 116, at 200. Kaye's analysis suffers from four misconceptions.
First, a judicially created substitution exception should not be read into § 547(b). Section 547(c) is
the sole source of exceptions to the operative language of § 547(b). Second, § 547(c)(1) was in-
tended to cover precisely contemporaneous substitutions of collateral, as well as the substantially
contemporaneous near miss. There is nothing inadvertent about the application of this section to
exact or precise substitutions. Third, the substitution is a § 547(b)(5) preference even if the collat-
eral does not appreciate after transfer. Section 547(b)(5) merely requires that the creditor receive
more with the security interest in the new collateral than he would in liquidation without the
security interest in the new collateral. Fourth, § 547(c)(1) comes into play if the substitution quali-
ties when viewed at the time of transfer. The subsequent appreciation of the substituted collateral,
viewed at the time of petition, has no bearing on the determination of whether the § 547(c)(1)
elements have been met.
244. See P. MURPHY, supra note 67, at § 10.14.
245. It is possible to read the Code's definition of "receivables" as used in § 547(c)(5) narrowly
to exclude chattel paper and instruments. The better view would include them in the definition.
See infra text accompanying notes 301-05. Documents and equipment are more clearly outside
the § 547(c)(5) exception. It might be expected that the relaxed substitution concept drawn from
prior case law will be advanced by creditors in order to protect replacements of collateral not
protected under § 547(c)(1) or § 547(c)(5).
24b. See cases cited at 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 60.21 (14th ed. 1976). See also 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 6, at 1315.
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upon the absence of net diminution of the debtor's estate. As already
emphasized, diminution is no longer an element of a section 547(b)
preference. Some of the section 547(c) exceptions, including subsec-
tions (c)(1) and (c)(5), provide specific protection for transfers that are
part of a larger, "no diminution" exchange. Both of these subsections,
however, are limited and specific. Under subsection (c)(1), the debtor
and creditor must intend that each release and substitution be contem-
poraneous and each release and substitution must in fact be substan-
tially contemporaneous. Congress has also explicitly limited the
protection given to replacements of collateral in floating lien financing
arrangements, but the subsection (c)(5) exception applies only to inven-
tory and receivables.247 Some replacements protected under the old re-
laxed substitution rule, therefore, will not qualify under subsection
(c)(1) or subsection (c)(5). Congress could not have intended to limit
the subsection (c)(1) and (c)(5) protections and at the same time pro-
vide a broader general exception for all replacement collateral.
2. Payments
Section 547(c)(1) was designed to protect payments as well as trans-
fers of collateral. As a result of the strict timing requirement of section
547(b), a payment for goods or services of equivalent value may be a
preference under section 547(b).248 If the payment does not occur until
after value is given, the payment is "for or on account of an antecedent
debt."249 Therefore, even a technical timing delay in the payment
transfer will make it avoidable unless it qualifies for the protection of
section 547(c)(1). The payment by check presents special problems
under the new Code preference scheme. 50
Like some of the concepts already explored, the payment by check
seems to have been caught somewhere between the structure of the new
Code and old Act concepts. Payment by check against concurrent sale
247. See infra text accompanying notes 296-305.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 47-67.
249. The pure cash sale does not involve delayed payment and is not within the § 547(b)
definition of a preference.
250. Payments or advances made in after-acquired property financing arrangements are not
properly viewed as isolated. Payments to a secured creditor are for the antecedent obligation even
if cash is tendered. The question of when payment by check affects a transfer may be an impor-
tant issue, however, in applying the preference section. The dating of the transfer when a check is
used therefore has important, indirect consequences in analyzing secured financing arrangements
in bankruptcy.
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and delivery has many of the characteristics of a cash sale under state
law.211 It is not, however, an immediate assignment of funds and it
only suspends the underlying obligation for which it is taken. 2 Be-
cause final payment is delayed, a check seems properly viewed as a
transfer for an antecedent debt within the strict-timing definition of a
preference in section 547(b). Accordingly, section 547(c)(1) is neces-
sary to protect a payment by check.
Unfortunately, the legislative history is confusing. As the preference
section acquired its present form, the drafters were clear on their in-
tended treatment of payment by check. In the mark-up minutes to the
Drinan substitute to H.R. 6, a payment by check is referred to as "in
technical terms, an extension of credit" protected by the exceptions in
section 547(c).253 The elimination of the artificial grace periods in the
definition of antecedent debt created the need for that protection af-
forded by section 547(c). 4 Both the House and Senate Reports con-
tinued to suggest that section 547(c)(1) was designed to rescue the check
from the technical and inclusive reach of section 547(b).255
In subsequent discussions of the bill on the floor, however, Congress-
man Edwards and Senator DeConcini appeared to refute the reports.
In identical statements both men stated that: "Contrary to language
contained in the House report, payment of a debt by means of a check
is equivalent to a cash payment, unless the check is dishonored. Pay-
ment is considered to be made when the check is delivered for purposes
of sections 547(c)(1) and (2). ' '256 While purporting to contradict the
House Report, these statements are not necessarily inconsistent with
the conclusion suggested in the mark-up minutes, House Report, and
Senate Report. Section 547(c)(1), not section 547(b)(2), is the proper
section for determining whether or not to treat a check as a cash
equivalent. The remarks in the Congressional Record, referring to the
delivery as the critical date for section 547(c)(1) and section 547(c)(2)
251. See U.C.C. §§ 2-507, 2-511.
252. See U.C.C. § 3-802.
253. MARK-UP MINUTES, supra note 12, at 562 (statement by Mr. Klee in response to an obser-
vation by Representative Drinan).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 55-67.
255. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 373-74; SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 88. Both
reports suggest that a check presented within the 30-day period of U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(b) will be a
transfer which is "substantially contemporaneous."
25o. 132 CoNG. REC. HII,097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 132 CONG. REC. S17,414 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1978).
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purposes, indicate that Representative Edwards and Senator DeCon-
cini might not have appreciated the important technical difference be-
tween payment and transfer. 57
Although a contrary position has been taken by knowledgeable com-
mentators, 258 both floor statements stop short of the direct conclusion
that the check transfer fails to create a technical "antecedent debt."
Such a conclusion would make section 547(c)(1) irrelevant to the treat-
ment of payment by check. Treating a payment by check as a cash
transaction would be consistent with section 60 case law, but it is not
consistent with the new definition of a preference in section 547(b). 25 9
The section 547 treatment as a technical antecedent debt follows
from the elimination of diminution of the estate as an element of a
preference. Under section 60 case law, the check payment was treated
257. See infra note 266.
258. V. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 109, at 270; P. MURPHY, supra note 67, at §§ 10.08, 10.14.
259. The technical delay between the time value is given when a check is used in a cash sale
and the time final payment is made by the drawee bank is recognized elsewhere in the new Bank-
ruptcy Code. In particular, this technical delay and its implications are basic to the way in which
postpetition payment of a check is handled by § 549 and § 542(c). Section 549 empowers the
trustee to avoid unauthorized postpetition transfers, but specifies two kinds of transfers in which a
third party transferor is "authorized" to make the transfer even though the trustee may avoid it
and recover the funds from the transferee. One of these specially authorized but nonetheless
avoidable transfers allows the trustee to avoid postpetition final payment to the payee of a check
by the bank of the bankrupt drawer. Under § 549 the payment to the payee is avoidable if it
occurs after the commencement of the case, despite pre-petition use of the check by the bankrupt
in a "for value" exchange. The bank which disperses the bankrupt's funds after the petition is
protected, however, under the limited authority in § 542(c). Under § 542(c), if the bank pays the
check in good faith with "neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of the commencement of the
case," the bank is treated as if the case "had not been commenced." Section 549 recognizes that,
despite the intent of the parties, the mechanics of final payment of a check transform a cash sale
by check into a technical antecedent debt, followed by a third party transfer of the bankrupt
debtor's property. This protection to the bank, however, provides no shelter to the payee who is
the beneficiary of this postpetition transfer. It makes no difference that the check was used in a
new value exchange before the petition. In a voluntary case in which the commencement and
order for relief are simultaneous, the postpetition transfer to the payee is voidable under § 549(a).
Even if the petition is an involuntary one and the check is paid in the gap between the petition
and the order for relief, the transfer to the payee is vulnerable. Section 549(b) protects transfers in
this "gap" but only to the extent that value is "given after the commencement of the case in ex-
change for such transfer." 11 U.S.C. § 549(b) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). If a check is
taken in a pre-petition cash sale, the value given cannot be "after the commencement of the case."
If the check were deemed to be a transfer when taken by the payee, an anomalous result is posii-
ble where an involuntary petition is filed. If the technical antecedent debt were not recognized,
the payee who has transferred funds in the gap could be protected from avoidance irrespective of
knowledge. At the same time, the drawee bank could be liable for postpetition dealing with the
bankrupt's property if the check were paid in the gap after the bank had knowledge of the com-
mencement of the case within the meaning of § 542(c).
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like a cash transaction primarily because the estate was not diminished
and because the trustee could not demonstrate an intent to extend
credit.26 Transfers that tend to return guaranteed equivalents do not
for that reason escape the strict definition of section 547(b). On the
other hand, guaranteed equivalent value emerges as a fundamental ra-
tionale for the section 547(c) exceptions. The rationale of cases like
Engstrom v. WileI 26 1 and Dean v. Davis262 is captured in the section
547(c)(1) exception, not in the section 547(b)(2) definition of an antece-
dent debt.263 In fact, the section 547(c)(1) exception incorporates the
'critical requirement that the parties intend a contemporaneous ex-
change, not a credit transaction. Therefore, the same substantive pro-
tection is provided in section 547(c)(1) as in the old "check-as-cash"
case law. The burden of proof, however, is allocated consistently with
the trustee's lighter obligation under section 547(b).
Use of a check does in fact delay payment and final discharge of an
obligation. A check could be used to take advantage of this delay or to
disguise a credit transaction.2 4 The trustee should not have to show
that a credit extension was intended. His burden should be satisfied by
mere proof of the delay. The creditor should then be obliged to show
260. Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1951). Although this case interprets state pref-
erence law, it is often cited as the leading case for treating payment by check as a cash transaction.
261. id at 684.
262. 242 U.S. 438 (1917). For a further discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying
notes 55-67.
263. In fact, the legislative history of the § 547(c)(1) and § 547(c)(2) exceptions charts the
movement of the protection of "like-cash" transactions from the definition of antecedent debt to
the explicit protection of the § 547(c) exceptions.
264. The debtor and creditor can accomplish this in a number of ways. The debtor can use a
postdated check or the creditor can agree to delay deposit of the check for collection. Even with-
out this additional delay, a debtor may give a check to the creditor although they both know that
there are presently insufficient funds to cover the check. There may be an understanding with the
payee, however, that funds will be deposited in time to cover. In all these cases, the transaction is
premised on the delay incident to a fund transfer caused by placing the check in collection. If
debtor and creditor intended to utilize this delay, they did not intend a contemporaneous transfer
so § 547(c)(1) does not apply.
In re Duffy, 3 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) involved a postdated check where the parties
clearly intended a credit transaction. The reasoning used to find transfer at payment rather than
at delivery, however, applies generally to all checks. A check itself does not vest in the payee any
title to or interest in the funds held by the drawee bank. See U.C.C. § 3-409. The check is simply
an order to the drawee bank to pay the sum stated and does not constitute a transfer and delivery
of the funds until it is paid. The date of payment, and not the date of delivery, is crucial in
determining when the preferential transfer occurred. See also Olsen-Frankman Livestock Mar-
keting Serv., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 4 Bankr. 809 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (applying the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898).
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that a "like-cash" transaction was intended. The evidence is most ac-
cessible to the creditor and the showing can easily be made in most
cases.
265
The timing of a transfer when payment is made by check has limited
but extremely important significance in the context of after-acquired
property financing. The check is often the device by which the debtor
will make his payments or the secured creditor will make advances. In
the case of the debtor's payment, the existing secured obligation fore-
closes any argument about whether the payment is "for or on account
of an antecedent debt." The resolution of this timing issue, however,
can determine whether a transfer occurs within the critical pre-petition
period. If a payment by check is a transfer effective at delivery, then
checks tendered before the beginning of the critical period would not
satisfy section 547(b)(2) even if they were not paid until after the begin-
ning of the critical period. Despite the ambiguous statements made on
the House and Senate floors, the transfer under section 547(b) occurs
when the check is paid. There is a preference if such payment occurs
within the critical period, and other elements of section 547(b) are satis-
fied. The creditor may prevent avoidance only if he proves all the ele-
ments of one of the section 547(c) exceptions. Payments applied
toward a prior secured obligation which falls within the critical period
because of this delay will generally be avoidable. Section 547(c)(1) will
be of no aid to the creditor unless the debtor received new value in
exchange for this payment in a transaction which was intended as a
contemporaneous exchange. 266
265. While the debtor will wind up with the cancelled check, the creditor should have the sales
or service record indicating that a substantially contemporaneous exchange in fact occurred. The
creditor's records wil normally disclose whether the transaction was treated as one for cash or
credit. See In re Hersman, 20 Bankr. 569, 573 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
266. The time of payment for § 547(c)(2) purposes might still be when the creditor receives the
check. This was the court's position in In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920, 928 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1982). But see In Re Super Market Distribs. Corp., 25 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)
(transfer of funds must occur within the 45-day period to qualify under subsection (c)(2)). For
§ 547(c)(4) purposes, however, the words "after such transfer" should be read to refer to the pre-
liminary avoidable § 547(b) transfer, which only takes place when the check is paid. On this point
the Garland opinion disagrees. 19 Bankr. at 928.
Likewise, new credit advances by the creditor take effect under § 547(c)(4) when a check is
cashed by or paid to the debtor. Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1979). Delay-
ing the effect of advances will improve slightly the creditor's ability to make use of § 547(c)(4) in
those cases where delivery of a check to the debtor occurs before or simultaneously with the acqui-
sition of new collateral or another potentially preferential transfer. If the date the check is paid is
[Vol. 61:1
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C. Section 547(c)(2): Ordinary Course Payments
The exception in section 547(c)(2) protects recurring credit transac-
tions that are handled by the debtor on a current, ordinary course ba-
sis. 217  Four requirements must be met for the exception to apply.
First, the transfer must be in payment of an obligation incurred in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee. Second, the payment must be made not later than forty-five
days after the debt was incurred. 261 Third, the payment must be made
in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the date of the advance under § 547(c)(4), the creditor may have an easier time proving that the
advance was new value given after the § 547(b) transfer as required by § 547(c)(4).
2t)7. 1I U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms;
2t,8. Congress intended the word "incurred" to relate only to the date the debtor undertook to
pay a debt, not the dates on which installment payments incident to the obligation come due. The
vast majority of cases have correctly analyzed this issue. See In re Chancellor, 20 Bankr. 316, 319
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Iowa Premium Sen'. Co., 12 Bankr. 597, 600 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
19,l), aft'd. 676 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1982); Kampf v. Postal Fin., II Bankr. 361, 362 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1981); In re McCormick, 5 Bankr. 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Williams, 5 Bankr.
706, 708 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). But see In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. 632, 644
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (interest obligation incurred when earned). Cf. In re Bullen, 11 Bankr.
440, 441-42 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 19R 1) (payment not § 547(b) preference because creditor would
have repossessed if payment missed). As in Ken Gardner Ford, some creditors have attempted to
argue that the interest portion of any payment is covered by the § 547(c)(2) exception. Under this
reasoning, the "interest debt" is not incurred until it is earned. This is a perversion of the purpose
of the exception, which was designed to protect transfers to such "like-cash" creditors as utilities
and trade merchants who bill on a monthly basis. Although the House Report states a general
purpose not to disturb "normal financial relations," see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 373, the
his tory of the exception indicates a more specific purpose. Earlier versions had specified utilities
and trade creditors and employees. House subcommittee staff stated that the section was still
designed to apply to "inventory' and utilities and paychecks. So that's why forty-five days was
picked." MARK-UP MINUTES, supra note 12, at 564. It is hardly conceivable that this exception
was intended to apply to installment obligations without a specific reference ever being made to
these transactions.
This issue was correctly decided by one bankruptcy court and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. In
re Iowa Premium Serv. Co., 12 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1981), aft'd, 676 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.
1982). One judge dissented, relying on the broad statement contained in the House and Senate
Reports concerning "normal financial relations." 676 F.2d at 1222 (Gibson, J., dissenting). Judge
Gibson in Iowa Premium, and the court in Ken Gardner Ford both treat the legislative history too
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the transferee. Finally, the payment must be made according to ordi-
nary business terms.
In section 547(c)(2) Congress identified a cluster of payment transfers
that are both regular and current. It thereby guaranteed that the credi-
tor provide the debtor with an important equivalent a short time prior
to the transfer. Section 547(c)(2) is not, however, a less stringent ver-
sion of section 547(c)(1). The section 547(c)(2) exception was designed
around the narrow concept of the "ordinary course current" transaction
rather than a broad concept of "no diminution." Many of the section
547(c)(2) transfers escaped avoidance under the old Act's requirement
that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent.26 9
Perhaps, section 547(c)(2) mistakenly excluded many small un-
secured consumer obligations, and some modification of this section
may be necessary. ° Commercial financers, however, were never in-
tended beneficiaries of this exception. It may be possible for a secured
floating lien creditor to set up an initial payment schedule geared to
payment within a period not less than forty-five days following any
single advance, or incurred debt. Such a scheme, assuming it is worka-
ble, would not survive the "ordinary business terms" requirement of
superficially. The § 547(c)(2) exception was designed to deal with "like-cash" trade creditors,
service creditors, utilities and employees paid on monthly, biweekly, or weekly cycles.
It is not always easy to determine when a debt is incurred. For purposes of installment obliga-
tions, the debt is incurred when the original obligation is incurred. It is far more difficult to
determine when a utility "debt" is incurred, when the service is supplied or when the monthly use
is tabulated. At least one court has chosen the latter, at least for an electric bill, reasoning that
there is no way to actually determine daily supplies of electricity. Compare In re Thomas W.
Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920, 927-28 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982) with In re Dickey & Sons, Inc., II
Bankr. 146, 147-48 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980). This result is justified, although the legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress chose 45 days to providefurther reasonable time after the bill contain-
ing a month's charges was received. Note also the possible application of § 547(c)(4) if credit
service is continuing. In re Hersman, 20 Bankr. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). The provisions of
§ 547(c)(2) seem to be overly restrictive. See 1981 ReformAct Hearings, supra note 15, at 158, 244-
45, 254-55. See, e.g., In re Chancellor, 20 Bankr. 317 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). See also Fortgang
& King, supra note 15, at 1167.
269. Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1981).
270. There has been some justified criticism of this subsection. See supra note 15. The real
cause for complaint, however, is limited to those types of transactions, such as payments for credit
card purchases, which were targeted for protection but don't quite qualify under the 45-day time
limit. Proposed changes in § 547, such as those contained in S. 2000, which would protect all
regular payments, go too far and drastically undermine the entire preference scheme. Any prop-
erly conceived modification of subsection (c)(2) should protect only those "like-cash" transactions
presently unprotected by (c)(2), including utility payments or payments for credit card purchases
made during the current billing cycle.
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section 547(c)(2).2 7 1 Furthermore, if the scheme represented an altera-
tion of existing credit terms, in response to a perceived financial weak-
ness in the debtor, neither the incurring of the debt nor its payment
would be in the ordinary course.
. Section 547(c)(3): Enabling Loans
The transfer of a security interest in collateral incident to a purchase
money or enabling loan is, if certain requirements are met, protected
under section 547(c)(3 ).272 First, the loan or other credit must not occur
before the security agreement is executed.273 Second, the loan or other
credit must be given by the secured party to enable the debtor to ac-
quire the collateral. Third, the loan proceeds must in fact be used to
acquire the collateral in question. Fourth, the security interest must be
perfected "before 10 days after such security interest attaches. ' 274 This
271. See supra text accompanying notes 40-67. See also MARK-UP MINUTES, supra note 12, at
566- 7. Staff counsel, Mr. Klee and Mr. Levin, emphasized that a payment to the creditor had to
be according to the ordinary terms common to the industry. A secured commercial installment
Jender could not create an arrangement which would both qualify under the subsection (c)(2) time
frame and be made according to ordinary business terms. Nor can the creditor argue that the debt
j incurred when the payment is due. See supra cases cited at note 268. But see In re Ken Gardner
Ford Sales, Inc.- 10 Bankr. 632, 646-48 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (interest accruing to a floor plan
financer within 45 days protected)
272. I1 U.SC. § 547(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(3) of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a descrip-
tion of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected before 10 days after such security interest attaches.
273. The limiting reference to the signing of a security agreement would apparently exclude
.ecurity interests which satisfy U.C.C. § 9-203 without a written security agreement because the
creditor has possession of the collateral. This might simply be a drafting oversight. There is no
reason to treat differently the rare case of an oral agreement and a possessory security interest. It
is highly unlikely, however, that a purchase money loan will be made with an oral agreement for
creditor possession instead of a written security agreement.
274. The Technical Amendments would make the 10-day period in § 547(c)(3)(B) conform to
the U C.C. period. See infra note 277. The general 10-day grace period in § 547(e)(2) remains the
samc terminating 10 days after the transfer takes effect. If the debtor already has rights in the
collateral under § 547(e)(3), the § 547(e)(2) period runs from attachment. If amended, the subsec-
tion (,.(3)(B) period would run from possession of such property by the debtor. The debtor could
concciv'ably obtain possession before or after transfer of the security interest. For example, if the
credit extension and transfer of collateral are simultaneous but delivery of the collateral to the
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exception is not made necessary by the ten-day grace period in Article
9 for perfecting many purchase money interests. Instead, a grace pe-
riod for all security interests is provided in section 547(e).2 5 The ten-
day grace period in section 547(e), however, merely allows for a rela-
tion back to the moment that the transfer of collateral takes effect. Sec-
tion 547(e)(3) provides that the transfer cannot be made until the
debtor has rights in the collateral transferred.27 6 Whenever the en-
abling loan occurs before the debtor acquires such rights, as it often
would, the section 547(e) grace period would not prevent the subse-
quent collateral transfer from being "for or on account of an antece-
dent debt." Section 547(c)(3), therefore, is made necessary by the strict
timing rules in sections 547(b)(2) and 547(e)(3), which make effective
transfer possible only after or at the moment the debtor has acquired
rights in the property. 7
debtor is delayed by three days, a filing made nine days after delivery would not relate the perfec-
tion back under § 547(e)(2) because more than 10 days has elapsed since the "transfer" took effect.
The filing does, however, meet the requirements of the enabling loan exception in § 547(c)(3).
On the other hand, the debtor may have possession of the seller's property before the decision to
purchase on credit is made and before a security interest in the collateral is created. In such a case
the 10-day period under the proposed amendment to § 547(c)(3)(B) should begin to run from
ostensible possession. Thus, the secured seller would still have 10 days from the attachment of the
security interest. He would be protected by the grace period in § 547(e)(2), which would relate the
transfer back to the time of credit extension and creation of the security interest. As long as the
credit extension did not predate the creation of the security interest, the transfer would not be for
antecedent debt. Section 547(c) would not apply because there would be no preference. If there
were a gap between credit extension and creation of a security agreement, the proposed
§ 547(c)(3)(B) would limit the creditor's protection. The § 547(c) exception would not apply un-
less perfection occurred within 10 days of the debtor's possession of "such property."
The use of the phrase "such property" in proposed § 547(c)(3)(B) eliminates for bankruptcy
purposes a dispute which has arisen under U.C.C. § 9-312(3). Some have successfully argued that
property received but not yet owned by the debtor prior to sale and creation of the security interest
was not "collateral" until the conditional sale was executed. Therefore, the 10-day period did not
begin to run until that time. See Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d 1316 (9th
Cir. 1970); Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, Inc., 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1964).
275. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 81-112.
277. At present the 10-day period in § 547(c)(3)(B) does not coincide with the grace period
provided for purchase money interests in Article 9. In U.C.C. § 9-301(2) the 10-day period begins
to run from the time "the debtor receives possession of the collateral." The protection offered by
the grace period under the Uniform Commercial Code does, however, run from "attachment" to
filing. The § 547(c)(3)(B) requirement is that perfection occur before 10 days after attachment.
The Technical Amendments contain a provision aimed at making the § 547(c)(3)(B) time period
conform to the time period in U.C.C. § 9-301(2). S. REp. No. 150, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 74 (1981).
Some states have nonuniform versions of§ 9-301(2) that give the creditor a grace period longer
than 10 days. It can be argued that these longer state law grace periods operate to retroactively
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A secured creditor with a "floating" interest in all of the debtor's
after-acquired inventory may be the supplier who is selling the inven-
tory on credit. To a certain extent, subsections (c)(2), (c)(3), and, (c)(5)
each provide necessary protection for transfers incident to a normal
financing pattern.278 Similarly, a secured lender with a "floating" inter-
est in the debtor's inventory may make a loan for the purpose of en-
abling the debtor to acquire specific items of additional inventory.
Again, more than a single exception might be applied. 27 9 Although no
single transfer can be protected more than once, the overlapping cover-
age of either subsection (c)(1) or (c)(3) with subsection (c)(5) can create
confusion. Section 547(c)(5) would protect all inventory transfers to
the extent that the gap between debt and collateral has not been nar-
rowed to the prejudice of other creditors. Transfers that narrow the
gap are unprotected: 20  If discrete collateral transfers are protected
"perrfect" transfers to the date they take "effect" within the meaning of § 547(e)(1)(B) and
§ 547(e)(2)(A). Congress, however, seems clearly to have intended the perfection definition to be
modified only by the uniform grace period in § 547(e)(2)(A). The only relation back envisioned
by Congress was in § 547(e)(2)(A). Despite the clear evidence of congressional intent on this
point, at least one court has read a longer state law grace period into what becomes a retroactive
definition of "perfection" in subsection (e)( t )(B). In re Burnett, 14 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1981). Burnett is a stunning judi ial tour de force. Judge Kelley recognized that Congress in-
tended the 10-day grace period to operate uniformly making state grace periods irrelevant. Id at
801 Nevertheless, he held that a secunt' interest perfected 20 days after it actually took "effect"
relates, back so that the trustee does not meet the antecedent debt requirement. The holding is
based on the conclusion that incorporating the state grace period into the meaning of "perfection"
in § 547(e) is "less troublesome than the interpretation that agrees with Congress' intent." Id
27K. In a normal financing pattern, the security interest in the new collateral secures prior and
future obligations, as well as the credit extension incident to its sale. Therefore, if the security
agreement contains a cross-collateral clause, each transfer of collateral will satisfy the § 547(b)
element of a preference requiring the transfer to be for or on account of an antecedent debt, even
if it v, simultaneous with the credit extension. Thus, the creditor will have to prove the applicabil-
it)y of one of the § 547(c) exceptions. This relieves the trustee of having to determine which credit
extensions have been extinguished and whether a specific item of collateral secures prior, contem-
poraneous or subsequent credit extensions.
279, The purchase money seller would be adequately protected by either § 547(c)(1) or
§ 547(c)(3). The purchase money lender is the party who will more often find it necessary to resort
to § 547(c)(3), which was designed to protect him. If there is any significant gap between the loan
and the acquisition of the collateral, the lender will not be protected by § 547(c)(1), but will be
protected by § 547(c)(3) if all requirements are met. In both cases § 547(c)(5) will also afford
protection for collateral transfers in inventory.
A secured creditor may also release collateral for sale outside the ordinary course in exchange
for the purchase of new collateral, a substitution also protected by § 547(c)(1) and to an extent by
§ 547(c)(5).
280. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 296-312.
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under subsection (c)(1) or (c)(3), how is the final section 547(c)(5) gap
to be figured? Consider the following illustration:
CASE 11. S is a secured creditor holding a security interest in all of
D's inventory. On January 1, D owed S $100,000 and had $80,000 in
inventory. To help D with his financial problems, S agreed to lend D an
additional $20,000 to enable him to purchase and sell a new line of silver
widgets. S loaned the $20,000 and filed a financing statement on January
3. On January 14, D purchased $20,000 worth of silver widgets which
were delivered on January 16. Unfortunately D's poor financial condi-
tion prevented him from effectively attempting to advertise or market
these silver widgets. Other inventory was bought and sold until the be-
ginning of March, when D's activities virtually ceased. D filed a bank-
ruptcy petition on April 1. At that time S was still owed $120,000. Due
to a change in the price of silver and favorable market conditions for the
new silver widgets, those widgets were now worth $30,000. The value of
all D's inventory is $115,000.
To what extent are those collateral transfers avoidable? Does S have
an option to choose which exception protects any of these transfers?
Must S choose? To begin, it is necessary to note the possible solutions.
If section 547(c)(3) is ignored when section 547(c)(5) is applicable, then
the transfer of collateral incident to the enabling loan is protected along
with the other transfers to the extent that the gap is not narrowed to the
prejudice of other creditors. It seems unlikely that the enabling loan
and transfer of the resulting purchase money interest would cause any
reduction in the gap. In this case, however, the gap between the se-
cured debt and the value of the inventory has been reduced by $15,000,
but $10,000 of this reduction was caused by an unexpected appreciation
of the purchase money collateral. This mere appreciation probably
does not cause "prejudice" to other creditors. The creditor, however,
carries the burden of proof on all the section 547(c)(5) elements, includ-
ing the lack of prejudicial effect."a ' If the transfer is protected under
section 547(c)(3), however, the creditor need only show that a section
547(c)(3) enabling loan existed at the time of transfer. Once the ele-
ments of section 547(c)(3) are proved, the transfer is protected without
any further explanatory proof if the property appreciates.28 2
The choice for the creditor is simple. If collateral has not appreci-
281. See supra note 76. For a discussion of prejudicial effect, see infra text accompanying
notes 313-19.
282. The same applies if the transfer is protected under § 547(c)(1). The creditor need only
prove the necessary elements of the contemporaneous exchange subsection.
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ated, the creditor will probable resort solely to section 547(c)(5), since
he need only show the level of debt, the value of collateral and that the
collateral is inventory. If some collateral has appreciated, the secured
creditor can decide whether it will be easier to prove the elements of
section 547(c)(3) as opposed to proving the absence of prejudicial effect.
Once the creditor chooses to seek the protection of subsection (c)(1)
or (c)(3), it is necessary to establish how the section 547(c)(5) gap will
be calculated. According to the legislative history, exceptions apply in-
dependently to specific transfers and application of one does not pre-
empt the application of others.2"3 Therefore, it seems logical to exclude
subsection (c)(1) and (c)(3) collateral transfers before arriving at the
final value of collateral in the section 547(c)(5) calculation. At the
same time, the debt owed to the creditor has been increased by the
'new value" given in the transfer protected under either section
547(c)(1) or section 547(c)(3). To prevent distortion, this increase in
debt must also be excluded.
In Case 11, S would have two options. S could seek only the protec-
tion of section 547(c)(5). The gap, originally $20,000, would initially
appear to be reduced to $5000 ($120,000-$115,000). This would enable
the trustee to avoid $15,000 in collateral transfers. S, however, could
further prove that the $10,000 reduction caused by appreciation was
not to the prejudice of other creditors. Thus the trustee only avoids
$5000 in collateral transfers.
S could alternatively prove that the transfer of the purchase money
interest was covered by the section 547(c)(3) exception. In that case,
the value of the purchase money collateral at petition is excluded from
the section 547(c)(5) calculation. The credit extension incident to that
transfer is also excluded. After excluding those items, the value of col-
lateral is $85,000 ($115,000 - $30,000) and the debt secured figure is
$100,000 ($120,000 - $20,000). The gap at petition is $15,000, a reduc-
tion of $5000. Thus the trustee can still avoid $5000 in collateral
transfers.
. Section 547(c)(4): Subsequent New Credit
Unlike the other section 547(c) exceptions, section 547(c)(4) does not
283. "Subsection (c) contains exceptions to the trustee's avoiding power. If a creditor can
qualify under any one of the exceptions, then he is protected to that extent. If he can qualify
under any one of the exceptions, then he is protected by each to the extent that he can qualify
under each." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 373.
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focus on the transfer protected.28 4 Instead it allows the creditor to pro-
tect any transfer avoidable under section 547(b) to the extent of subse-
quent, unsecured and unconditional new value. The premise of section
547(c)(4) is the creditor has already restored what he has taken as a
preference. The premise is borrowed from the old statutory net result
rule in section 60(c) of the Act. Section 547(c)(4) has eliminated some
of the problems of section 60(c) which unfairly denied a set-off to some
creditors. In this sense it is more generous than section 60(c).285 The
most significant change was the elimination of the "remaining unpaid"
condition of section 60(c). When section 60(c) was applied literally,
payments during the four-month pre-petition period were often applied
in payment against advances, thus making them ineligible for section
60(c) credit. At the same time, the trustee attempted to avoid these
payments. The creditor lost both the section 60(c) credit and the pay-
ments which caused the loss of credit. Paradoxically, a creditor could
have been in a better position if he did not receive payments during the
critical period.286 This problem could have been easily avoided if
courts had simply stated that the credit remained unpaid if the pay-
ment was itself avoidable.287 Instead, the problems were probably seen
284. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (c)(4) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such
creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoid-
able transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor.
285. See supra note 181.
286. For an excellent analysis of this problem, see Note, supra note 181, at 297-300. A creditor
would be most vulnerable if he entered the critical period owing a relatively small amount of
money. Payments would quickly extinguish that debt and would begin to be applied against the
advances. The advances would be deemed paid even though the trustee could avoid these pay-
ments. Grandison v. National Bank of Commerce, 231 F. 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 644
(1916). Similarly, the creditor would be caught in the same paradox if he and the debtor agreed to
apply payments first against the most current advances. Note, supra note 181, at 300. If the
creditor was not paid, he could be in the same position as the recipient of a voidable preference
which had to be returned. The trustee, however, could no longer make the argument that the
subsequent credit had been repaid for purposes of § 60(c).
287. One court recognized this paradox and avoided the result by refusing to allow the trustee
to avoid the payment of advances which would have otherwise been available for § 60(c) credit.
In re Ace Fruit & Produce Co., 49 F. Supp. 986, 989-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). The court did not notice
the apparent conflict with Grandison v. National Bank of Commerce, 231 F. 800 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 242 U.S. 644 (1916). The § 60(c) discussion in Grandison is rather abbreviated and per-
haps should not be given much weight. The credit, however, was repaid from two different sets of
assigned accounts and the trustee successfully avoided one assignment as a preference. Nonethe-
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as a justification to circumvent the limitations of section 60(c) by doc-
trines such as the case law net result rule.2s8 The section 547(c)(4) ex-
ception takes the easier, more direct route which clearly specifies the
extent of protection. The set-off for new value given is available to the
extent that the debtor does not on account of the new value "make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor." '289
The section 547(c)(4) exception is otherwise substantially similar to
section 60(c). The extention of new value for which a set-off is avail-
able must occur after the preferential transfer, an important limitation
rendering the case law net result rule a nullity.290 The operation of this
limitation is demonstrated by the following illustrations:
CASE 12. On January 1, D owed S, an unsecured creditor, $5000. On
January 3, D made a payment of $1000 to S. On January 10, S extended
an additional $4000 credit to D. On January 17, D paid S $3000. On
February 15, S extended an additional $1000 credit to D. On April 1, the
bankruptcy petition was filed.
CASE 13. On January 1, D owed S, an unsecured creditor, $5000. On
January 3, D made a payment of $3000 to S. On January 10, S extended
an additional $2000 credit to D. On January 17, D made a $1000 pay-
ment to S. On February 15, S extended an additional $2000 credit to D.
On April 1, the bankruptcy petition was filed.
What can the trustee avoid in each case? If the discredited case law
net result rule of section 60 were applied, the trustee could not avoid
any payments in either case. In both illustrations, credits during the
critical period equalled or exceeded payments. This is not, however,
how section 547(c)(4) operates. In Case 12, the trustee may avoid
$2000, because section 547(c)(4) only provides a set-off to the creditor
of $2000. The January 10 credit extension can only offset the prior
preference of $1000 on January 3. The February 15 credit extension of
$1000 can offset $1000 of the January 17 preference. However, $2000
of that preference remains unprotected and avoidable.
In Case 13, the trustee cannot avoid any payments. The January 10
credit extension -of $2000 is a partial set-off against the prior (January
less, the court found that § 60(c) was totally unavailable, even to the extent of the avoided assign-
ment, 231 F. at 810.
28. Note, smpra note 181, at 298 n.29.
289. Gibraltar Factors Corp. v. Barenow, 393 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 837
(1968),
290. In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982); In re Bishop, 17
Bankr. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 161-207.
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3) preference of $3000. The February 15 credit extension of $2000 is
set-off against the prior (January 17) preference of $1000 and against
the $1000 portion of the prior (January 3) preference which has not yet
been cancelled.
In one significant respect, section 547(c)(4) readopts by express lan-
guage section 60(c) case law. In a significant section 60(c) opinion, In
re Hygrade Envelope Corp. ,29 the Second Circuit applied the require-
ment that qualifying credit be "without security of any kind. 292 The
court rather carefully attempted to determine to what extent advances
were actually secured at the date of petition. New credit was not se-
cured to the extent that the security was either avoidable or actually
necessary for other prior secured debts. The approach of this case is
expressly found in the requirement of section 547(c)(4)(A) that the new
value not be secured by "an otherwise unavoidable security inter-
est."'293 In Hygrade, the court successfully struggled with the calcula-
tions made necessary by this approach. In the new preference scheme,
there are no additional difficulties unless the collateral is covered by
section 547(c)(5). When, however, the collateral is inventory or receiv-
ables, the degree of protection afforded by section 547(c)(5) will affect
the degree to which advances are secured.294
Other modifications are minor, although they sometimes create new
puzzles.295 One change is the substitution of new value in section
547(c)(4) for new credit in section 60(c). The section 60(c) exception
was clearly designed to cover new loans, goods, or services. The defini-
tion of new value includes a "release of property previously transferred
that is neither void nor voidable." This would include the release of an
unavoidable security interest. At the same time, section 547(c)(4) re-
quires that the new value be unsecured. This may indicate that the
291. 393 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 837 (1968).
292. Bankruptcy Act § 60(c).
293. See GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 213-15; CoMMIssION REPORT (pt. 2),
supra note 8, at 171-72; Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the
Subcomr. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comn on the Judiciary, Appendix, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1975) (comment to § 4-607(c)(2) of both the Commission and Judges' Bill).
294. For a discussion of the integration of § 547(c)(4) and § 547(c)(5), see infra text accompa-
nying notes 323-46. A theory of integration is made necessary because § 547(c)(4) requires a
determination of available security while § 547(c)(5) requires a determination of the extent to
which payments are avoidable. This latter determination is necessary to fix the "debt secured"
figure in calculating the § 547(c)(5) gap.
295. One minor adjustment was the elimination of the requirement that new credit be given in
good faith; it was never clear what this requirement of § 60(c) was trying to prevent.
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drafters never considered whether releases of collateral should qualify
for subsection (c)(4) credit. Nonetheless, the new value definition is
clear and there appears to be no good reason to ignore it. The trustee
and court, however, should be careful that the security released was
"neither void nor voidable."
If the collateral was not inventory or receivables, the question is sim-
ply whether the released collateral, viewed from the date of petition,
would have been available to the creditor or whether the original trans-
fer of collateral could have been avoided. When the collateral is inven-
tory or receivables, the situation is somewhat more difficult. The limit
on section 547(c)(5) protection focuses on the net effect of all inventory
or receivable transfers rather than specific transfers. In contrast, the
section 547(c)(4) exception, if releases of security are within its scope,
focuses on specific releases. A creditor could conceivably attempt to
utilize this contrast to gain additional section 547(c)(5) protection.
Consider the following illustration:
CASE 14. D owed S $100,000. This debt is secured by D's automo-
bile inventory. On January 1, D has five automobiles worth $10,000 each.
During the week of January 7, he sells three automobiles. A week later he
acquires seven new automobiles, each worth $10,000. Soon afterwards,
D's activities virtually cease. On the eve of bankruptcy, C releases his
security interest in the two automobiles which D had acquired prior to
January 1. On April 1 a petition is filed. The debt is still $100,000.
What can the trustee avoid? IfS had not released the collateral, the
trustee would have been able to avoid the transfer of security in four
automobiles because the section 547(c)(5) gap of $50,000 ($100,000-
$50,000) would have been reduced to $10,000 ($100,000-$90,000). Be-
cause of the release, the gap has been reduced to $30,000 ($100,000-
$70,000), a reduction of only $20,000 ($50,000-$30,000). Applying only
subsection (c)(5), the trustee can avoid the $20,000 improvement. The
creditor, however, might try to argue that the $20,000 release of collat-
eral also justifies a $20,000 subsection (c)(4) credit which would prevent
the trustee from avoiding the $20,000 subsection (c)(5) improvement.
The creditor would argue that the preferential collateral transfers
which do not qualify under subsection (c)(5) ($20,000) occurred prior to
the release, or new value. Furthermore, the collateral released was the
subject of an unavoidable security interest because the two automobiles
released were acquired before the critical period. This argument has a
seductive but superficial logic.
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Absent the release, other collateral transferred within the critical pe-
riod would have lost section 547(c)(5) protection. On the date of peti-
tion, it is apparent that the release helped validate additional security
interests. In this sense, the new value, or release, was "secured" by an
unavoidable security interest as prohibited by section 547(c)(4)(A). If
section 547(c)(4) is to be sensibly applied to all new value, including
such releases, the section 547(c)(4) credit should not be available to
give the creditor a windfall.
Finally, it should be noted that the date of the petition is the critical
date under section 547(c)(4) for determining whether a release of collat-
eral qualifies as new value, that is, whether the security interest released
would have been unavoidable. The date of the petition is also critical
in determining whether a release is itself "secured" for section
547(c)(4)(A) purposes, that is, whether it helps to validate additional
section 547(c)(5) collateral. At the same time, the date new value is
given is critical in determining whether new value was given after the
preferential transfer.
F Section 547(c)(5): The Floating Lien
L The Scope of Section 547(c)(5) and its Relationshio to the
Definition in Section 547(b)
Among the most significant changes in the Code is the section
547(c)(5) compromise designed to deal specifically with the floating
lien. 96 This compromise was accomplished by first anchoring the
transfer of any discrete item over which the creditor's interest "floats"
to the time when the debtor obtained rights in that item.297 As a result,
all collateral obtained during the critical period, unless superfluous, re-
296. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(5) of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of
either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused
a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other
creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such
security interest exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of-
(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection(b)(4)(A) of this section ap-
plies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition. . ..
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section ap-
plies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement
creating such security interest.
297. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
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sults in a section 547(b) preference.298 Section 547(c)(5) then excepts
all transfers of prefected security interests in inventory, receivables or
their proceeds, subject to limitations, from trustee avoidance. The key
limitation removes protection "to the extent that the aggregate of all
such transfers. . . caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing. . . to
the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any
amount by which the debt secured by such security exceded the value
of all security interests . . ." at the beginning of the critical period.
In other words, section 547(c)(5) requires a two point comparison of
the gap between debt and collateral.2 99 The apparent mathematical
simplicity of section 547(c)(5) is deceptive. The important qualifying
language of section 547(c)(5) must be understood before it can be sensi-
bly applied. First of all, the basic scope of the exception is tied to the
definition of inventory, receivables and their proceeds-a definition
which is not clear. Furthermore, the key limitation, the two point com-
parison, contains two important qualifications. Reductions in the gap
must be caused by transfers of security in these items, and the reduction
must prejudice unsecured creditors.3"
Inventory and receivables are defined in section 547(a).31 The key
298. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
299. For insiders with "reasonable cause to believe," the first point is generally one year. For
others, the first point is generally 90 days. If new value is given for the first time during the critical
period, the first point for both insiders and others is the date on which new value is given. In this
case, the value of collateral at the first point of comparison will be the value of collateral in which
the debtor already has rights at the time value is first given.
300. The first qualification has escaped at least one court purporting to apply § 547(c)(5). In
In re The Music House, Inc., I 1 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980), the trustee challenged a prefer-
ential payment of $214 made to an undersecured creditor during the 90 day period. The court
rejected the trustee's challenge because the trustee failed to show that the payment improved the
creditor's position under subsection (c)(5). d at 140-41. Payments are not protected at all under
subsection (c)(5). Furthermore, the Music House case places upon the trustee the "burden of
proving by a fair preponderance of all evidence every essential controverted element resulting in
the composite preference," including the burden of showing the secured creditor's position was
improved. Id at 140. This seems contrary to the allocation suggested by the legislative history of
§ 547(c). See supra note 76.
301. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
(1) "inventory" means personal property leased or furnished, held for sale or lease,
or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials, work in process, or materi-
als used or consumed in a business, including farm products such as crops or livestock,
held for sale or lease;
(3) "receivable" means right to payment, whether or not such right has been earned
by performance.
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difficulty is determining whether instruments and chattel paper are cov-
ered by the definition of a "receivable." Despite some support for the
view that chattel paper and instruments are not covered, these forms of
collateral are within the definition- of collateral protected by section
547(c)(5).32 While earlier drafts contained language more closely re-
sembling a standard definition of accounts, the section 547(a) definition
includes all fights topayment. °3 Moreover, the section 547 definition
is nearly identical to the UCC definition of an account, without the
UCC's explicit exclusion of instruments and chattel paper.3 n Because
the drafters of the UCC thought an express exclusion was necessary to
remove these items from the intentionally broad definition of accounts,
the elimination of the excluding language from section 547(a)(3) evi-
dences an intention to include these items. Most important, inclusion
of these types of collateral is wholly consistent with the purpose of sec-
tion 547(c)(5), which is to give limited protection to collateral that by its
302. See V. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 109, at 288. The authors of this casebook rely on the
fact that "the term was taken, and the definition adapted, from the draft bill proposed by the
National Bankruptcy Conference." See GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9,
§ 60(a)(5)(iv), at 211. The Committee apparently intended the definition to be identical with the
U.C.C. § 9-106 definition of accounts. The definitions in the Commission and Judges' Bills were
substantially identical. The final definition, however, was significantly altered. See infra note 303.
It is not clear why the Gilmore Committee excluded chattel paper and instruments. Appar-
ently, they believed that "'inventory' and 'receivables' are where the action has been. . ." and
that "sleeping dogs should be left undisturbed." GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at
215.
303. The National Bankruptcy Conference version defined receivables as "claim to money for
the transfer or use of property or for the furnishing of services, whether or not the claims have
been earned by performance." GILMORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, § 60(a)(5)(iv), at 211
(emphasis added). The Commission and Judges' Bills defined a receivable as "any right to money
for the transfer or use of property. . . whether or not the right has been earned by performance,"
COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 168 (emphasis added). The version adopted by
Congress in § 547(a)(3) simply is "any right topayment, whether or not such right has been earned
by performance." 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
The difference between the claim or right to money and the right to payment has great signifi-
cance. U.C.C. § 9-105 defines "instrument" as a negotiable instrument in Article 3, or a certified
security as defined in Article 8, or "any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of
money." If Congress had intended to exclude writings which evidence the right to payment from
§ 547(a)(3), they could have retained the word "money" in the definition.
304. The Uniform Commercial Code defines "account" as "any right to payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper,
whether or not it has been earned bypel'formance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (emphasis added).
With the exception of the substitution of"such" for "it," the § 547(c)(3) definition is identical to
the italicized portion of the Uniform Commercial Code definition of accounts. Because Congress
dropped the exclusion, it is reasonable to assume that it intended to include those items excluded
by the unitalicized portion of the Commercial Code definition.
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nature "turns over."
305
The trustee's power to avoid is limited to reductions in the gap caused
by transfers of specpled collateral. The gap might also be reduced by
payments which result in a lowering of the debt on the date of petition.
To the extent the gap is reduced by the debtor paying the debt, the
reduction is not caused by transfers of specified collateral. Such pay-
ments should be recovered separately under section 547(b) because sec-
tion 547(c)(5) does not protect payments at all. On the other hand,
such payments do not reduce the protection afforded to collateral trans-
fers under section 547(c)(5). Consider the following illustration:
CASE 15. The secured party, S, had a floating security interest in D's
inventory. On January 1, the inventory was worth $50,000 and D owed
$100,000. During the next ninety days, D sold $30,000 in inventory and
acquired $50,000 in inventory. D also made payments to S totaling
$20,000. S extended no further credit. On April 1, a petition is fied. D
owns $70,000 in collateral and apparently owes S $80,000.
What can the trustee avoid? What is protected by section 547(c)(5)?
To begin with, the order in which inventory was acquired and sold
during the critical period has no bearing. Fluctuations in the gap are
not relevant under section 547(c)(5). The gap need only be measured at
the two points of comparison."° The original gap, ninety days before
305. An interesting, although minor problem, arises under the term "proceeds," which is not
defined for § 547(c) purposes. Under U.C.C. § 9-306, proceeds "includes whatever is received
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." Article 9 case
law has supported the use of tracing in order to identify proceeds in nonseparate bank accounts, as
required by § 9-306(2), for the continuation of a security interest. See, e.g., Michigan Nat'l Bank
v. Flowers Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690, 217 S.E.2d 108 (1975).
When the debtor is in bankruptcy, however, the creditor's traceable rights in nonseparate ac-
counts ceases. Instead, the creditor receives the statutory substitute defined in § 9-306(4)(d). In a
notable opinion, the Ninth Circuit declared the § 9-306(4)(d) interest to be a preference under § 60
of the old Bankruptcy Act. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S 946 (1977). Of course, the Ninth Circuit broadly defined the substitute award available
under U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d). Moreover, the § 9-306(4)(d) award was only preferential to the extent
it exceeded the traceable proceeds. 543 F.2d at 657. See also In re Dexter Buick-GMC Truck Co.,
2 Bankr. 242 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1980).
Regardless how § 9-306(4)(d) fared under § 60, it may have greater difficulty under the Code. It
is not certain that the § 9-306(4)(d) interest would be considered as "the proceeds" of inventory or
receivables for § 547(c)(5) purposes. Moreover, it may very likely be considered a statutory lien
under § 545(l)(A) or (B). For an opinion to the contrary, see J. WHITE & R. SUMNIERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1017 (2d ed. 1980).
306. The final language of § 547(c)(5) retains the policy derived from the Commission Report
that "[intervening fluctuations in the relationship between debt and collateral during the [three]
month period [should be] ignored...." COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 1), supra note 8, at 209; GIL-
MORE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 216.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the petition, was $50,000 ($100,000-$50,000). On the date of bank-
ruptcy, the apparent debt is $80,000 and collateral is worth $70,000.
That gap has been reduced by $40,000. Can the trustee avoid $40,000
in security interests? Section 547(c)(5) protects all transfers of specified
collateral up to the point that the transfers cause a reduction in the gap.
Transfers beyond that point, those which cause a reduction, may still
be avoided. In Case 14, only $20,000 of the reduction was caused by
collateral transfers. Therefore, $20,000 in collateral is avoidable. The
payments caused the further reduction. The $20,000 in payments are
recoverable as preferences under section 547(b).
The trustee might attempt to avoid additional collateral transfers in
such cases by ignoring the effect of avoided payments on the level of
debt important to the section 547(c)(5) calculation. Consider the fol-
lowing illustration:
CASE 16. On January 1, D owed S $100,000, secured by a floating
lien on D's inventory. At that time, the inventory was worth $50,000. On
January 5, D acquired $50,000 in additional inventory. Thereafter, ap-
proximately $50,000 in inventory was sold and $50,000 in inventory was
acquired. On January 15, S loaned $50,000 to D. On March 1, D paid S
$50,000. On April I a petition was filed.
What can the trustee avoid? On the date of bankruptcy, the debt
appears to be the same as ninety days previous ($100,000) and collat-
eral has grown in value by $50,000 to $100,000. The gap appears to
have narrowed by $50,000 to zero ($100,000-$100,000). The $50,000
payment made on March 1, however, can be avoided. Because the
$50,000 advance on January 15 was prior to the preference of March 1,
none of this preferential payment is protected by section 547(c)(4). 30 7
The trustee might argue that the exception in section 547(c)(5) makes
$50,000 in collateral transfers avoidable regardless of what payments
can be recovered. In other words, the trustee might attempt to peg the
"debt secured" figure at bankruptcy at $100,000 for purposes of com-
puting the section 547(c)(5) gap. Such a reading of the section would
permit an unwarranted double recovery and the statute does not re-
quire it. Instead, the debt on the date of bankruptcy should be adjusted
upward to the extent that preferential payments are recovered. These
recovered payments have the effect of raising the creditor's bankruptcy
307. These prior advances cannot be set off against subsequent preferential transfers under
§ 547(c)(4) and should not be protected under a net result rule derived from the cases interpreting
the language transplanted from old § 60. See supra text accompanying notes 161-207.
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claim and the gap should be measured using that adjusted amount in
applying section 547(c)(5).308 In Case 16, the $50,000 payment is recov-
erable and the adjusted debt, the "debt secured" figure, should be
$150,000 for purposes of section 547(c)(5) ($100,000 + $50,000). Col-
lateral at bankruptcy is worth $100,000. The gap, therefore, is the same
as it was ninety days before bankruptcy ($50,000). The trustee, having
recovered the $50,000 payment, does not have a claim to any collateral
and he does not recover twice for the same improvement in the credi-
tor's position.
This integration of sections 547(b) and 547(c)(5) is consistent with
the policy of section 547(c)(5): to protect collateral transfers in speci-
fied collateral as long as the creditor's position is not improved. More-
over, this integration has the further advantage of permitting the
trustee to get cash first. The creditor, having lost the cash, keeps collat-
eral in its stead, an asset for which he has bargained by securing his
debt and for which he has the responsibility of oversight and
maintenance.
The fact that section 547(c)(5) only protects collateral transfers sug-
gests the proper course of action for secured creditors dealing with a
financially troubled debtor. The creditor must closely monitor the
debtor and exert tighter control over collateral. Most standard security
agreements contain a requirement of a certain collateral-to-debt ratio-
often in excess of 1:1. A debtor who is not carefully policed may sell off
collateral or liquidate accounts when experiencing extreme financial
difficulty.319 If the creditor belatedly discovers that he has become un-
dersecured, he might force the debtor to rectify the situation by making
payments. Moreover, if periodic monitoring reveals further deficien-
cies in the level of collateral, the creditor might demand further pay-
ments to correct this. Is this the correct course of action in anticipation
of a possible bankruptcy? Consider the following illustration:
CASE 17. S loaned money to D secured by a floating lien in D's
inventory. The security agreement required a collateral-to-debt ratio of
308. Such a readjustment would make the "debt secured" language of § 547(c)(5) consistent
'ith the way in which an allowed secured claim is determined under § 506 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.
309. When inventory is the collateral, the debtor's proper course would be to replace inventory
or place the proceeds in a separate deposit account. The creditor has a security interest in these
pro.ceeds. Similarly, in order to maintain the level of collateral, the account proceeds should be
segregated. The creditor can release the security interest in these funds in return for payment and
qualify for § 547(c)(1) protection in any subsequent bankruptcy. See supra note 232.
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5:4. On January 1, however, D owed $100,000 but only had $80,000 in
inventory. S discovered this on January 15 and demanded $36,000 in
payments under threat of default and repossession of all inventory.
Struggling to avoid triggering a bankruptcy, D paid the $36,000 to restore
the collateral-to-debt ratio. Moreover, S began to institute more frequent
checks on collateral. Each subsequent check revealed a further reduction
in collateral. In each instance S demanded and received payments. D
made payments of $4000, $2000, $6000 and $4000. In the last days before
bankruptcy, D sold $12,000 in inventory, but made no payments to S. On
April 17, a bankruptcy petition was filed. At that time, D apparently
owed S $48,000 and had $48,000 in collateral. D acquired no inventory
during the critical period.
Can the trustee avoid any of these payments? During the critical
period, S received $52,000, which the trustee should be able to avoid.
The payments comprising the $52,000 enable the creditor to "receive
more" within the meaning of section 547(b). Without the payments, S
would have realized $48,000 in collateral against a claim of $100,000,
leaving $52,000 unsecured. With the payments, S is fully secured; he
will realize $48,000 in collateral as security for his $48,000 claim. In
addition, he has $52,000 in cash. None of the payments, measured on
the date of bankruptcy, was secured and they may all be avoided.3 10
The creditor might try to argue that due to section 547(c)(5), only
$20,000 should be avoided. He could argue that on January 1, the gap
was $20,000 ($100,000 - $80,000). On the date of the petition, the gap
had been narrowed to zero. Section 547(c)(5), however, only protects
transfers of collateral, not payments.31' In Case 17, no collateral trans-
310. Since the collateral will be applied against the existing claim of the creditor, payments
already made should first be applied against the unsecured portion of the loan. See In re McCor-
mick, 5 Bankr. 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980), and cases cited supra at note 268. Since the creditor
entered the critical period undersecured, all payments will enable him to receive more regardless
of the final state of collateral. If the level of collateral had risen to make available "surplus"
collateral, theoretically securing any preferences which were returned, those collateral acquisitions
would be preferential. In other words, his oversecured position, upon which he bases his claim
that payments were not preferential, is preference-built.
For example, suppose S entered the critical period owing $100,000 secured by $50,000 in inven-
tory. During the critical period, D raised the level of collateral to $100,000 and also paid S
$50,000. S might argue that the payments were not preferential because they don't enable him to
receive more. He would argue that if the $50,000 in payments are avoided, he will merely acquire
the right to an additional $50,000 in collateral. This argument would be specious. If the payments
were avoided, the debt would be $100,000. The acquisition of collateral has reduced the gap from
$50,000 to zero. The trustee will also avoid $50,000 in collateral transfers, and S will be unsecured
for $50,000.
311. See supra text accompanying note 306 (discussion of Case 15).
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fers occurred during the critical period. Section 547(c)(5), therefore,
could not protect any of these transfers.
An alternative course of action exists that will better protect a se-
cured creditor if a troubled debtor goes bankrupt. Section 547(c)(5)
suggests that the creditor seek a restoration of collateral. If S had
forced D to restore and maintain the collateral-to-debt ratio by acquisi-
tion of additional collateral, he would be in a better position. Had D
nevertheless filed a petition on April 1, S would have been unsecured
for only $20,000. In other words, the trustee would have avoided these
transfers of collateral only to the point beyond which the section
547(c)(5) gap was restored to its January 1 level. If D avoided bank-
ruptcy for ninety days after the collateral was restored, S would be
wholly protected as long as he made sure the level of collateral re-
mained adequate at all times.312
2. The 'Prejudice" Requirement in Section 547(c) (5)
Perhaps the most difficult limitation of section 547(c)(5) is the re-
quirement that any reduction in the gap caused by collateral transfers
also be "to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims."
The history of this limitation makes absolutely clear that the drafters
were trying to protect secured creditors in two situations: when col-
lateral fluctuated in value after acquisition and when the debtor ex-
pended funds to ready collateral for sale.3 13
3 ( 2. If S wished to allow D to operate with somewhat less inventory, he could arrange for a
release of security in exchange for a payment. This transaction would qualify for § 547(c)(1)
protection. IfS really could not trust D to maintain the level of collateral, he would be faced with
either accelerating the loan and repossessing collateral or instituting a radically stringent policing
method. For example, S might institute a trust receipts or warehousing system by which D could
only 'eli collateral by agreeing to forward the proceeds to S in exchange for a release. Then S
would arrange to make new loans to enable the purchase of additional collateral. The payments
and releases would qualify for § 547(c)(1) protection. The acquisitions of collateral and new loans
would qualify for protection under sections 547(c)(3), (c)(4), or (c)(5). See supra note 232.
313. The limitation was prompted by a letter by Professor Kripke to the Gilmore Committee.
Apparently, Professor Kripke noted that certain increases in value of collateral could cause an
improvement of position and would not be protected by the receivables and inventory exception.
St' CO NISSiON REPORT (pt. I), supra note 8, at 209-10 (partial summary and excerpt of Kripke
letter to Gilmore Committee, September 17, 1970). There was some confusion in the Commission
Report about the meaning of the Kripke letter. In Note 17 to the preference section, the Commis-
.ion arguably implied that increases in value because of "e.g., harvesting crops, completing work
in progress, sales of inventory, and seasonal fluctuations in value" would cause improvement
without any expense to the estate. COMISSiON REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 172. This is
probably not what the Commission intended because the portion of the Kripke letter quoted in
part I of the report explicitly refers to the problem in the work-in-process context. Kripke indi-
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In the first instance, a secured creditor might acquire new inventory
to replace sold inventory. After the debtor acquired the inventory, it
might appreciate in value. Under section 547(b), the transfer of collat-
eral would be preferential and the trustee could avoid the security in-
terest entirely. Under section 547(c)(5), the security transfer would be
protected, but only to the extent that the subsection (c)(5) gap was not
reduced. If the collateral had appreciated, the gap might be reduced,
but without additional resources of the estate being utilized. Congress
could have decided to allow the unsecured creditors to enjoy this wind-
fall. Instead they chose to leave the benefit of this appreciation with
the secured party.
The situation in which the prejudice requirement protects the credi-
tor should be distinguished from situations in which the creditor is not
protected because the gap is narrowed with "prejudice." Compare the
following illustrations:
CASE 18. On January 1, D owed S $200,000 secured by a floating lien
in D's widget inventory. Other circumstances, unrelated to widget sales,
had caused D great financial difficulty. On January 1, D owned 10,000
widgets with a wholesale value of $10 each. During January, D sold
$20,000 of these widgets. D had a contract with its supplier, Ace Widget,
to receive delivery of 2000 ten-dollar widgets every forty-five days unless
D gave notice by the thirty-fifth day. On February 10, Ace assembled
and shipped 2000 widgets to D. They arrived on February 12. At that
time, Ace notified D, as specified in the contract, that the per widget price
wouldbe $12 effective on the next shipment. Costs and market conditions
had pushed up the price. D scraped up the money to make a regular
timely payment for the February 10 shipment. D immediately notified
Ace, however, that it would not require the next scheduled widget deliv-
ery. D's financial difficulties resulted in a virtual shutdown of all its oper-
cated that only the increases in value after subtracting the costs expended by the bankrupt should
be protected. COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 8, at 210. The National Bankruptcy Con-
ference specifically objected to the possible inference to the contrary. See NBC BankruptcyAct of
1975, supra note 60, at 363-64. The Conference pointed out that all properly allocable costs
should be considered prejudicial. See infra note 314.
According to Professor Riesenfeld, the original language of § 4-607(d) in the Commission Bill,
"at the expense of the estate," was abandoned and the final language, "to the prejudice of other
creditors" substituted, at his suggestion, in order to "clear the legislative history" of any miscon-
ceptions created by Note 17. The final language itself added nothing. Since many language
changes were made from the early draft to the final text, often without explanation, the change
itself would not have cleared the legislative history. Professor Riesenfeld, and others, however,
have helped make an adequate record of the true application of the preudice limitation. S. RIE-
SENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 658 (3d ed. 1979).
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ations shortly thereafter. No widgets were sold after January. On April
I, when the bankruptcy petition was filed, D owned 10,000 widgets worth
$12 each. During the critical period D made no payments to S.
CASE 19. Assume the status of D and S on January 1 is the same as in
Case 18 above. During January and February, however, D sold 5000
widgets and acquired none. On March 2, D acquired and paid for 5000
widgets at $12 each. Unfortunately, 3 days later, the actions of other
creditors virtually stopped D's activities. On April 1, a bankruptcy peti-
tion was filed. At that time D owned 10,000 widgets worth $12 each, and
still owed S $200,000, having made no payments during the critical
period.
What can the trustee avoid in each case? In Case 18, security inter-
ests in 2000 widgets were the result of preferential transfers under sec-
tion 547(b). Since the transfers were security interests in inventory,
however, section 547(c)(5) applies. The gap on January 1 was $100,000
($200,000 - $100,000). At the time of bankruptcy it had narrowed to
$80,000 ($200,000 - $120,000). Although the gap had been reduced by
$20,000, the trustee cannot avoid any collateral transfers. Most of the
gap reduction was not caused by collateral transfers, but by an appreci-
ation of collateral acquired before the critical period. This apprecia-
tion was not the result of any transfer under section 547(b). Even the
portion of the gap reduced by the appreciation of collateral transfers
preferential under section 547(b) was not to the prejudice of the un-
secured creditors. The gain caused by this appreciation seems to be
protected under section 547(c)(5) despite a proportionate reduction in
the subsection (c)(5) gap. The legislative history of section 547(c)(5)
makes clear that reductions in the gap caused by collateral appreciation
unassociated with debtor expense should not result in the loss of sub-
section (c)(5) protection.31 4
314. For example, a spokesman for the National Bankruptcy Conference, testifying about the
Note 17 confusion, emphasized that the secured creditor should benefit from "an increase in value
resulting from inflation or other factors inherent in the product itself." 1976 House Hearings, supra
note 43, at 1842 (statement of Mr. Forman). At the same time, the Conference took pains to point
out that appreciation could be accompanied by hidden expenses to the bankrupt which were not
to be ignored. For example, the sale of collateral might increase the value of security in as much
as the proceeds of sale would be greater than the value of goods in the hands of the debtor. At the
same time, there might be expenses of sale. In Mr. Forman's statement, he indicated that both
"direct labor and a suitable portion of overhead charge involved in keeping the enterprise going"
would be "prejudicial" costs. Id The Conference indicated that even seasonal fluctuations can
involve some expense to the estate properly allocable to preserving and storing of goods. NBC
Bankruptcy Act of 1975, supra note 60, at 364.
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The application of this limitation is further clarified by comparing
the result in Case 18 to the result in Case 19. In the latter case the
section 547(c)(5) gap had been reduced by $20,000 from $100,000
($200,000 - $100,000) to $80,000 ($200,000 - $120,000). Appreciation of
widgets acquired before the critical period caused $10,000 of this reduc-
tion. The debtor, however, paid $60,000 to replace widgets that had
originally cost $50,000. Those preferential transfers, the acquisition of
5000 $12 widgets, caused $10,000 of the reduction of the gap. This
$10,000 expenditure came from funds which would have otherwise
been available to the unsecured creditors. Thus, unlike the situation in
Case 18, the trustee may avoid $10,000 in collateral transfers.
"Prejudice" within the meaning of section 547(c)(5) can also be
found in situations in which the debtor spends money to complete or
otherwise ready collateral for sale. The limitation was designed to re-
solve questions concerning the allocation of costs between the creditor
secured by work-in-process, the transferees who are paid to complete or
ready the inventory for sale, and the trustee. Operation of the
"prejudice" qualification in section 547(c)(5) suggests another problem
relating to the proper integration of sections 547(c)(5) and 547(b).
Goods which are completed or otherwise readied for sale normally in-
crease in value. This increase, however, will often exceed the costs as-
sociated with completion or sale. The debtor might pay production
employees and the utility company $10,000 and these production costs
might yield a $15,000 increase in the value of work in process.
Applying section 547(b) only, the direct transfers to the employees
and the utility company would be preferential. Again applying section
547(b) only, the transfers would also be "for the benefit" of the inven-
tory financer and thus recoverable from him by the trustee. The direct
transferees, the employees and the utility company, may be protected
against a trustee recovery by section 547(c)(1) or section 547(c)(2).
Does section 547(c)(5) provide a measure of protection for the indirect
transferee, the inventory financer? The trustee may argue that section
547(c)(5) has no application because the transfers were payments "for
the benefit" of the inventory financer, and not collateral transfers. Sec-
tion 547(c)(5) would then provide no protection because it applies only
to transfers of security interests and not to payment transfers which are
indirectly beneficial due to the fact that they increase the value of ex-
isting security. The legislative history, however, suggests that at least
for section 547(c)(5) purposes, this argument should be rejected.
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As the early discussions of H.R. 6 suggest, production expenses re-
lated to section 547(c)(5) collateral should be viewed as "transfers" of
"security interests."3"' Accordingly, production expense "transfers"
seem to be eligible for the limited protection of section 547(c)(5).
When these "transfers" are viewed as transfers of security, however, the
amount of the preference is uncertain. Neither section 547(b) nor sec-
tion 547(c)(5) makes clear whether the initially voidable transfer is
measured by the amount transferred to procure the improvement (cost)
or the resulting benefit from improvement (the increased value of the
inventory).
Considering the effect of section 547(b) alone, if the "transfer" of a
'security interest" is preferential, it ought to be recoverable in its ap-
preciated state. The structure of section 547(c)(5) further suggests that
transfers resulting from the debtor's payment of production expenses
are measured by the resulting increase in the value of the security. In
referring to the gap reduction calculus, section 547(c)(5) requires a two
point comparison of the "value of all security interests." The section is
technically silent and arguably neutral on whether each discrete trans-
fer is to be valued at cost or at the resulting increase in value. If the
transfers of security in the form of production expenses are valued at
cost, however, the prejudice language in section 547(c)(5) becomes ir-
relevant to the work-in-process case. Moreover, this valuation is incon-
sistent with the notion contained in section 547(b) that the trustee
315. It is clear from the Kripke letter and the Commission response, incorporated in substance
in § 547(c)(5), that the increase in value because of completion, harvesting or sale were to be
treated as transfers of security, generally protected by § 547(c)(5) subject to its limitations. If these
were not treated as seeuritj
, 
transfers, but as indirectpaiments which were § 547(b) preferences,
§ 547(c)(5) would not protect them at all, even if the § 547(c)(5) gap were not reduced. By treating
the increases as security transfers to the secured creditor, at most the "prejudicial" costs to the
bankrupt for finishing the goods can be avoided. If other goods had been sold and the proceeds
were no longer available, however, the trustee might not be able to avoid these transfers even to
that extent. The creditor would be protected except to the extent that the § 547(c)(5) gap was
reduced to the prejudice of the unsecured creditors.
Treating these as security transfers also helps to avoid certain problems with the § 547(b) defini-
tion. For example, in determining if the indirect transfer to the secured creditor is a preference,
which debt should be used to measure antecedence, the debt of the direct transferee or the secured
creditor? If the transfer is considered a security transfer when the secured creditor is being consid-
ered, the latter is obviously the correct choice. Moreover, should the secured creditor have the
benefit of the direct transferee's § 547(c)(2) defense to avoidance? If the allocation explicitly made
by § 547(c)(5) is to be followed, the answer is no. Improvement in collateral as a result of una-
voidable payments by the bankrupt is the precise problem at which the prejudice limitation of
§ 547(c)(5) is directed. If the transfer is treated as a security transfer, it is clearer that § 547(c)(2)
does not apply, since § 547(c)(2) is directed at payments.
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avoids preferential transfers of collateral in the collateral's fully appre-
ciated state.
The concept of prejudice was apparently included in section
547(c)(5) to prevent an unfair denial of protection when the gap is re-
duced at no cost or at a cost less than the reduction. The architects of
section 547(c)(5) seemed to assume that these production expenses were
"security transfers," and that a prejudice requirement was essential to
the gap reduction formula because the resulting "security transfer"
would often exceed in value the production costs incurred by the
debtor.316 Viewing these production expenses as transfers of a "secur-
ity interest" works well in the common work-in-process case where ex-
isting section 547(c)(5) collateral is improved during the critical period.
However appropriate for section 547(c)(5) purposes, this view of the
transfer as security seems less appropriate when section 547(c)(5) is not
at issue. If existing equipment increases in value because of repair, res-
toration or retooling paid for during the critical period, are the ex-
penses viewed as transfers of security? Can the trustee recover only the
cost of repair or can he recover the increase in value of the machine?
Consider the following illustration:
CASE 20. D manufactured duck decoys. On January 1, D owed SI
$100,000 on an outstanding loan secured by a perfected interest in the
decoys at all stages of production. The value of D's decoy inventory was
$50,000. Also on January 1, D owed SE $100,000 on an outstanding loan.
SE's loan was secured by an interest in all of D's woodworking equip-
ment. The equipment was valued at $50,000 on January 1.
Between January 1 and March 1, D turned blocks of wood into decoys.
In so doing D incurred production expenses of $10,000. Solely as a result
of these expenses, the inventory of SI increased in value by $20,000. No
other inventory was "transferred" to SI during the critical period and SI
made no further advances.
Between February 1 and March 1, D also paid repairmen and techni-
cians $5000 to repair and retool woodworking equipment. These ex-
penses increased the value of SE's equipment collateral by $10,000. A
bankruptcy petition was fied on April 1.
What amount can the trustee recover from SI? From SE? When the
production expenses are viewed as transfers of "security interests" the
entire increased value of the inventory appears to be vulnerable under
section 547(b). The creditor is not unfairly treated, however, when the
316. See supra notes 313 & 315.
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collateral is inventory. When the collateral is covered by section
547(c)(5) the transfers are protected to the extent that reductions in the
section 547(c)(5) gap do not prejudice other creditors. 17 Other credi-
tors could never be prejudiced beyond the production costs. Section
547(c)(5) provides the correct answer regardless of how the transfer is
characterized. The initial $50,000 gap ($100,000-$50,000) was reduced
by $20,000 to $30,000 ($100,000-$70,000). Only $10,000 of this $20,000
reduction, however, was "to the prejudice of other creditors." There-
fore, only $10,000 is recoverable from SI.
Although it is appropriate to treat production expenses as transfers of
"'security interests" when section 547(c)(5) can be applied, it may not be
appropriate to do so when the collateral is not covered by this excep-
tion. The transfer to repairmen for the benefit of SE is not protected
by section 547(c). Therefore, the only appropriate question is: how
much is vulnerable under section 547(b)? Since section 547(c)(5) ap-
pears to turn on the assumption that improvements in inventory are
transfers of security interests, the same assumption might -arguably
hold for equipment as well. Under this view, the entire increase in
value of the machines would be vulnerable under section 547(b). It
would be unfortunate, however, if this assumption were applied to a
case outside the scope of section 547(c)(5). Apparently the drafters
never explicitly addressed the measurement of these indirect transfers
which improve the value of collateral not covered by section 547(c)(5).
As already noted, production expenses might ordinarily be viewed as
indirect payment transfers. Because section 547(c)(5) only protects
transfer of security interests, the treatment of these transfers as security
transfers under subsection (c)(5) was aimed at assuring that these trans-
fers would be eligible for the qualified protection of subsection (c)(5).
Any undesirable implications from this assumption are easily checked
by the "prejudice" requirement in section 547(c)(5). Since this artificial
characterization was designed to bring production expenses within the
protection of section 547(c)(5), there is no reason to extend the charac-
terization when subsection (c)(5) is not applicable. When equipment is
repaired or improved, this transfer, which benefits a secured creditor
such as SE in Case 20, should not be viewed as the transfer of a secur-
ity interest. It might be better viewed as apayment "for the benefit" of
317. Inventory as defined in § 547(a)(1) includes "raw materials and work in process, or
materials used or consumed". See supra note 301.
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the secured party (SE) and recoverable only as such. In Case 20, the
trustee ought not be able to recover more than $5000 from SE. The
trustee should not be able to recover $10,000 by characterizing the
transfer as the transfer of a security interest recoverable in its appreci-
ated state.
The integration of sections 547(b) and 547(c)(5) consistently yields
the proper result when inventory is improved. It does not matter
whether the inventory improved in the production process during the
critical period was acquired before or during the critical period. Sup-
pose in Case 20 the debtor had acquired new wood blocks during the
critical period and improved them in the production process. The new
block acquisitions will clearly be transfers of "security interests" ini-
tially vulnerable under section 547(b) but saved by section 547(c)(5) to
the extent that no prejudicial gap reduction resulted. Any reduction
would be prejudicial only to the extent of actual inventory acquisition
costs or production costs expended to complete the decoys. The bal-
ance of the added value, if any, is protected as a benefit to the secured
creditor resulting from the inherently greater value of completed goods.
In contrast, if new equipment was acquired during the critical period
and improved by the debtor's expenditures before bankruptcy, the
trustee can avoid under section 547(b) the entire security interest in the
transferred machine. Here, unlike the case of repair to a machine
owned at the beginning of the critical period, the transfer must be
treated as the transfer of a security interest and thus recoverable in its
appreciated state, even in the rare case where the cost of repair is much
less than the resulting increase in value.
The concept of prejudice in section 547(c)(5) raises another integra-
tion problem affecting only inventory and receivables. The determina-
tion of whether production costs involve prejudice might be affected by
whether the production costs were payments to third parties which the
trustee may avoid. The solutions discussed in Case 20 assume that the
payments to employees and utilities which were the components of
these production costs were not recoverable from the direct and pri-
mary transferees because of section 547(c)(1) or (c)(2). If the trustee
can recapture these payments from the direct transferees, is there any
prejudice under section 547(c)(5)? If not, then any gap reduction
caused by the resulting increase in value is not recoverable from the
secured party, not even to the extent of the production costs. The con-
cept of prejudice requires a net loss to the estate and if the payments to
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the direct transferees have been avoided, there is no such loss. The
trustee should only have one recovery.318
The separation of prejudicial and nonprejudicial increases in value
may often be difficult. Once again, the proper allocation of the burden
of proof is essential to the preference sceme. The burden will be on the
creditor to establish lack of prejudicial effect.3 19 When there is an indi-
cation of prejudicial effect and the creditor does not present sufficient
evidence to make an allocation, he will lose the protection of the
limitation.
V1. WORKING WITH THE NEW INTEGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF
COMMERCIAL FINANCING: SOME COMPLEX EXAMPLES
While new section 547 provides a solid conceptual foundation for
handling preferences generally, it is not easily applied to the many in-
terrelated transfers incident to a typical financing arrangement. In this
regard, Congress gave little attention to the relationship between the
various section 547(c) exceptions. In fact, the more visible legislative
history seems to assume that the section 547(c) exceptions operate inde-
pendently of each other.3 20 There are also conceptual problems with
integrating section 547(b), in particular subsection (b)(5), with the sepa-
rate section 547(c) exceptions. These problems are solved, however, by
applying the provisions of sections 547(b) and 547(c) in simple mechan-
ical steps.3 z
In typical after-acquired property financing arrangements, matters
are further complicated. If activity during the critical period merely
involved acquisitions and sales of inventory or generation and liquida-
tion of receivables, a simple two-point comparison of the section
547(c)(5) gap would suffice. The calculations might be further compli-
cated by evidence that reductions in the gap were not "prejudicial" to
unsecured creditors. Even this problem is really a question of proof
31 8. It would seem that the secured creditor, not the other transferees, is better protected by
the tatute. The other transferees are preferred under the "receives more" test and are protected
only by subsections (c)(1) or (c)(2) Of course, employees do have limited § 507 priority which
may make some transfers to them nonpreferential under the § 547(b)(5) test. See supra text ac-
companying notes 145-52. To the extent that the trustee has recovered payments, however, there
VS no prejudicial effect. Since the § 547(c)(5) exception provides total protection except to the
extent indicated, the secured creditor has the advantage.
319. See supra note 76.
320. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 373; SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 88.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 208-23 & 284-319.
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and does not overly complicate the preference section. Unfortunately,
the difficulties do not stop here.
In many instances, there will be considerable activity between the
financing creditor and his debtor. In addition to acquisitions and dis-
positions of collateral, the critical pre-petition period will include ad-
vances by the creditor to the debtor and payments by the debtor to the
creditor. Payments might satisfy a portion of the principal of the debt
and/or might be applied towards accrued interest.322 Some payments
or transfers of security interests might involve subsection (c)(1) or (c)(3)
exceptions. A theory of integrating the subsection (c) exceptions is nec-
essary to properly classify the transactions for section 547 purposes.
The most important and most difficult section 547(c) integration
problem is the relationship between subsections (c)(4) and (c)(5). At
first glance, integration of these two exceptions seems to involve an ir-
reconcilable circularity problem. In order to compute the section
547(c)(5) gap, the court needs to calculate the "debt secured" on the
date of petition. To prevent a double penalty to the creditor, the deter-
mination of the "debt secured" figure must reflect the increase in the
creditor's claim as a result of the avoidance of preferential payments. 23
The extent to which these payments are avoidable will depend in part
on the application of section 547(c)(4). At the same time, section
547(c)(4) protects the creditor from avoidance of preferential payments
to the extent of subsequent advances "not secured by an otherwise una-
voidable security interest." 24 The circle appears complete when it is
noted that whether an advance is "secured" for section 547(c)(4) pur-
poses seems to depend on the extent to which collateral is protected by
section 547(c)(5). Once again, the key to breaking the circle is sug-
gested by the statute itself. Moreover, the solution is wholly consistent
with the basic purposes and policies of the preference section. Con-
sider the following illustration:
CASE 21. D Corp. was a wholesale distributor of stereo equipment.
On January 1, D owed S $1,000,000 secured by a floating lien in D's
322. In Case 22, infra text accompanying notes 334-46, payments are applied towards both
principal and interest. In many hypothetical cases treated in this Article, the facts assume pay-
ments are toward principal and no interest is being earned. This concession to simplicity has not
been critical in any problem. As Case 22 demonstrates, a more realistic situation does not pose
particularly difficult problems.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 305-08 (discussion of Case 15).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 291-94.
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inventory and proceeds, which were worth $800,000. On January 2, D
acquired $200,000 in inventory and paid S $150,000. On January 15, S
advanced an additional $100,000 to D. On February 1, D paid S $50,000.
On February 5, D acquired $100,000 in new inventory. On February 12,
S advanced an additional $60,000 to D. On March 5, D acquired
$150,000 in additional inventory. On March 10, S advanced an addi-
tional $50,000 to D. On March 25, D paid S $75,000. On April 1, a
bankruptcy petition was filed. Between January 1 and April 1, D sold
inventory valued at $400,000. On April 1, D had $850,000 in inventory
and $50,000 in available proceeds of inventory sold, for a total of
$900,000 in collateral. 2 5
What payments and security interests may the trustee avoid? During
the critical period, the debtor has made $275,000 in payments which
are section 547(b) preferences. If all of these payments are avoidable,
the "debt secured" figure would be adjusted to $1,210,000.326 This
would be the maximum "debt secured" figure in the section 547(c)(5)
calculation. Based on this adjustment, the section 547(c)(5) gap, which
was $200,000 on January 1 ($1,000,000 - $800,000), would be expanded
to $310,000 ($1,210,000 - $900,000). S, however, had made $210,000 in
advances, some of which will qualify for section 547(c)(4) credit. But
how much?
325. The facts of this hypothetical case are summarized in the following chart. For simplic-
ity',. sake, the hypothetical ignores the effect of accruing interest and unrealistically assumes all
payments are applied toward reducing the principal. Case 22 makes more realistic assumptions
about payments. The chart also only gives the value of collateral on January I and April 1, the
dates of the two-point comparison under § 547(c)(5). Intermediate fluctuations are irrelevant; the
dates of collateral acquisitions are given in order to show the maximum in transfers of security
which would be vulnerable without § 547(c)(5).
Inventory Value of Payments Advances Balance on
Date Acquisitions Collateral to S to D D's Books
1/1 800,000 1,000,000
1/2 150,000 850,000
1/5 200,000 850,000
1/15 100,000 950,000
2/1 50,000 900,000
2/5 100,000 900,000
2/12 60,000 960,000
3/5 150,000 960,000
3/11 50,000 1,010,000
3/25 75,000 935,000
4/1 900,000 935,000
326. This upward adjustment is made to prevent a double recovery by the trustee. See supra
text accompanying notes 305-08 (discussion of Case 15).
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First, no more than $200,000 in advances can qualify. The January
15 advance of $100,000 can save part of the January 2 preferential pay-
ment of $150,000. The $60,000 advance of February 12 can protect all
of the $50,000 payment of February 1 and $10,000 of the yet unpro-
tected portion ($50,000) of the January 2 preferential payment. The
$50,000 advance on March 10, however, can only protect the yet unpro-
tected prior payments-40,000 from the January 2 preferential pay-
ment. Section 547(c)(4) does not protect any of the subsequent
payments on March 25. At minimum, the trustee can avoid that
$75,000 March 25 preferential payment. We can, therefore, prelimina-
rily compute the trustee's minimum payment recovery and the minimum
"debt secured" figure for section 547(c)(5) purposes.327
The minimum payment recovery and the minimum "debt secured"
figure provide an important preliminary calculation for section
547(c)(5) purposes. In Case 21, the minimum section 547(c)(5) "debt
secured" after adjusting the debt for the minimum payment recovery
of $75,000 is $1,010,000 ($935,000 balance on D's books plus $75,000).
With $900,000 in collateral, the subsection (c)(5) gap would be reduced
from $200,000 to $110,000 ($1,010,000-$900,000). Thus the trustee
could avoid $90,000 in security interests, the maximum collateral avoid-
ance, if all $200,000 of possible subsection (c)(4) credit was "un-
secured." By the same token, the creditor, S, under this preliminary
calculation, would only be entitled to keep $810,000 in collateral, the
minimum available collateral.
For each dollar of the possible $200,000 subsection (c)(4) credit
which is disqualified, the trustee will be able to avoid an additional
dollar in payments, and the section 547(c)(5) "debt secured" figure will
be adjusted one dollar upwards. 328 This in turn will protect one addi-
tional dollar in collateral by permitting the creditor to keep it without
narrowing the gap. In Case 21, $90,000 worth of collateral is available
to be "picked up" as a result of any upward adjustment of the section
547(c)(5) "debt secured" figure. Therefore, if $90,000 of the possible
subsection (c)(4) credit is disqualified, S will keep $90,000 in additional
collateral. The disqualification of this possible subsection (c)(4) credit
327. The minimum payment recovery is the amount of preferential payments which, regard-
less of security, does not qualify for § 547(c)(4) credit. The minimum "debt secured" figure for
§ 547(c)(5) purposes is the debt adjusted upwards for those payments which will certainly be
avoided, the minimum payment recovery.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 305-08 (discussion of Case 15).
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validates otherwise avoidable security interests. In other words, the
possible subsection (c)(4) credit should be considered as "secured by an
unavoidable security interest" to the extent that collateral which would
otherwise be unprotected under section 547(c)(5) can be protected.329
This collateral becomes protected when the possible subsection (c)(4)
credit is disqualified resulting in more payment avoidance and a larger
"debt secured. 330 The remaining credit, $110,000 in Case 21, is both
unsecured and subsequent to preferential payments. Only to this ex-
tent does section 547(c)(4) make advances available as a set-off against
otherwise avoidable payments. The remaining $165,000 in payments
can be avoided. When this $165,000 is added to thefinal "debt se-
cured" figure, however, the trustee will not be able to avoid any secur-
ity interests. 33'
This method of integrating sections 547(c)(4) and 547(c)(5) is not
only consistent with the language of the statute, but is consistent with
the entire preference scheme. The trustee's burden is eased by facilitat-
ing avoidance of the maximum amount in payments and protecting in
return the maximum in collateral. 332 The costs and risks of actually
realizing the value of collateral are placed on the party who bargained
for the collateral as security, not on the trustee as representative of
other creditors.
Only one other refinement of the integration of subsections (c)(4) and
(c)(5) is necessary. Possible subsection (c)(4) credit would not qualify
to the extent that it is secured by collateral not covered by subsection
(c)(5). This credit should be disqualified first, along with advances
which are not subsequent to preferential transfers. In Case 21, if the
January 15 advance had been secured by an unavoidable security inter-
est in two of D's delivery trucks, each worth $10,000, only $80,000
would be available under subsection (c)(4). The next two advances,
32). For example, if only $150,000 in § 547(c)(4) credit were available, the trustee could avoid
$50,D0O in payments, in addition to the $75,000 already certainly avoidable. This would result in
the § 547(c)(5) "debt secured" figure being adjusted upwards to $1,060,000. Therefore, the
§ 547(c)(5) gap would then be $160,000, a reduction of only $40,000. The trustee could avoid
$40,0(K0 in collateral transfers, leaving the creditor $860,000 in collateral. The disqualification of
$50,100 in § 547(c)(4) credit resulted in protection of an additional $50,000 in collateral.
330. Any new value should be considered to be secured by an "unavoidable security interest"
to the extent that the new value validates under § 547(c)(5) otherwise avoidable security interests.
See supra text accompanying Case 14.
331. After the payments are avoided, the § 547(c)(5) "debt secured" figure on the date of the
petition will be $1,100,000. The value of collateral will be $900,000 for a gap of $200,000, the
same as on January 1.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 306-09 (discussion of Case 16).
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however, would qualify as possible subsection (c)(4) credit, for a total
of $190,000. Of this amount, $90,000 would still be secured by avail-
able subsection (c)(5) collateral. Only the remaining $100,000 would
qualify under subsection (c)(4) and the trustee could avoid $175,000 in
payments, but still no security interests in collateral would be
avoidable.333
Once the major integration problems in section 547 are overcome, it
becomes relatively easy to deal with any additional levels of complexity
incident to commercial financing. The debtor may have made pay-
ments toward accrued interest. Collateral may have appreciated in
value which may be due only in part to the use of the debtor's re-
sources. The creditor may have released some collateral for bulk sale
to allow the debtor to reduce his costs. The debtor may have paid over
some or all of the proceeds of collateral to the creditor. None of these
or other conceivable complications pose overly difficult problems for
the trustee or the court. Consider the following illustration:
CASE 22. D Corporation was engaged in the business of assembling,
selling and installing heating systems. Although D manufactured no
components, it did purchase other components and combine them into
systems of its own design. D Corporation was experiencing extreme
financial difficulty because of bad credit decisions and high interest rates.
S Bank was a major creditor of D, secured by a floating lien in D's inven-
tory and accounts. On January 1, D owed S $2,000,000 secured by
$1,500,000 in inventory and accounts.
On January 15, D paid S $110,000. Of this amount, $10,000 was inter-
est for the first two weeks in January. On February 1, D paid S $109,500,
$9500 of which was accrued interest. On February 15, D made an interest
payment of $9000. On February 21, S loaned D an additional $150,000.
On March 1, D paid accrued interest of $9375. At that time, S also gave
written permission to D to sell $450,000 in collateral to X Inc. The pur-
pose of this sale was to reduce the level of inventory. D agreed to pay
over to S the proceeds of the sale. D made this payment of $450,000 on
March 8. On March 15, P paid S $108,625. Of this amount, $8625 was
interest. P paid no further money to S.
On April 1, a bankruptcy petition was filed. The value of inventory,
333. This hypothetical assumes that the transfer of the security interest in equipment was not
avoidable. This would occur if the equipment secured only the advance and the security interest
were properly perfected within 10 days. The transfer of security would then relate back to the
date of the security agreement under § 547(e)(2), and the transfer would not be for antecedent
debt. Even if the transfer is for an antecedent debt, it might qualify for protection under
§ 547(c)(1).
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accounts and proceeds on the date of the petition was $1,300,000. This
figure is the result of activity not specifically itemized above. This activity
included the sale of additional inventory and the liquidation of some ac-
counts. This also included inventory and accounts acquired during the
critical period which are still on hand and are worth $750,000. D ex-
pended funds assembling heating systems, which increased the value of
some of the inventory. Some completed systems were installed and gen-
erated the accounts referred to. Uninstalled systems remain as available
inventory. Costs such as salaries and utility bills were incurred in order to
assemble and install various components. Although these expenditures
helped to increase the value of available collateral, the S Bank can prove
that $75,000 of this increase is due to factors other than properly allocable
costs. Some of these other factors include inflation, market conditions,
and the inherent value of completed collateral.
Finally, the creditor's claim includes $7000 in unpaid interest that ac-
crued between March 15 and the filing of the petition. It presently ap-
pears from the books, before taking into account preference avoidance,
that D owes S $1,407,000. 3
3 4
What transfers may the trustee avoid? During the critical period, D
has made interest and principal payments to S totaling $796,500. All
of these payments to an undersecured creditor are preferential under
section 547(b).335 S, however, will attempt to assert that some of these
334. The facts of this hypothetical case are summarized in the following chart. In this in-
stance, payments are divided toward principal and interest. For simplicity's sake, the details of
inventory acquisition, completion, sale and installation are ignored. It is important to note, how-
ever, that S, the creditor, would bear the burden of proving that any reduction in the § 547(c)(5)
gap was not prejudicial. Once again, the chart merely details the value of collateral on January 1
and April 1, the dates of the two-point comparison under § 547(c)(5). The inventory and account
acquisitions and other costs are given merely to demonstrate the degree to which S would be
vulnerable without § 547(c)(5).
Value of Payments Payments toward Advances Balance on
Date Collateral to S Principal to D D's Books
1/1 1,500,000 2,000,000
1/15 110,000 100,000 1,900,000
2/1 109,500 100,000 1,800,000
2/15 9,000 0 1,800,000
2/21 150,000 1,950,000
3/1 9,375 0 1,950,000
3/8 450,000 450,000 1,500,000
3/15 108,625 100,000 1,400,000
4/1 1,300,000 1,407,000
335. S began the critical period undersecured. Although he appears to be oversecured on
April 1, this situation was caused by a combination of preferential payments and collateral
transfers.
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payments are protected by subsections (c)(1) and (c)(4). Moreover, a
substantial amount of collateral was acquired within the critical period.
Additional resources were expended by D to acquire the inventory,
complete it, ready it for sale, and to sell or install it, thereby generating
accounts. This acquisition of collateral, as well as expenditures to com-
plete or improve it, were preferential collateral transfers under section
547(b).336 S, however, will assert that section 547(c)(5) protects these
transfers, at least in part.
The first step in resolving this case is to deal with those section 547(c)
exceptions for which the date of transfer, not the date of petition is the
critical date.337 S has a strong claim that the March 8 payment of
$450,000 is not avoidable by virtue of subsection (c)(1). The release of
the collateral, or new value, was intended to be contemporaneous and
was in fact substantially contemporaneous. IfS successfully proves the
elements of subsection (c)(1), only $346,500 in payments remain vul-
nerable (the sum total of all other payments from D to S).
The parties to the dispute must now deal with the more difficult sub-
section (c)(4) and subsection (c)(5) integration. S has advanced
$150,000 which might qualify as subsection (c)(4) credit. The advance
was subsequent to $228,500 in preferential payments. Therefore, the
only issue is to what extent the $150,000 advance is "secured" for sub-
section (c)(4) purposes.
If the entire $150,000 qualifies under subsection (c)(4), $196,500
($346,500 - $150,000) will still be recovered by the trustee (the minimum
payment recovery). The minimum "debt secured" figure for subsection
(c)(5) purposes will be $1,603,500 ($1,407,000 + $196,500). Using this
amount, the court can make a preliminary determination of how much
collateral will be avoided if the entire $150,000 in new credit qualifies
336. The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended to treat expenses of comple-
tion as transfers of security under § 547(c)(5), and, therefore, under § 547(b) as well. See supra
notes 313 & 315. In Case 22, part of the accounts which came into existence during the critical
period would be proceeds of previously existing inventory. Part would also be generated by ex-
penditures made on that inventory, including sale, completion and installation. Case 22 merely
suggests substantial acquisitions and sales of inventory and generation and liquidation of ac-
counts. Because the collateral transfers incident to these events are all covered by § 547(c)(5), it is
unnecessary for the facts to indicate the precise extent of § 547(b) preferential transfers.
337. The exceptions in § 547(c)(1), § 547(c)(2) and § 547(c)(3) fit in this category. See supra
text accompanying notes 237-83. The § 547(c)(5) exception obviously depends on the situation on
the date of the petition. In order to determine the extent that new value advances are secured or
unsecured under § 547(c)(4), the situation on the date of the petition must be analyzed.
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under subsection (c)(4).3 38
On January 1, ninety days before the petition, the subsection (c)(5)
gap was $500,000. If all $150,000 in credit qualifies, the minimum
"debt secured" figure will be $1,603,500. The value of collateral on
April I was $1,300,000, for a gap of $303,500. The subsection (c)(5)
gap has been apparently reduced by $196,500. 339 Not all of this reduc-
tion however, is necessarily avoidable. The prejudice limitation of sub-
section (c)(5) must still be figured into the calculation.
The purpose of establishing the effect of the prejudice limitation is
clear if the next step is kept in mind. 34° At this preliminary stage, the
court should establish the maximum collateral avoidance, that is, how
much collateral is not protected by subsection (c)(5) if subsection (c)(4)
protects $150,000 in preferential payments. The court can then deter-
mine the extent to which additional collateral will become protected if
the subsection (c)(5) "debt secured" figure is further increased if addi-
tional payments are unprotected. Additional payments will be unpro-
tected if some of the $150,000 does not qualify as credit under
subsection (c)(4). To the extent that additional collateral is made avail-
able to the creditor, possible section 547(c)(4) advances are "otherwise
secured." 34' The first step is a preliminary section 547(c)(5) calculation
to determine how much collateral will be avoided if all of the possible
subsection (c)(4) credit can be used to reduce the otherwise recoverable
payments.342 This preliminary calculation will be accurate only if all of
the subsection (c)(5) qualifications are taken into account. To the ex-
tent that any reduction in the gap is not prejudicial, the trustee cannot
avoid it. Therefore, in calculating an accurate maximum collateral
avoidance, it is necessary to subtract any nonprejudicial reduction in
the gap.
In Case 22, S can apparently prove that $75,000 of the reduction in
the subsection (c)(5) gap was not prejudicial. Therefore, even if al
$150,000 qualifies under subsection (c)(4), only $121,500 of the
$196,500 reduction in the subsection (c)(5) gap may be avoided. If,
however, the trustee can avoid an additional $121,500 in payments, S
338. See supra text accompanying notes 328-32.
339. The original gap of $500,000 ($2,000,000 - $1,500,000) has been reduced to $303,500
($1,603,500 - $1,300,000), a reduction of $196,500.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 313-19.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 328-32.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 327-28.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
will be able to recover an additional $121,500 in collateral under sub-
section (c)(5). Therefore, this amount is otherwise "secured" for sub-
section (c)(4) purposes and only $28,500 qualifies for set-off under
subsection (c)(4).343
To summarize, the trustee may not avoid the March 8 payment of
$450,000. Of the remaining $346,500 in payments preferential under
section 547(b), $28,500 is protected by subsection (c)(4) set-offs and
$318,000 is avoidable. For subsection (c)(5) purposes, the "debt se-
cured" figure is adjusted upwards, reflecting the preference recovery of
$318,000, for a final "debt secured" figure of $1,725,000. The value of
collateral is $1,300,000 and the subsection (c)(5) gap has been reduced
by $75,000. S, however, can prove this reduction was nonprejudicial
and therefore no security interests are avoidable.
No special calculations were required in order to account for the fact
that payments were made toward both interest and principal. Certainly
the distinction has no effect on whether the payments were preferen-
tial.3" For subsection (c)(5) purposes, there is also no need for a dis-
tinction. The typical security agreement will almost certainly provide
that the collateral secures both principal and interest. The section 506
definition of a "secured claim" is based on the assumption that these
provisions are in the security agreement.345 The trustee and court
should take care to ensure that the subsection (c)(5) "debt secured"
figure at thefirst point of comparison includes unpaid interest accrued
until that date. Therefore, at both points in the subsection (c)(5) com-
parison, the "debt secured" figure will be consistent with the section
506 definition of a "secured claim." To the extent that accrued interest
remains unpaid or any interest payments are avoided, they are in-
cluded in the readjusted subsection (c)(5) "debt secured" figure on the
date of the petition. 46
343. See supra text accompanying notes 328-32.
344. The payments are either "for or on account of an antecedent debt." The creditor cannot
attempt to argue that the interest payments qualify for § 547(c)(2) protection. See mupra note 268
and cases cited therein.
345. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which,
after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such
claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any
reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which such claim
arose.
346. The creditor cannot successfully classify unpaid interest as new value advances under
§ 547(c)(4), even if he refinances the debt. If the creditor lends additional money to the debtor to
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VII. CONCLUSION
The new section 547 integration does not make the application of
preference law to commercial financing simple. If, however, the inte-
gration is applied in the proper sequence of small steps it yields a more
mechanical, predictable result-a result fairer to all creditors.
The first step is the proper application of section 547(b). The inte-
gration of definition and exception requires a strict, literal application
of section 547(b). The individual elements in the definition, the "ante-
cedent debt" and "receives more" requirements in particular, must be
relieved of much of the case law baggage they carried under section 60.
The second step is the proper ordering of definition and exception. The
status of each transfer must be separately and preliminarily determined
under section 547(b)(5) before their combined impact is judged and
before the exceptions in section 547(c) are applied. The third step is the
proper integration of the various exceptions. Both individual collateral
transfers and payments to a secured creditor may be protected under
more than one exception. When the creditor has a choice of exceptions
applicable to the same type of transfer, those exceptions which require
an evaluation at the time of transfer should be applied first. When the
combined effect of two or more types of transfer is critical to the opera-
tion of the exceptions, as it is when sections 547(c)(4) and 547(c)(5) are
applied to payments and collateral transfers, a preliminary calculus is
required. Once again the steps involved in the computation are
straightforward.
This relationship between the preference definition and the section
547(c) exceptions, and among the various exceptions, has been derived
from the structure of the statute and its drafting history. The mechan-
ics essential to the application of the section were in turn derived from
these relationships. Perhaps both the underlying relationships and the
mechanics should have been more explicitly detailed in the statute. In
this sense, section 547 is flawed. The unrealistically tight time limits in
section 547(c)(2) may be a further flaw. These problems, however, do
not justify changes which are inconsistent with the goals of the new
preference scheme.
The legislative design is basically sound. Hastily conceived and
drastic changes, such as the proposed reintroduction of the requirement
pay off accrued interest, this money will not qualify as new value under § 547(a)(2). The defini-
tion of new value "does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation."
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that the creditor "have reasonable cause to believe," go too far. They
undermine the mechanical efficiency of the new definition and displace
many of the carefully crafted limitations in the section 547(c) excep-
tions. These drastic changes would be unwise, at least at this time.
Some adjustment of the section 547(c) exceptions may be justified, such
as minor changes in subsection (c)(2). Even these changes, however,
should be cautiously considered so that the basic equality principle
does not give way to the special interests of particular creditors.
The new integration needs time-time in the courts to sort itself out
from the obsolete concepts born under section 60 and time to allow the
development of a new preference jurisprudence. Then, and only then,
will the fairness and efficiency of new preference section be proved or
disproved.
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